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

Athena's Justice

Athena, Athens and the Concept of Justice in Greek Tragedy

by

Rebecca Futo Kennedy

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

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Athena's Justice

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Vol. 16

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Rebecca Futo Kennedy

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kennedy, Rebecca F.
Athena's justice: Athena, Athens and the concept of justice
in Greek tragedy / Rebecca Futo Kennedy.
p. cm. — (Lang classical studies; v. 16)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Greek drama (Tragedy)—History and criticism. 2. Athena (Greek deity) in literature.
3. Athens (Greece)—In literature. 4. Justice in literature. I. Title.
PA3131K38 882'.0109353—dc22 2009005764
ISBN 978-1-4331-0454-1
ISSN 0891-4087

Bibliographic information published by **Die Deutsche Bibliothek**.
Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the "Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie"; detailed bibliographic data is available
on the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de/.

Cover image: Statue of Athena. Photo: Fotografica Foglia. Museo Archeologico
Nazionale, Naples, Italy (courtesy of Scala/Art Resource, NY)

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability
of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity
of the Council of Library Resources.

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29 Broadway, 18th floor, New York, NY 10006
www.peterlang.com

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Printed in Germany

For Elly

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Acknowledgments

There are many people whom I should thank for helping me start, continue with, and complete this project. There are people I should also thank who had no direct contribution to the project but provided assistance in more intangible ways. A short list includes: June Allison, Eric Cline, John Given, Alex Gottesman, Hans-Friedrich Mueller, Stacie Raucci, Peter Rose, Mark Toher, Alana Vincent, Tarik Wareh, and the members of TIHC. Your encouragement and assistance are much appreciated.

Additionally, I am grateful to the Humanities Development Fund at Union College for a research grant that has made completion of this project possible. I owe gratitude as well to Dan Garrison for his editorial direction and to Caitlin Lavelle and Jackie Pavlovic at Peter Lang for their assistance throughout the process.

A couple of acknowledgments need be made: a portion of Chapter 2 previously appeared as "Justice, Geography, and Empire in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*," *Classical Antiquity* 25 (2006): 35–72. Images are provided with permissions through Art Resource or courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum.

Abbreviations

ABV	J. D. Beazley, *Attic Black-Figure Vase-Painters*
AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AJPh	*American Journal of Philology*
ARV	J.D. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters*
BICS	*Bulletin of Classical Studies of the University of London*
BSA	*British School at Athens, Annual*
CA	*Classical Antiquity*
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CW	*Classical World*
CVA	*Corpus Vasorum Antiquorum*
G & R	*Greece and Rome*
HSPh	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
MH	*Museum Helveticum*
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
ZPE	*Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

• CHAPTER ONE •

Introduction

Athena and Athens

Athene the goddess is Athens itself—i.e., the real and concrete spirit of the citizens.
—G.W.F. Hegel

Athena was the patron deity of Athens: a simple statement which denotes a complex relationship. In reality, she was more than the patron. In myth, Athena gave her name to the city after being chosen over Poseidon as protector of that land (Apoll. 3.14.1).[1] She was the surrogate mother of the autochthonous child, Erichthonius, from whom the Athenians sprang.[2] In Homer, the name of Athena is synonymous with the rock of the Acropolis and it was upon that same Acropolis that the Athenians built Athena's great temple, the Parthenon.[3] The Panathenaia, reorganized in 566/5 BC, and the most important Athenian festival in the fifth century, was celebrated in her honor every four years.[4] She appeared on Athenian coins and on art spread throughout the city.[5] As Hegel so eloquently states, she was the city itself—the spirit that infused and informed every aspect of citizen life.[6]

For Hegel, as well as for many other scholars and philosophers, Athena represented moderation, justice and democracy. Unlike emotional and irrational divinities such as Aphrodite, Hera and Ares, Athena has been seen as a figure of reason and enlightenment, and the city she watched over as the seat of civilization. The city was what it was because its goddess was what she was and this was a relationship the Athenians actively fostered in their art.

Athena is understood in most Athenian art as an allegory or representative of Athens. Such an equation of goddess and city is accepted on Athenian monuments, but only in a handful of the Athenian tragedies in which she appears. It is clear that in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* she is the city and its institutions as much as she is the founder of the Areopagus court. In patriotic plays such as Euripides' *Ion* and *Suppliants*, she also seems to stand in as a representative of Athens' interests. She has not been considered as such in other plays, such as Sophocles' *Ajax*, Euripides' *Trojan Women*, or *Iphigenia Among the Taurians*. It would appear that she loses her status as allegory or representative of Athens when the play is not specifically about, or set in, Athens or when she is not the serene goddess we and others have come to expect. Athens, however, was not static in the fifth century: its political institutions, physical landscape, military power and international prestige underwent dynamic change. Why should we not expect the figure of Athena to reflect this change? As Athens underwent its transformation, Athena, its goddess and symbol, did so as well. The objective here is to trace this varying picture of Athena and attempt to understand how Athens' imperial transformations altered the ideals, specifically justice, upon which the democracy rested.

Tragedy, Civic Identity and the Athenian Empire

Simon Goldhill's research on the relationship between Greek tragedy and its performance venue, the Great Dionysia, brought the notion of civic ideology to the fore of tragic scholarship.[7] Since then, numerous studies have been published which attempt to discern how notions of citizen identity were created, supported, and deconstructed in various tragedies written and produced in fifth-century Athens.[8] Two areas of civic identity that have been little explored in tragedy, however, are the impact of the Athenian Empire on Athenian culture[9] and the evolution of political thought and its relationship to identity formation and projection in this very public art form. One aspect of such identity creation and promotion in tragedy that has been entirely ignored is how the patron deity of Athens, Athena, was represented as part of the process. How the Athenians chose to represent her in public contexts was intimately bound up to how they wished to represent their own collective image, including their democracy and the institutions associated with it. My specific interest in this study is what the representations of Athena in tragedies performed at the Great Dionysia can tell us about some ways in which the Athenians conceptualized justice, a fundamental aspect of Athenian democracy and democratic identity. Although these plays are written by indi-

viduals, these playwrights are part of the larger community and subject to the same cultural pressures as other Athenians. Through tragedy we can see both a bit of what the playwrights intended and how their intentions were shaped by their environment.

Scholars since Goldhill have almost all agreed that tragedy played a large role in civic discourse in Athens, serving as a public venue where issues such as the nature of their democracy, justice, war, and class and gender differences could be negotiated.[10] The use of myths as basic storylines allowed such issues to be played out without being overtly politicized or threatening stasis. Myths were not static but were adapted, altered, written and re-written in order to reflect the shifting sensibilities and needs of the city and her citizens. Part of this shifting involved the way the Athenians identified themselves both as citizens and as hegemons. The Athenians could view debates about their contemporary concerns but filtered through well-known stories which would provide both cultural and temporal distance.

Tragedy was a part of civic, not private, life for the Athenians. Participation in the tragic festivals was a function of citizenship. The plays were written by citizens, paid for by citizens, performed by citizens, watched by citizens and, in the end, voted on by citizens. Concepts such as *parrhesia* and *isonomia* applied to the theater as much as to the assembly. The playwrights spoke their piece as if defendants or prosecutors in the courts. The poets' job was to persuade their jury, the audience, and each had equal standing before the law of the tragic competition. Each citizen in the audience had as much chance as another at being selected by lot as judge for the day. The tragic competitions were as much an expression of Athenian citizenship as were juries and assemblies. In fact, during the performance of some tragedies, the audience was co-opted into the performance to serve as a jury. Also, tragedy was part of a symbolic order in Athenian political life wherein the Athenians manipulated images, history and myth in order to fashion a specific version of their own collective identity.

Because the Great Dionysia was also the venue where allies in the Delian League brought their tribute after 454 BC, it may also be said that the tragedies were not just about the Athenians negotiating their identity among themselves but about projecting an image of Athens to her allies and subjects as well. As Goldhill clearly demonstrated, the ceremonies surrounding the performance of the tragedies were about projecting Athenian power. The Great Dionysia was the glory of Athens and her empire on stage. An Athenian seeing such a display might think of how great his city must be to have gained such wealth. Perhaps he might think how powerful his city must be if others were willing (or compelled) to give this wealth to them. An ally, on the other

hand, might see one of two things in that display: either the glory of his position as a member of the Athenian family or his servitude.[11] Either way, it was Athens' power being projected out to the audience. The tribute in the orchestra was the fruit of its labors, the payoff for keeping the Persian menace at bay.

Given this close bond between tragedy and civic identity as well as the intimate political bond between the Athenians and their patron Athena, it is important that we consider her appearances in tragedy and how they may be significant in Athenian identity formation. We take such a thing for granted when discussing the Parthenon or the Panathenaia and yet do not apply the same framework to drama. The imperial implications behind tragedy have been largely left unmentioned, though now there is a growing literature in this direction.[12] Because the general scholarly consensus recently has been that the empire was always oppressive, even when scholarship on tragedy does address it, the analysis almost always tends to view tragedy as critical of it. The *archê* was bad and tragedy is good; therefore, tragedy must question empire. More recently, however, scholars have begun to reexamine the nature of the empire and whether it was as oppressive as has ofteny been believed.[13] Examining further the relationship between tragedy and the *archê* can help us better see its influence on fifth century culture especially since the relationship is far more nuanced than has widely been appreciated.

To suggest that staging Athena is apolitical is to define political too narrowly. In each of the plays in which Athena appears, justice is a central theme, and justice is a political concept. In addition, to suggest that a historicized, political reading means linking a text directly to specific events is to ignore the continuum of political thought that underscores all those individual events. The political context of a play is never only about a single event (like Ephialtes' reforms of the Areopagus) but about the climate that makes such an event even possible. In every instance, Athena is represented as an arbiter of justice, though the type of justice she proposes or enforces varies.

In *Eumenides* and Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*, she is the representative of a type of justice Athens very carefully cultivated as fundamental to their democracy, specifically associated with their court and jury system. We might call this Athena and the justice she affirmed the "official" justice of Athens—it was the image of Athenian democracy and justice which they wanted to promote to others. It is under this heading as well that most of the Euripidean representations fall. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, however, we see a darker side of Athena and her justice. Instead of being impartial and part of civic process, she is arbitrary and vengeful. She embraces exactly the type of justice the Athena in *Eumenides* is sent to disavow and replace. This Athena

and this justice, I argue, reflect the underbelly of Athens' imperialism. While they claimed their courts as an impartial type of justice to be admired and envied by all, the mechanisms they used to enforce such justice among their allies and subjects belied the very notion of justice as communal and fair, and this undercuts one of the foundations of their democracy as well as the goodwill upon which their early hegemony rested.

Athena in the Empire

Athena was, for the Athenians and others, synonymous with her city and, throughout the fifth century, Athena was positioned as patron deity of the Athenian empire as well. The Athenian *archê* had its origins in the Delian League, an ostensibly defensive alliance between the Athenians and the islanders of the Aegean against the Persians. Established in 478 BC, in the wake of the Athenian victory at Salamis, the League soon became not just a defensive alliance but also served as a front for the offensive activities of the Athenians against both those Greeks who had "medized" and the Persians themselves. The original divine patron of the Delian League was Apollo.[14] The League treasury was housed in his temple on Delos, and it was there that the Athenians and other members met for their congresses (Thuc. 1.96-7 and 3.11.4).[15] When the tribute was first assessed by Aristeides, one-sixtieth of the *phoros*, the *aparchê*, was set aside as a dedication to Apollo. When the League treasury was transferred to Athens in 454 BC, the *aparchê* was also transferred—to Athena.

It is little observed that with the transfer of the treasury the Delian League gained a new patron.[16] This must have been noted officially. The Delian League also appears to have become a new entity—the Athenian Empire, for there is little doubt that by 454 BC the Delian League had been transformed into the Athenian *archê*. This is not synonymous with saying that the Delian League had become oppressive. It simply means that the Athenians no longer made a show of being first among equals but, instead, wielded their authority much more openly. As patron of the *archê*, Athena enjoyed the *aparchê*, brought to Athens and displayed in the orchestra at the Great Dionysia each year, as well as the dedication of a cow and panoply by allied states at the Panathenaia every fourth year.[17] Some cities were even required to give her grain and other "first fruits."[18] Athena also appears to have enjoyed the fruits of others' labor on islands such as Aegina, Samos, Chalcis and Kos. *Horoi*, boundary stones demarcating cult precincts dedicated to Athena, queen of Athens or Athena Polias, are found on each island.[19] The *horoi* on Aegina are a most interesting case when considering the transfe-

rence of League patronage. The boundary stones, dated most probably to the mid 450s, are not the only sacred precincts designated on the island. Also found are *horoi* dedicated to Apollo and Poseidon, the previous patrons of the Delian League.[20] These were most likely dedicated in the immediate aftermath of Aegina's forced entry into the Delian League in 457 BC. The stones dedicated to Athena mark additional confiscations of land that accompanied the change in patron. The existence of the *horoi* allows us to see Athena as more than a patron and patriotic symbol for the city of Athens. She was partner to the Athenians and a representative for them in building and maintaining their *archê*.

Even before the transfer of the treasury to Athens, the Athenians appear to have begun promoting their patron Athena as a pan-Ionian patron and spreading her influence throughout the Aegean. The process of promoting Athena begins with elaborations upon the role of Athens in the Homeric tales most prominently after 490 BC.[21] Along with this process of enlarging the Athenian presence at Troy came an increase in the production of paintings which associated Athena with the Trojan War heroes (including Ajax). One prominent example is a scene made famous by Exekias of Ajax and Achilles playing draughts (Fig. 1). This scene appears with increasing frequency on Attic and other Greek vases with the insertion of Athena warning them of a coming attack (Fig. 2).[22] Another new scene is of the duel between Ajax and Hector from Book Seven. Athena stands behind Ajax while Apollo stands behind Hector (Fig. 3).[23] Perhaps Athena is meant only to stand as the general spirit of the divinities who fought beside the Greeks but her appearance on vases in scenes she had not earlier inhabited, especially with Ajax, suggests a desire to increase the prominence of their patron deity.[24] Included in this category as well is the dedication of a colossal bronze Trojan horse on the Acropolis.[25] The deeds of Athena at Troy had now become the deeds of all Athenians much like her deeds in the Giantomachy.

The official assimilation of Ajax as an Athenian eponymous ancestor by Cleisthenes also gave the Athenians a greater claim to glory than the barely mentioned exploits of Menestheus and Theseus' sons.[26] This assimilation seems to have begun in the sixth century and coincided with the conquest of Salamis. His adoption as an eponymous hero in 508 BC made his status as Athenian official and he was hereafter represented as such. Even Menestheus, however, was given greater glory as early as the 470s. An epigram found on the base of a herm in the Agora suggests that, based on Homer's praise of Menestheus, the Athenians could claim to be both marshals of war and a heroic people.[27] There is a focus as well on the rescue of Aethra by Acamas and Demophon at Troy which coincides with the increase in repre-

sentations of the *Ilioupersis* on Attic vases after the 490s BC. By the time we get to the middle of the fifth century, their deeds receive prominent display most notably on the Parthenon, is the Nekyia painting on the Cnidian Lesche, and on the Stoa Poikile.[28]

Already by the 470s, then, Athens had begun using the pan-Hellenic myths of Homer to increase its importance in history and to align itself undeniably in the minds of other Greeks with the deeds of Athena and the Athenian (and Salaminian) heroes at Troy. In 454 BC, Athena became the patron of the Delian League and Athens could point to its long association with her, and the military greatness that was connected with her in the great pan-Hellenic wars of the past, and justify the dominion they now claimed in the Aegean. The insinuating of Athens into the Homeric stories via Athena and Ajax's newly emphasized relationship, the spread of Athena's cult to allied states in the 450s and 440s, the dedications at the Panathenaia and the transfer of the patronage from Apollo to Athena along with the transfer of the treasury served not only to bind Athena and Athens together in the minds of Greeks but also to bind Athena and her worship in their minds with the Athenian *archê*.[29] This process continued in Athenian tragedy as shall be examined here.

Approach and Assumptions

This study is historical and ideological. My primary interest is in understanding the way the appearances of Athena in tragedies represent more general notions of Athenian identity, specifically with regard the empire and how ruling an empire altered some fundamental democratic ideals. One of the foundations of the Athenian democracy was its jury system, and as Athens emerged after the Persian Wars it was one of the components of the democracy exported to allies. It should be no surprise to find this democratic type of justice represented on Athenian public buildings, on pottery, and on the tragic stage—almost always with Athena (or her proxy Theseus) standing as judge. The connection between these representations and Athenian civic and imperial ideologies is evident. What remains for us is to understand how the Athenian audience conceptualized these connections. In other words, I am concerned with what issues were at stake in the Athenian rise to power and with how the Athenians addressed these issues as playwrights and as audience members. How did they formulate and then debate the questions surrounding the *archê* and their allies? To what extent did the ideological constructs surrounding the performance of the plays inform the Athenians' understanding of their own position as hegemons? What caused the explo-

sion of public works of art vested in the notion of a particular Athenian identity? And, perhaps most importantly, how does tragedy reflect the process of identity construction and deconstruction?

This is not the first political study of tragedy, but it is one of only a few to look at the political as something both overt and covert, and which sees allegory and ideology both as aspects of a larger system of thought or space where politics and culture interact. Most scholars agree with Susanne Saïd's assessment of tragic scholarship as a progression from studies on reflections of contemporary events and current politics to looks at committed theater and propaganda to, at last, studies of tragedy and political thought, each succeeding approach an improvement on that last.[30] But political does not necessarily mean committed or propagandizing theater, since ideology often creeps into art and texts unsuspected, and ideology is itself not innocent. Nor does the tendency of scholars to speak now of ideology or political thought render a text incapable of reflecting specific historical events or contexts. The categories of interpretation are not mutually exclusive. A play can simultaneously be allegorical, reflect contemporary events, or support, construct, and undermine ideologies. It is in the nature of art which always has at least two lives: the life intended by its creator and the life it forges all on its own in the world beyond the author's intent. Our goal is to examine the field within which these ideologies, allegories, intentionalities or incidents are enabled.

In many ways, then, this study of Athena straddles the line between the broadly political and the historical or allegorical.[31] On the one hand, studying the individual portrayals of Athena within the reality of the changing *archê* commits one to allegory in so far as the goddess is concerned as patron and representative of the city. The ties between Athena and Athens were too strong and too pervasive to be overlooked. While this type of allegorical search within tragedy is defective, it is mostly so because scholars have often sought references to individuals or specific events, and this is sometimes impossible from our distance and with large gaps in our knowledge. As David Rosenbloom suggests, "myth is formed by condensation and dramatization; it encodes more information than a single historical person or circumstance."[32] We may see influences of individual events, but those individual events also are enabled by the dynamic we seek to examine. The performance of a tragedy, the suppression of a revolt, and the erection of a new temple all happen within the same space, under the same influences and constraints, and they each act upon each other as they are acted upon.

To get at this space, in addition to reading tragedy as a product of its historical circumstances and as, in some ways, a reflection of those circumstances, I am interested in the larger dynamics involved in such an allegorical and historical understanding of tragedy. To my mind, the shift in the repre-

sentations of certain myths and characters on stage signals a shift in the way the Athenians conceived of the very issue of what justice was and how it should be arbitrated. Like Athenian attitudes toward freedom, their notion of justice must also have changed. While submission to the Persians was unthinkable in the 490s and 480s, submission to the Athenians came to be expected in the 430s. There must be a detectable trace of how such a shift in attitudes toward freedom among Greeks occurred and how they used their courts to enforce this new understanding.[33] The same must also be true of justice. Some scholars have sought insight into this issue by examining leadership as a theme in tragedy:

> Everyone agrees that "problems of public life" and relations among citizens and between citizens and non-citizens are among the major themes of tragedy...More specifically, tragic poets explored the problems of decision making and leadership, which were crucial for a society of free individuals.[34]

And yet, few consider that one major aspect of this leadership role would have dealt with the negotiation of Athenian identity between being free citizens of their polis and rulers over an *archê*, or that bound up with that negotiation would have been a reevaluation of the concept of justice, both as part of democratic practice and in dealing with the allies.

Absolutely essential to this study is recognition that the image of the goddess Athena was a fundamental element in the creation and maintenance not only of Athenian civic identity, but also of Athenian imperial identity. Her image was consciously used as a focalizer for Athenian patriotism and identity. Any connection made between the goddess and the city/*archê* forces us to recognize and consider the way in which her image was utilized by the Athenians in their self-promotion and self-definition. Worship and representation of Athena was a central fact of Athenian life.[35] Promotion of her cult was at the heart of Athenian democratic and imperial practice. Tracing the ways in which she was used in tragedy, within the framework of representation in other public art, and in her promotion in civic and imperial contexts, can only help us understand better the interactions between political, military and cultural life in fifth-century Athens.

In order to do this, I argue from an initial set of three premises. The first premise is that tragedy is a part of civic process. Following the arguments of Paul Cartledge who himself looks to Clifford Geertz, I accept that we can see the larger debates (political and social) of Athenian society playing out on the tragic stage.[36] The role of tragedy, in many ways, is to provide a space where civic relationships can be discussed, but in such a way that they are divorced from the reality of everyday practice. It is a reflective art form that can either force its audience to (re)consider basic assumptions about their

own practices and beliefs or serve to reinforce such assumptions. Tragedy, then, reflects the societal norms of those writing and performing it, but it also allows a space within which to debate those same norms.

The second premise is that "culture" is inherently chauvinistic.[37] The art and literature of a community is in many ways a manifestation of the sense of community and pride in that community. Embedded within any work of art will be the norms and attitudes of the members of the society that produced it. When that work is promoted, performed, or disseminated among those within the community, it fosters chauvinism. When presented to outside communities, it serves to spread and promote those norms as superior and desirable to others. Furthermore, because both imperialism and culture are frequently attached to and promote a patriotic vision of a community, they are also about recreating that community's identity elsewhere. Tragedy, as a public art form that was closely identified with Athens specifically, and performed not only for Athenians but for allies and other foreigners, served the interests of empire by promoting a certain version of Athenian identity as Athenocentric, pan-Ionian, and pan-Hellenic.

Thirdly, it is absolutely necessary to look at these tragedies not in isolation from each other or from Athenian culture in general, but as a part of an inherently connected system and to think of the playwrights as subject to this system as much or more than they shape it. As Foucault reminds us, nothing is produced in a vacuum. Any study that aims at understanding a system of thought must begin from a basic premise that all events/texts/moments are related. We must study:

> Relations between statements (even if the author is unaware of them; even if the statements do not have the same author; even if the authors are unaware of each other's existence); relations between groups of statements thus established (even if these groups do not concern the same, or even adjacent, fields; even if they do not possess the same formal level; even if they are not the locus of assignable exchanges); relations between statements and groups of statement and events of a quite different kind (technical, economic, social, political).[38]

One goal is to discover the "space in which discursive events are deployed" and so understand both the space and events better and, in the end, to learn to recognize similar dynamics elsewhere.

The Textual Landscape

Our study of Athena in tragedy begins with Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, in which Athena is explicitly linked to the democratic juries and courts. I argue that the founding of the court of the Areopagus should be understood not only in

light of the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 BC, but also as part of a process of judicial imperialism, in which we see a distinct move on the part of the Athenians to forge a correlation between the type of justice provided by a democratic jury and the polis. This link is promoted not just by situating democracy and the courts as a grant from Athena to the Athenians, but also through spreading the courts to the allies within the Delian League as part of an effort to control the members (and provide them the benefits of Athenian justice).

I then turn to Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*, a fragmentary play, where, I argue, a courtroom drama similar to that staged in *Eumenides* appears. I read the play in light of other representations of the myth surrounding the lesser Ajax in Athenian public art, specifically on the Stoa Poikile. Here, as in *Eumenides*, we see myths rewritten to construct a specific relationship between Athena and justice and to situate Athens or those associated with Athens as the ones authorized to dispense such justice.

In a number of plays by Euripides staged between 424 and 410 BC, Athena appears briefly as a *dea ex machina* and an examination of these plays makes up the subject matter of the next chapter. In many ways, Athena's cameo appearances in *Ion, Suppliants, Iphigenia among the Taurians, Trojan Women* and *Erechtheus* fall into two categories: either they represent Athenian myths and the reaffirmation of Athenian patriotic positions like pan-Ionianism, or they reaffirm mythical alliances established by Athena in earlier plays or public art. Some make direct references either to Athena's role in *Eumenides* or to her role as patron of Athens, which is then positioned as progenitor of the Greek race. In each of the plays, there is a pro-Athenian message wrapped in a plea for pan-Hellenism. In each as well, the pronouncements of Athena's justice are softened either by de-centering the authority of her judgments or by claiming it was Apollo's will that her autochthonous Athenians should give birth to the other Greek peoples. Athena in each of these plays does not necessarily present a new vision of justice. Instead, these plays serve as a fitting venue for trying to understand how the Athenians later reflected upon the chauvinism of those earlier Athenas on the tragic stage and how such representations were reaffirmed in times of military and civic crisis.

Finally, I turn to Sophocles' *Ajax*, one of the more troubling tragedies to have come down to us. No longer is Athena represented as an arbiter of justice associated with the courts, democracy, and equality before the law, but instead with vengeance and the exercise of power. In this chapter, I argue that *Ajax* calls into question the ideologies upon which Athens built its empire and democracy by showing the incompatibility of the ideals of the de-

mocracy—specifically justice—with the exercise of power. Justice for Ajax is not justice that fits the crime but exceeds the crime. Instead of justice that serves the best interest of the polis community and that reflects the notion of justice as balancing the power of the few with the needs and rights of the many, it is shown to be incompatible with wielding power, since justice as embodied in the courts is meant to mitigate power inequalities, while running an empire insists upon such inequality. Athena herself becomes a symbol of an oppressive type of justice, just as the polis she is identified with finds itself resulting to ever harsher means for controlling its allies. No longer are the democratic courts of Athens dispensers of justice to be envied as represented in *Eumenides*, but tools for oppression.

The concluding chapter will round out the analysis by thinking about the total picture the study of these tragedies provides. Athena moves from the majestic goddess of the courts and promoter of civic justice to cruel and vengeful. She then moves back again to a goddess of the polis. What we see is that under the influence and pressures of empire, Athena became as corrupted as the institutions she represented. In time of great stress and war, however, Athena becomes once again a patriotic symbol calling Athens and her allies back to the ideals their union was first founded upon. In the end, because the goddess is just, the city she represents must be as well.

Figure 1. Ajax and Achilles playing draughts by Exekias, ca. 530 BC. Museo Gregoriano Etrusco, Vatican Museum, Vatican City. Source: Alinari/Art Resource, NY.

Figure 2. Ajax and Achilles playing draughts while Athena urges them to battle. Ca. 510 BC. London E160, British Museum, London, UK. © Trustees of the British Museum.

NOTES

I use Page's Oxford edition of Aeschylus with cross-reference to West's Teubner throughout. For Sophocles' *Ajax*, I have used the Oxford text of Lloyd-Jones and Wilson. The fragments of *Ajax Locrus* are from Halsam's text in *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* v. 44, with reference to Diggle's Oxford text. For Euripides, I rely on Diggle's Oxford texts unless otherwise indicated. Inscriptions are cited according to their source—either *Inscriptiones Graecae* (abbreviated *IG*) or *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC* (abbreviated ML). Translations of ancient texts are my own except where noted.

1 Herodotus tells us that Erechtheus, after ascending the throne of Kekrops, renamed the Kekropidae Athenians in honor of his patron goddess, Athena (8.44).

2 See especially, Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 132–71, 145–55 esp.; *Children of Athena* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3–71; *Born of the Earth* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); and Vincent Rosivach "Autochthony and the Athenians," *CQ* 37 (1987): 294–306.

3 As Guthrie points out, in *Odyssey* 7.80, ἵκετο δ' εἰς Μαραθῶνα καὶ εὐρυάγυιαν Ἀθήνην; namely, Athene came to Athene; Guthrie, W.K.C. *The Greeks and Their Gods* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947), 107. Athene is singular (on analogy with Mykene) because it is the name of the rock. It becomes plural on analogy with the locative Athenai (Mykenai). So the goddess was named like the rock, as Guthrie quotes Cook, "because at the outset she was the rock."

4 On the significance of the Panathenaia in fifth-century Athens see, Jennifer Neils, *Goddess and Polis: The Panathenaic Festical in Ancient Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Robert Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); H.A. Shapiro, "Democracy and Imperialism: the Panathenaia in the Age of Perikles" in *Worshipping Athena: Panathenaia and Parthenon*, ed. Jennifer Neils (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 215–28.

5 For a good overview of the intense relationship between Athens and Athena specifically with regards Athenian civic art, see Jeffrey Hurwit, *The Acropolis in the Age of Pericles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1–48.

6 Hegel, G.W.F., *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 252. For a general treatment of the goddess of Athena in myth, see Susan Deacy, *Athena* (London: Routledge, 2008). Chapters 5–7 deal specifically with Athena's relationship in myth to the city of Athens. The first chapter of Hurwit is also good and gives further details concerning the material remains that expressed the Athenian bond with their goddess.

7 See especially, Simon Goldhill, "The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology," in *Nothing to do with Dionysos: Athenian Drama and its Social Context*, eds. John Winkler and Froma Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 97-129 and "Civic Ideology and the Problem of Difference: The Politics of Aeschylean Tragedy, Once Again." *JHS* 120 (2000): 34–56. A number of political interpretations appeared before this though they focused more on allegory and reflections of historical events instead of on ideology.

8 Most studies come in the form of essays in edited volumes. Few book-length studies have appeared. A welcome exception is now Elton Barker, *Entering the Agon: Dissent and Authority from Homer to Tragedy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2009. Some

important essays on civic issues in tragedy include, Goldhill, "Dionysia," 97–129; Jasper Griffin, "The Social Function of Attic Tragedy," *CQ* 48 (1998): 39–61; Leslie Kurke, "Decentering Tragedy: The Impact of (on) Democracy" in *Democracy 2500? Questions and Challenges*, eds. Ian Morris and Kurt Raaflaub (Dubuque: Kendall and Hunt, 1997), 155–69; Oddone Longo, "The Theatre of the *Polis*," in Winkler and Zeitlin, 12–19; Josiah Ober and Barry Strauss, "Drama, Political Rhetoric and the Discourse of Athenian Democracy," in Winkler and Zeitlin, 237–70; and Suzanne Saïd, "Tragedy and Politics," in *Democracy, Empire and the Arts in Fifth-century Athens*, eds. Deborah Boedeker and Kurt Raaflaub (Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1998), 275–95.

[9] The empire in not mentioned as a political influence though the creation, maintenance, and promotion of such a hegemony is a political enterprise by D.M. Carter, *The Politics of Greek Tragedy*, (Exeter: Bristol Phoenix Press, 2007). In fact, although some scholars suggest that they are reading tragedy historically (especially plays like *Eumenides* and *Trojan Women*), few make reference to the most comprehensive histories of the period, such as Russell Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972) and Charles Fornara and Loren Samons, *Athens from Cleisthenes to Perikles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Instead, we see uncritical use of the histories of Thucydides and Herodotus. It is also surprising how few scholars working within the frame of civic ideology take advantage of the plethora of works on Athenian democracy produced in the last 20-30 years.

[10] Examples of such collections include Barbara Goff, ed. *History, Tragedy, Theory* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995) and Winkler and Zeitlin.

[11] Simon Goldhill, "Dionysia," 97–129 on Isocrates *de Pace* 82.

[12] Scholarship on tragedy and empire include: David Rosenbloom "Empire and its discontents: *Trojan women, Birds*, and the symbolic economy of Athenian imperialism," in *Greek Drama III: Essays in Honour of Kevin Lee, BICS* Supplement 87, eds. John Davidson, et al. (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2006), 245–71; "Myth, History and Hegemony in Aeschylus" in Goff, 91–130; Peter Rose, "Historicizing Sophocles' *Ajax*" in Goff, 59–90 and *Sons of Gods, Children of Earth: Ideology and Literary Form in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Rebecca F. Kennedy, "Justice, Geography and Empire in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*," *CA* 25 (2006): 35–72. Especially in the case of Sophocles, however, scholars seek to avoid the taint of politics and empire. For example, see Cedric Whitman *Sophocles: a Study in Heroic Humanism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951) and Jasper Griffin, "Sophocles and the Democratic City," in *Sophocles Revisited*. Ed. Jasper Griffin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 73-94.

[13] Harold Mattingly, *The Athenian Empire Restored* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), has been the strongest proponent of this reevaluation but more scholars seem to be moving in this direction. See especially Nikolas Papazarkadas, "Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire: Re-shuffling the Chronological Cards," in *Interpreting the Athenian Empire*, edited by John Ma, Nikolas Papazarkadas, and Robert Parker (London, Duckworth Press, 2009), 67–88. As Kallet (2009) reminds us, the re-dating of many of the overtly "imperialistic" inscriptions is often an attempt to relieve Pericles of the taint of imperialism and to push contain the oppressive era of the *archê* to the period of the Peloponnesian War ("Democracy, Empire and Epigraphy in the Twentieth Century," in Ma et al, 50–56.

[14] It has always been assumed by scholars that Apollo was patron of the Delian League at its founding. This view has been based primarily on the fact that the League meetings and treasury were based on Delos, an island devoid of people for the most part. Only the shrine to Apollo rested there, thus the treasury would have been under his protection. Also, it seems only logical that there was a precedent for the *aparchê* that would be awarded Athena after 454 BC. If Apollo had not received a similar tithe, uproar over Athens' claim would surely have left a trace. The transition seems too smooth to have had such an otherwise overtly imperial act, the taking of the *aparchê*, not follow a precedent set by putting a portion of the tribute aside for Apollo. It has also been noted that Poseidon was a probable secondary patron, for he was the original patron of the earlier Ionian League (Her. 1.141.4; 1.170.1; 6.7) and as a naval venture the League would have done well to keep the favor of the sea-god (J.P. Barron, "The fifth-century *horoi* of Aigina," *JHS* 72 (1983): 11).

[15] Meiggs, 460.

[16] Meiggs, 292.

[17] The requirement of the cow and panoply was thought to have been part of the allies' obligation only beginning in the 430s. However, the Clinias decree concerning tribute payment mentions the delivery of these items to the Panathenaia already as early as 447/6 BC (Meiggs, 293). Those allies who were also colonists would have already had this obligation.

[18] Erythrai appears to have been required to send first fruits beginning in 453/2 BC following the suppression of their revolt from the Delian League/Athenian Empire. See chapter 2 for a discussion of the Erythrai decree. The so-called "First Fruits" decree (ML 73) has been recently re-dated to the 430s instead of the orthodox date of 422/1 BC (Papazarkadas, 69).

[19] The *horoi* each belong to slightly different periods. Those of Samos were perhaps set up on land confiscated after the war in 441/0 BC, though Meiggs and Barron argue for an earlier date. Those of Kos are probably from the 440s. The *horoi* of Aegina will be discussed below. For discussions of each set of stones, see especially Barron, "Aigina," 1–11 and "Religious Propaganda of the Delian League," *JHS* 84 (1964): 35–48; Thomas Figueira, *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 115–20; Meiggs, 255–58; Graham Shipley, *A History of Samos, 800–188 B.C.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Meiggs also notes that there is a possible reference to the establishment of a cult to Athena in Colophon after their revolt was suppressed in 447/6 BC (ML 47). For different datings of these and many other fifth-century Athenian inscriptions, see Mattingly. On the extensive use of religion for political gain by the Athenians during the fifth century see especially, Bernhard Smarczyk, *Untersuchungen zur Religionspolitick und politischen Propaganda Athens im Delisch-Attischen Seebund*, (Munich: Tuduv, 1990) and Carl Anderson and Keith Dix, "Politics and State Religion in the Delian League: Athena and Apollo and the Eteocarpathian Decree," *ZPE* 117 (1997): 129–32, who add the Eteocarpathian decree to those of Samos, Kos and Colophon as being dedicated to Athena Polias; see also Robert Parker "Athenian Religion Abroad" in *Ritual, Finance and Politics*, eds. Robin Osburne and Hornblower (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 339–46.

[20] Anderson and Dix, 129–32.

21 Gloria Ferrari, "The *Ilioupersis* in Athens," *HSPh* 100 (2000): 120, who refers to the study of Karl Schefold and Franz Jung, *Die Sage von Argonauten, von Theben und Troia in der klassischen und hellenistischen Kunst* (Munich: Hirmer Verlag, 1989), 66-71. For descriptions of some of the scenes representing the rescue of Aethra by the son's of Theseus, see Ferrari, 120-23.

22 The same scene appears on many vases after 525 BC including Louvre F290 (*ABV* Louvre 324, 37) and Basel 1921.340 (*ARV* Basel Antikenmuseum 1, 121, PL. (200) 54.6.9). On the popularity of the Athena variant, see Susan Woodford, "Ajax and Achilles Playing a Game on an Olpe in Oxford," *JHS* 102 (1982): 174-75.

23 The scene parallels the duel between Memnon and Achilles represented on Boston 97.368, which shows Athena urging Achilles on while Eos urges Memnon. The reverse side shows a similarly designed scene of Diomedes (urged by Athena) killing Aeneas flanked by Aphrodite. The difference, of course, is that Athena is present in the Homeric versions of these scenes while she is not present in the Ajax/Hector duel. She protects Odysseus, Achilles and Diomedes in Homer, not Ajax.

24 Greg Anderson offers a thorough and enlightening discussion of the myth-making process in early democratic Athens; *The Athenian Experiment: Building an Imagined Community in Ancient Attica, 508–490BC*, (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2003). Deacy discusses the unification of images of Athena in Athens during the 5th century and gives recent bibliography on the images on the Acropolis.

25 Hurwit, 197-98.

26 It is also interesting to note that the myth surrounding Theseus' paternity by Poseidon also increased in popularity as the fifth century wore on. Part of the reason for this may be the emphasis Athenians placed on their navy; see, J.P. Barron "Bakchylides, Theseus and a Woolly Cloak," *BICS* 27 (1980): 1–8; Deborah Boedeker, "Presenting the Past in Fifth-century Athens," in Boedeker and Raaflaub, 187; David Castriota, *Myth, Ethos and Actuality: Official Art in Fifth-century BC Athens* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 59–63. The favor and patronage of Poseidon would have been a necessary component of the Empire. Also, even though the Athenians rejected Poseidon's divine patronage of their city, opting instead for Athena, this does not mean they did not pay heed to him at all. The claim of Theseus' paternity would have been another way to co-opt divine and heroic glory to Athens and thus support their claims to dominance over the other Greeks, especially the islands.

27 ἦν ἄρα κἀκεῖνοι ταλακάρδιοι, οἵ ποτε Μήδων/ παισὶν ἐπ' Ἠιόνι, Στρυμόνος ἀμφὶ ῥοάς,/ λιμόν τ' αἴθωνα κρατερόν τ' ἐπαγόντες Ἄρηα/ πρῶτοι δυσμενέων εὖρον ἀμηχανίην. This epigram dates to ca. 475 BC. From Aeschines *Against Ktesiphon* 184.

28 See Castriota, 89-95.

29 This is not a novel idea. In fact, Meiggs makes a brief nod in that direction in his discussion of Athens' cultural growth in the fifth century (290).

30 S.Saïd, 275–95.

31 D.M. Carter dismisses full-scale allegory as a possible element in tragedy (22), which I agree with for the most part. But a figure like Athena who *did* function as an allegory in most other forums in Athens could hardly lose that function in only one public medium.

32 Rosenbloom, "Myth," 95.

33 See Kurt Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) for the evolution of freedom as a political concept.

[34] S. Saïd, 281-82. For these types of reading see in particular Christopher Pelling, ed. *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) which contains multiple essays on precisely this approach to tragedy. See also, Rose, *Sons* and "Historicizing;" Peter Euben, *The Tragedy of Greek Political Theory: The Road not Taken*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 130–66, especially; and Christian Meier, *The Political Art of Tragedy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

[35] Deacy, 74-121 and Robert Parker, *Athenian Religion: A History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).

[36] Paul Cartledge, "Deep Plays: Theatre as Process in Greek Civic Life," in *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy*, ed. P.E. Easterling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 3–35.

[37] This is the primary argument of Edward Saïd, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993). Also, on culture: typically, the types of public art I refer to in this study are considered "high art" and this is what Saïd seems also to consider "culture." In the case of Athens, however, the theater as well as the monuments, festivals and other art works referred to here were a part of the fabric of everyday life for the average Athenian much more so than the theater, literature and the arts were for later peoples. In this sense, when I refer to these elements of culture, I consider them part of the totality of a society and culture in a larger sense of the overall interactions and mechanisms for interacting between the members of a given community. These were popular and public arts that we now consider the "pinnacle" of Athenian culture but which to the Athenians were as common and everyday as a football game or romance novel today.

[38] Michele Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 29.

• CHAPTER TWO •

In the Courts of Athena

Aeschylus' *Eumenides*

The representation of Athena in *Eumenides* is complex, not least because she actually appears on stage although her presence in the myth of the house of Atreus was unattested before this play. The appearance must have been quite a spectacle—Athena standing on stage in her panoply with the burnt-out Acropolis behind her, the Athenian audience co-opted into the performance as a jury casting votes at a trial, like citizens carrying out their civic duty.[1] How the Athenians interpreted this appearance has been a popular subject for scholarly debate. While a variety of roles for Athena have been suggested, most scholars are in agreement on one point: Athena represents the city of Athens and its institutions on stage in *Eumenides*.[2] The significance of her status as representative of Athens in this context, however, is not quite clear.

Reading Athena in *Eumenides* as a symbol of, or proxy for, Athens and its institutions sets us squarely within the debate over the politics of the play. There have been many studies concerning this; some are (pre)occupied with the discovery of whether Aeschylus was a "radical democrat" or a "conservative,"[3] while others have attempted to remove the immediate historical context from their readings, making them more general. Macleod states, "the Areopagus and the Argive alliance [...] have [...] a meaning and a value which are not confined to any historical situation."[4] Instead of seeking Aeschylus' political affiliations or looking to make the play a strict allegory, Macleod and others like him look beyond the narrow partisan politics of Ephialtes' reforms and the Argive alliance to examine instead abstract political concepts, like justice—although they still understand the play as ultimate-

ly in support of the popular reforms of 458 BC. In many of these political readings of *Eumenides*, Athena is viewed as a representative of Athens, but the justice she doles out is the justice of Zeus.[5] The implications of her appearance on stage are overshadowed by the desire to seek out a political agenda for Aeschylus, or else by a desire to read the justice of the play as part of the traditional mythical hierarchy of the gods. No one pays much mind to whether Athena's appearance might suggest ideological trends or, in fact, considers it remarkable that she appear on stage at all.

Alan Sommerstein does look at Athena in *Eumenides*. For him, she is a conciliator, chosen by Zeus to decide between the old order of justice (retribution) represented by the Furies and the new order of justice based on reasoned judgment and persuasion.[6] To reconcile the Furies with this new justice, Athena establishes the law court upon the Areopagus and gives them a home nearby. Thalia Papadopoulou agrees with Alan Sommerstein that Athena represents Athens, calling *Eumenides* the "most influential portrayal of Athena in her role as the deity of Athens and its institutions."[7] Not only is Athena the patron deity of Athens, but, according to Papadopoulou, she should also be interpreted as its chief political authority. Along these same lines, Bowie suggests that an audience seeing Athena on stage in this play would be reminded of her contest with Poseidon and the myth of how Athens chose its patron deity, thus reinforcing her role as protector and surrogate mother to Athens.[8]

Figure 3. Ajax duels Hector while Athena and Apollo urge them on. Ca 500–450 BC. Douris Painter, Louvre G115. Louvre, Paris, France. Source: Réunion des Musées Nationaux/Art Resource, NY.

Other studies of Athena in *Eumenides* concern her more abstract function. These scholars address the issues surrounding her and her court within the major metaphors of the *Oresteia* trilogy, through her relationships to dark and light or male and female.[9] In these studies, Athena, not Apollo, is situated directly opposite the Furies. The maternal nature of the Furies is countered by Apollo's masculinity and Athena, because of her "paternal" birth, takes the side of Apollo and the male. Her relationship to light causes her to be associated with reason and with Apollo. Further, while she does agree with the Furies that fear is a necessary component of justice, Athena decides to place that fear within an impartial judiciary, allotting punishment through rational assessment (again associating her with Apolline rationality). Punishment comes not necessarily as is deserved, but as the community sees fit to inflict it.[10]

Each of these studies is, in its own right, important to our understanding of Athena's appearance and her relation to the court, and none wholly excludes the others. However, previous political interpretations have not done full justice to Athena and the role of the courts in *Eumenides*. During the fifth century, tragedy was not a private art form performed in symposia but was written and performed as a part of civic life. Thus we cannot fully appreciate the role of Athena, or the centrality of her democratic court, without considering the play within the larger political and cultural matrices of the mid-fifth century. Athena, in her capacity as representative of Athens, is not only making the case for why the Furies should submit to her persuasion and her justice, but why Athens' allies in the *archê* should, too.[11] This play is about more than Athenian democracy. It is about Athenian empire as well.

In all political interpretations, as mentioned above, it is taken for granted that Athena as she appears on stage in *Eumenides* embodies Athens and its interests.[12] The questions I ask are as follows: what is the significance of putting Athens' patron deity on stage as the representative of the city and her interests? What sort of import are we to place on the court she founds as a defining component of Athens and its institutions? Many scholars have argued in various capacities for the political/historical significance of *Eumenides*. None, however, has asked how the significance of the play is altered or emphasized by having Athena pronounce certain political truths, and few have considered the significance of the court outside of the reforms of Ephialtes. All have seen the *Oresteia* as unique and revolutionary instead of as indicative of a larger trend in public representations of democratic principles. The argument, here, is twofold. First, I set the courts and Athena within context of the Athenian *archê*. Second, I look at what having Athena and the court as the central focus of the play and the culmination of the trilogy tells us about Athens' self-representation within an imperial context.

The Court of the Areopagus

In fifth-century Athens, as democracy became more radical, the importance of courts and juries grew. This is likely connected to Solon, who in 594/3 BC established the Eliaia, a people's court, where the common people could appeal the decisions of aristocratic magistrates, thus safeguarding themselves from arbitrary decisions (*Ath. Pol.* 9.1). The proliferation of courts, however, did not begin in earnest until the 460s and 450s. Although we do not know precise dates for when various juries came into being during the Classical period, we do know that pay for jurors was introduced by Pericles in the middle of the century.[13] In addition, a number of buildings which used to house law courts, or which acted as repositories of laws, like the Stoa Basileos, Stoa Poikile, the Metoicheion, and even the Odeion, were built or rebuilt between 460 and 450 BC.[14] It seems clear that the law courts and juries were becoming a regular, and important, part of democratic citizen life.

Around the same time, we also see references to the courts in decrees pertaining to Athens' allies in the *archê*. The Phaselis (IG i^3 10),[15] Miletos (IG i^2 22+),[16] and Chalcis (IG i^2 39)[17] decrees assign certain cases for the allies to Athenian jurisdiction. Athens was exporting her judicial system just as they exported their democracy.[18] To be subject to Athens meant being subject to her law courts. *Eumenides* contributes to this identification of Athens with the courts, thereby strengthening the connection between Athens and democracy. Aeschylus himself emphasizes that the court Athena establishes is the Areopagus. But this in no way diminishes the intimate connection between courts and Athenian democracy as promoted abroad. Rather, Aeschylus may have chosen the Areopagus not necessarily because of its connection to the recent reforms of Ephialtes, but because of the very antiquity of that specific court. It was the oldest court in Athens, dating back to the seventh century, and the homicide law was the oldest law, dating back, so the Athenians thought, to Dracon (Aristotle *Politics* 8.125). By pushing the foundations of the first law court back to the heroic age, Aeschylus underscores the tradition of judicial practices in Athens, thus embedding the concept that much more firmly within Athenian collective democratic consciousness.

The play also strengthens the relationship between the courts and Athens' developing empire by underscoring the singular justice offered in these courts. It represents a foreign ally (*summachos*) submitting to the court and, by locating it in within a specific geographic framework, establishes a jurisdiction that coincides with Athenian hegemony. A close study of the geographical content of the text specifically associated with Athena suggests very strongly that not only is the play interested in linking the courts with

Athens' democracy, but also in giving that democracy jurisdiction over the *archê*.

Establishing Athena's Jurisdiction

Previous discussions of *Eumenides* have addressed some of the geographic references in relation to Athenian military/imperial activities in the early to mid-fifth century. These references have often been lumped together with the other political elements of the play and, especially since Dover dismissed many of them long ago as irrelevant, are generally underappreciated in analyses. Noel Robertson labels much of Aeschylus' geographic content, both in *Eumenides* and in other plays such as *Persians* as "geography extravaganzas," implying that these phrases are merely ornamental.[19] On the contrary, the geographic locations mentioned in *Eumenides* constitute a form of mapping. Mapping and geography are always associated with power, or more specifically, imperial power.[20] Mapping is a way of making something unknown known and the one possessing this knowledge gains control over the mapped space. Just as the map of Cleomenes (Her. 5.49.5–8) and Agrippa's map of the world clearly expressed spheres of control, so too is Aeschylus' map defining the physical space of Athens' hegemony.

Arguments against the political significance of geographic references at lines 292–97 and 397–402 are not decisive. It has been demonstrated that these references, while not reflective necessarily of particular battles or events, do mirror larger patterns of events.[21] The Athenians had a stake in the Troad as early as 479 BC and continued to maintain a presence there for most of the next two centuries. They were active in Libya and Thrace, as well as in Egypt, in the early 460s and also in the late 450s. Thus, the overall picture that emerges from a discussion of these regions points to a defined range of activity.[22] The locations in question are each at the extreme boundaries of Athenian activity and are each associated in the play with the whereabouts of Athena. Athena is the representative of Athens/Athenian interests in *Eumenides*. Thus, the regions can also be associated with the whereabouts or interests of the Athenians at the time.

In addition to this, it is interesting that each of the regions in question is associated with Athena or Athens in mythology. MacLeod claims that the Athenians invented a myth concerning the sons of Theseus and Athena's land allotment in the Troad in the sixth century to support their claim to Sigeum against Mytilene. The same myth could also refer to the assertion of the Athenians that they were "reclaiming" the region from the Persians for their Ionian kin.[23] The reference to the Tritonian strait (293) refers to an alternate myth of Athena's birth. According to Herodotus 4.180, the Libyans

had a myth that Athena's father was not Zeus, but Poseidon, and that she was born from Lake Tritonis in western Libya. One of Athena's Homeric epithets is *Tritogeneia*, triton-born (or "third-born") and may reflect this alternate version of Athena's birth. If understood as a reference to this alternate myth, it would be yet another example of the Athenians using myth to further their imperial claims. And, as Dover points out, Phlegra (297) was the site of a great battle against the Giants in which Athena played a central role.

The mention of each of these locations has a twofold purpose. First, they suggest known spheres of military action to the audience. Second, they supply a mythological precedent, or charter, for Athenian presence in those regions. Both of these purposes reflect patriotic self-representation and link it explicitly to an expansionist agenda contrary to Rosenbloom's argument that the *Oresteia* actually cautions against Athenian imperial aspirations. Rosenbloom's insistence that the text questions and undermines imperialism is based on the connection of naval words and imagery with Agamemnon, whom Rosenbloom understands as a negative character within the scope of the trilogy.[24] However, Athena, not Agamemnon, is the one located in the four corners of the Aegean in *Eumenides*. As noted above, Athena in *Eumenides* is the "most influential portrayal of Athena as the deity of Athens and its institutions." The goddess is the city, the city the goddess, and, unlike Agamemnon, Athena is not sullied by negative associations with eastern tyranny and violence in this play.[25] In fact, the play presents her as a paradigm of democratic principles. Thus, when Athena is associated with such adventurism, it becomes positive and patriotic rather than worrisome and ironic.

In addition, the intimate relationship between imperialism and geography recognized in more contemporary times suggests a similar relationship is not only possible but probable in imperialist Athens. Edward Saïd, writing of the emergence of a more geographically aware "world literature" in Cold War Europe, says:

> But in this geographically articulated vision (much of it based...on the cartographic results of actual geographical exploration and conquest) there is no less strong a commitment to the belief that European preeminence is natural, the culmination of...various "historical advantages" that allowed Europe to override the "natural advantages" of the more fertile, wealthy and accessible regions it controlled.[26]

By its very presence in a text such as *Eumenides*, with its public and politicized performance, geographical material, some of it directly related to actual exploration and occupation, supports a world vision that ultimately justifies the possession of that territory by the society that produced the literature. In fact, Saïd goes on, "To their audiences in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the great geographical synthesizers offered tech-

tried.[34] Since no Athenian citizens were involved in this case it would more rightly be tried by the polemarch.[35] The Areopagus itself may have held jurisdiction over homicide as early as the seventh century, and certainly did hold such jurisdiction, with the *basileos* at its head, in the fifth and fourth centuries,[36] but the case that is presented on stage to the audience does not follow the known structure of a murder trial there. For one thing, homicide trials required elaborate rituals like the three pre-trials (*prodikasiai)*. Furthermore, the jurors at these trials are called a *dikastai*, whereas the judges from the Areopagus were not referred to in that manner by the Athenians.[37] As Podlecki points out, "Whatever legal niceties and hypothetical pleas available to a latter-day Orestes, in the primordial, pre-legal period of Athens' history, Orestes is to be tried before the Areopagus."[38]

In other words, the case of Orestes would have been recognizable to audience members as atypical for the Areopagus. They would have been expected to suspend their disbelief and accept Aeschylus' mythical account as a general charter for Athenian legal institutions. What this suggests, therefore, is that we need not associate this court with the reforms of Ephialtes at all. Rather, the Areopagus becomes symbolic of all courts in Athens, thereby fostering a democratic identity for the Athenians, associated specifically with the concept of justice as trial by jury.[39] The distinctions between the Areopagus of Ephialtes' reforms and the court enforcing Athenian judicial hegemony in the empire are thereby blurred by the very nature of the representation. This distinction is blurred even further when the identities of the defendant and plaintiff are taken into consideration since neither Orestes nor the Erinyes are Athenians (though each one *is* given a distinctive association with Athens during the course of the play). The Erinyes become incorporated into Athenian society as *metics*, resident aliens, while Orestes, whose identification is most pertinent within an imperial context, comes to Athens as a *summachos*.

What it Means to be a *Summachos*

The word *summachos*, "ally," is the term used in inscriptions in the fifth century and later to denote the military relationship between Athens and other Greeks who attached themselves to her. Thus the term links in this context the military and judicial aspects of an alliance. It occurs nowhere in Homer, making its earliest appearance in the lyric poets (Sappho 1.28; Arch. 108.1; Tyrtaeus 3b, 580; Alcaeus 350.3). In Aeschylus' extant tragedies, *summachos* occurs seven times and is used each time to denote either a military or, in the case of *Choephoroi*, military-like alliance. It is most likely that this was the word used in the original agreements between the members of the

Delian League in 478 BC. The use of the word *summachos* here to introduce the appeal by Orestes for Athena's aid at 271–79 colors the meaning of the appeal itself. Its use and context forces us to consider what type of alliance is being offered. It is an alliance covering both military and judicial matters, and it is with an Athena whose influence stretches from Libya to Thrace.[40]

Summachos is used three times within the play (289–91, 669–73, 762–74) and it is generally accepted by scholars that these instances refer to the alliance between Argos and Athens in 462 BC. However, who is to say that the Argive alliance is the only alliance meant here? A close examination of the passages in question demonstrates that the Argive alliance, as portrayed in *Eumenides,* is being idealized within the text as an exemplary alliance much as the Areopagus is a paradigm for all Athenian courts.

The first passage in which the Argive alliance is mentioned occurs at 289–91. Orestes proclaims:

> κτήσεται δ' ἄνευ δορὸς
> αὐτόν τε καὶ γῆν καὶ τὸν Ἀργεῖον λεὼν
> πιστὸν δικαίως ἐς τὸ πᾶν τε σύμμαχον.
>
> She will obtain without her spear myself and the land and the Argive people as a trustworthy ally justly for all time.

Athena will become an ally of the Argive people. This much is not disputed and seems clear. But why does Orestes say "without spear"? The meaning of the phrase is, of course, that the alliance is agreed upon between two cities at peace with one another, that it is not a forced alliance coming as a result of any military action or threat. But the implication behind "without spear" is that Athena/Athens must have made allies "with a spear"—meaning she gained other alliances with force.[41] What *summachoi* did Athena/Athens gain "by the spear" up to 458 BC, other than certain members of the Delian League, namely Carystos, Naxos, Thasos, Andros and, shortly after the performance of *Eumenides*, Aegina? Each of these allies was either forced to join the League or was forced to return to it after revolting. The Argive alliance, as represented here, in which the Argives were willing participants, suggests a model alliance. Others too should become σύμμαχοι ἄνευ δορός.

This idea of becoming a willing ally of Athens is further complicated, however, since the ally in question will be asked to lift those same spears against others. *Summachos* occurs again at 773 in Orestes' speech of thanks to Athena after his acquittal, and addresses just this instance:

> ὀρθουμένων δὲ καὶ πόλιν τὴν Παλλάδος
> τιμῶσιν αἰεὶ τήνδε συμμάχωι δορὶ

ly in the presence of Athena? Despite Apollo's purification of Orestes, the Erinyes continue to hunt him. Parker suggests this happens because, although Apollo is known in the fifth century as the "purifier of men's houses" and he who "washes away" evil, he is not known directly as a purifier of murderers. Only Zeus offered such purification. Therefore, Athena stands as proxy for Zeus.[45] Because Orestes killed his mother on Apollo's orders, he is told he can be freed from the Erinyes by a judgment.[46] Thus Apollo is as much on trial as Orestes and the only place Apollo can stand trial is in front of Athena. Only Athena, because of her relationship to Zeus, is worthy of judging a case between two divinities.

Figure 4. Silver *tetradrachm* of Athens. Ca. 480 BC. One side shows the head of Athena, the reverse shows the owl. British Museum, London, UK. © Trustees of the British Museum.

The Dark Side of Athena's Justice?

The idea of a just Athena, who uses her law courts to solve problems for suppliants (even divine ones), has great significance in the real Athens of the fifth century. As early as the late 460s Athens was already requiring some of its allies to send court cases to Athens. The Phaselis decree (IG i^3 10), mentioned above, is possibly the earliest instance of this process. Although the exact nature of the cases to be tried at Athens is unclear from the inscription, it has been argued that the right to try certain cases there would have been seen as a privilege.[47] The suggestion that Phaselis would have felt privileged to send certain cases to Athens is in keeping with the spirit of *Eumenides*.[48] Orestes and other allies understand that justice dispensed at Athens under the auspices of Athena is superior. But there is a darker side to such justice, and it is found reflected in another decree, passed shortly after the production of

Eumenides. Perhaps it was not so much a privilege as a restriction on autonomy.

The Erythrai decree (IG i^3 14), dated to 453/2 BC, has a much different tone from the Phaselis decree.[49] It is in the form of an oath and lists the sanctions imposed upon Erythrai after its revolt from the Delian League/Athenian Empire. Some of the provisions of the oath run as follows:

- The Erythraians must bring grain to the Panathenaia.
- Officers in the democratic government must take an oath of loyalty to the Athenian people and to her allies.
- Murderers are to be punished by death.
- Any man exiled from Erythrai is automatically exiled from Athens and all allied cities, but no one can be exiled without permission from Athens.

The cases might not be tried in Athens, but the authority behind the punishment is directed by the Athenians. This practice continues and is even made stricter in the Miletos decree of 450/449 BC (IG i^2.22+) and the Chalcis decree of 446/5 BC (IG i^2 39). In each of these decrees, provisions are made for trying certain court cases in Athens, including murder, and although the Chalcis decree is dated a full decade after the production of *Eumenides*, following the suppression of a revolt there, the text of the decree actually confirms, rather than establishes, judicial controls already in place. The earlier decree to which this one refers most likely came from the 450s.[50] It is entirely possible that the imposition of judicial controls may have contributed to the desire for revolt.

As the century wore on and the Delian League was transformed more certainly into the Athenian Empire, the requirement that cases involving large fines, death penalties and exiles continued to be tried in Athens and was expanded to include allies such as Samos, Rhegion and Leontini. Meiggs states that it is only "natural" for the Athenians to move to Athens court cases that concerned possible threats to her authority after the Peace of Callias, when keeping the League in order became more important than fighting Persians.[51] This gave the Athenians a measure of control over the activities of those would-be opponents of Athenian imposed democracy.[52] That the Athenians would be emphasizing their "just" and litigious nature in a play dated only a few years prior to the first certain decree of this type should not seem odd. It may have even served as a harbinger of what was to come—and it certainly reflects an attitude that understood such a desire for control as not only natural but appropriate.[53]

Before Athena establishes the Areopagus court in *Eumenides*, Apollo promises Orestes to Athena as a *summachos*. Athena accepts Orestes as her ally, and establishes a court to try him, a murderer and an exile. Both Orestes

and the Erinyes have agreed to abide by its ruling and the Areopagus will be a φρούρημα, guardian, for those who submit to it. If we recall the details of the Erythrai decree (IG i^3 14), a few overlaps appear. The Erythraians must swear an oath to the Athenians and the other *summachoi*, an oath not unlike the one Orestes swears at 755–77. Erythrai must also submit itself to an overseer (ἐπίσκοπος) and garrison (φρούραρχος). Recall that Athena establishes her court as φρούρημα and, at lines 295–96, Orestes asks Athena to come to him εἴτε Φλεγραίαν πλάκα θρασὺς ταγοῦχος ὡς ἀνὴρ ἐπισκοπεῖ. This is just what the Athenians will supply for her *summachoi* according to the terms of the Erythrai decree.

The process of judicial imperialism that is emphasized by the Phaselis and Erythrai decrees is exactly the type of relationship between allies that is legitimized in *Eumenides*. Athena, in her role as both goddess and city patron, can be understood as Athens touting her judicial system and its benefits to the allies. By trying Orestes' case in Athens, Athena suggests that it can only be solved there. Only in Athens, Athena's city, can true justice be found.

Recall as well the fact that Apollo himself sanctions and requests the establishment of this court. This is interesting, considering the relationship between Athena and Apollo in their patronage of the Delian League. Apollo seems originally to have been patron of the League, whose center was on Delos, and the *aparchê* was initially dedicated to him. Around 454 BC, however, the League treasury was transferred to Athens and the *aparchê* was dedicated to Athena instead of Apollo. Shapiro has argued that there was no significant diminution of Apollo's association with the League in the years following the transfer but, rather, that Athena and Apollo came to have a "reciprocal relationship," sharing the task of protecting the allies.[54] I would go further by suggesting that *Eumenides* prefigures the transfer of the treasury, and thus the transference of patronage of the League. Apollo, by urging Orestes to have his case tried in Athens, is recognizing the judicial superiority of Athena and the democratic institutions embodied in the jury of Athenians.[55] Not only does the text legitimize Athenian judicial imperialism, but gives divine sanction to the *archê* by depicting the first patron of the Delian League as endorsing the transfer of authority to the second.[56]

A claim for Athenian hegemony has been made through a political subtext found in *Eumenides*. This subtext consists, first, of the "imperial geography" noted above and the military and quasi-inscriptional language of the play. The use of *summachos*, coupled with terms such as ταγοῦχος, φρούρημα and ἐπισκοπέω, emphasizes the military nature of the alliance to which Athena and Orestes are agreeing. The fact that Orestes, the *summachos*, is a murderer and exile seeking judgment in an Athenian court points

toward the developing Athenian practice of trying allies' cases concerning murder, exile and treason in Athens instead of in their own cities. But is this presented as a positive thing? Most scholars of the *archê* suggest that it was oppressive clearly in the 440s and maybe even as early as the 460s so we must consider the political climate in which this play appeared. Is the overall impact of this episode a justification, or a criticism, of such an attitude of cultural superiority and its underlying imperial aspirations? If, as I propose, *Eumenides* provides an overall justification for imperial practices, then we must consider whether the transfer of jurisdiction by an ally to Athens can be understood positively.

How desirable the allies found Athens' judicial imperialism is unclear, but the above analysis suggests that *Eumenides* creates and supports a vision of Athenian imperialism as both justified and desirable. The only other scholarly attempts to directly address the empire as an influence in Aeschylean tragedy, however, have argued for a decidedly anti-imperial stance for the play—as well as the trilogy—as a whole. Rosenbloom has written what is the most committed argument for an anti-imperialist stance, and one must admit that there are a number of more sinister readings available for some of the very passages addressed here.

The first of these troublesome associations concerns the connection made between the language of the play and the Erythrai decree. What seems so appealing in *Eumenides*—the right to have a difficult case tried in Athenian courts—loses its appeal when compared with the Erythrai decree. Surrendering control over law courts is one of the key steps toward loss of autonomy; it is a sure sign of one state's subjugation to another. Herodotus wrote concerning a conflict between Epidauros and Aegina, that the Aeginetans were subject to Epidauros to such an extent that they had to cross to Epidauros to have their law cases heard (5.83).[57] Herodotus probably wrote this over twenty years after *Eumenides* was produced. What his attitude must surely reflect, however, is the process by which Athens converted her allies into subjects, and changed the Delian League into an empire. Extradition was seen as a projection of imperial power.

There is another troubling aspect to the benefits and perceptions of transferring jurisdiction. This is suggested by a possible veiled reference to cleruchies at *Eum.* 399–402, combined with an ambiguous use of the term κερδός at 703–6. Analyzing these passages together can lead one to a decidedly anti-imperialist interpretation of the play as a whole, since practices like cleruchies were clearly considered tyrannical by Athens' allies—at least in the latter half of the fifth century—and profits from the empire were also considered by some to be ill-gathered.

The idea that there is a possible reference to cleruchies at 399–402 and 703–6 is interesting, but difficult to address, since we know so very little about the nature and number of cleruchies in the fifth century.[58] The only certain fifth-century cleruchies were those on Naxos, Andros and Euboea (ca. 450 BC), and Mytilene (ca. 427 BC). Cleruchies were sent out from Athens as both a form of population control within Athens, and as a way to garrison restless allies with Athenians invested in the continuation of the empire. This process seems to have begun shortly after the midpoint of the fifth century, and continued on until the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War. It is quite certain that the allies despised the practice, since a main condition of the Second League was that no cleruchies be sent out by Athens.[59] Whether or not the allies already hated the practice in 458 BC, however, is highly uncertain. Rather, within the context of the play, just as with the concept of Athenian courts, there is only praise for and justification for what would become a standard practice after 450 BC, not comment upon a form of oppression that was already in practice.[60] The establishment of cleruchies may even have contributed to a growing imperialist mentality, instead of being a product of it. As for κέρδος, in the first two plays, it refers to profits of dubious value (*Ag.* 342; 547; *Cho.* 825). Within the context of *Eumenides*, the term moves from being ambiguous (541; 704) to referring to "true and lasting benefits."[61] At this stage, the reference to cleruchies, if it is a reference at all, can only be understood as a validation of a subsequent practice and not likely to have incurred already the wrath of allies.[62] Allies, like Orestes, should submit willingly to Athenian jurisdiction as well as to her benevolent controls.

True Justice

Justice, as it is invoked in both *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*, is retributive and familial.[63] Agamemnon kills Iphigenia, so Clytemnestra kills him as punishment. Atreus kills Aegisthus' brothers, and so he too participates in Agamemnon's murder out of desire for revenge. Then, Orestes kills both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus as retribution for Agamemnon's murder. This cycle of justice would have continued with Orestes' death (by his own hand, perhaps) if Athena had not stepped in to stop it.[64] She does, however, and so in *Eumenides*, justice is expressed by the nonviolent verdict of the Athenian jury—a verdict that is decisive and unambiguously fair.[65] Athena's reprieve is indeed justified if we understand Orestes, as the audience may indeed have understood him, as a tyrannicide.[66]

This progression from retribution to court-centered justice follows along the path of Rosenbloom's ideology of freedom. It is through the use and

abuse of the concept of justice that the Argive people are enslaved (by Aegisthus the tyrant) and then freed (by Orestes the tyrant-slayer). But the conclusion is not, as Rosenbloom would have it, that Orestes must now become the tyrant in Aegisthus' place and suffer his own destruction.[67] Orestes does not, like his predecessor, become the tyrant, and then suffer subversion, in turn. Rather, Athena and her jury come on stage precisely to prevent the continuation of this cycle. Athena guarantees freedom by providing a proper form of justice to support it and by turning Orestes, not into an Eastern despot, but into an ally of Athens and one who submits openly to democratic judgments.[68]

The assertion of the desirability of this new justice is underscored by the transformation of *peitho*, a necessary component of *dikê*, within the play. Whereas *peitho* is the child of *atê* in *Agamemnon*,[69] she is a necessary part of Athena's new justice in *Eumenides*.[70] Where *peitho* leads to the destruction of Troy, Agamemnon and Aegisthus in the earlier plays of the *Oresteia*, it leads to the salvation of Orestes and of Athens in *Eumenides*. *Peitho*, according to Buxton's assessment of it, is linked in tragedy to *nomos* and *dikê* and is a civilizing force set opposite *bîa* and tyranny.[71] But does this mean that any negative connotation connected with *peitho* has been erased? It is still a tool of power. Athena's superior position *vis à vis* the Erinyes is affirmed through their submission to her persuasive efforts, just as Agamemnon's surrender to Clytemnestra's seals his doom.[72] Agamemnon's submission to her persuasion signals the superiority of Clytemnestra (940–43). Both Clytemnestra and Agamemnon perceive her persuasion in terms of a battle (μάχη, δῆρις) that is to be won or lost. Agamemnon's submission signals a victory (νίκη) for Clytemnestra, and Agamemnon, in turn, becomes the conquered (τὸ νικᾶσθαι).[73] For the Erinyes to submit to Athena's persuasion likewise signals their own submission to her authority. She becomes the guarantor of their powers and they become residents who will help protect Athena's city from any external or internal harm.

This submission, however, is positive within the context of *Eumenides*. Twice Athena appeals to *peitho* (794; 885–91) and it is persuasion to which the Erinyes, in the end, submit although a veiled threat is also leveled by Athena. At 824–29, Athena tells the Erinyes that they have not been dishonored. She then says:

> κἀγὼ πέποιθα Ζηνὶ, καὶ τί δεῖ λέγειν;
> κλῆιδας οἶδα δώματος μόνη θεῶν
> ἐν ὧι κεραυνός ἐστιν ἐσφραγισμένος.
> ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ δεῖ. σὺ δ' εὐπιθὴς ἐμοί;

> I too believe in Zeus, why is it necessary to say it? And I alone of the gods know where the keys to the halls are in which the thunderbolt is kept safe. But no need of that; be persuaded by me (826–29).

It is interesting to note that numerous scholars, including Winnington-Ingram and Lloyd-Jones, practically ignore the final appeal of Athena and credit the "threat" (or the will of Zeus embodied within it) with changing the Erinyes' decision.[74] But, as Sommerstein points out, regardless of the threat, the thunderbolt stays hidden, unlike in *Agamemnon* where it does not.[75] The violence inherent in the thunderbolt is appropriate to the vendetta-like justice of *Agamemnon*. In *Eumenides*, the thunderbolt becomes muted and unnecessary in light of the power of persuasion and the type of justice connected with it. In the end, justice persuades the Erinyes (888; 891). The mention of the thunderbolt points out how far justice has progressed. Even though the option of violence still exists, Athena and her Athenians have no need of it since they have their courts and persuasion.[76]

The establishment of the court and the submission by all parties in *Eumenides* to the authority of the court ultimately undermines any anti-imperialism reading of the trilogy. All parties, be they gods, allies, metics or Athenians, agree to the jurisdiction and wisdom of the court and its new kind of justice. Not only does this fact undermine an anti-imperialism reading, but it also ultimately supports Athenian judicial imperialism as it came to be practiced in the 450s. The idea of the courts becomes so intertwined with the concept of democracy and Athenian identity that it cannot be understood any other way. Thus, we can see something akin to an "official" representation of Athenian justice represented in *Eumenides* through the figure of Athena. To this paradigmatic representation on the Athenian tragic stage, that center of civic education, may be added another as well, Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*, which suggests that Aeschylus was a part of a much larger trend that positioned Athens, its goddess, and courts as the true heirs of Zeus and his justice.

NOTES

1 Griffith writes concerning audience identification with *Eumenides*, "...the theater audience is assimilated to the vital, but silent, role of the jurors—who are, after all, the characters in the play whose status and points of view most closely resemble theirs...;" Mark Griffith, "Brilliant Dynasts: Power and Politics in the *Oresteia*," *CA* 14 (1995): 77–78.

2 Gagarin suggests that each of the individual characters of the trilogy should be read as part of a larger whole; Michael Gagarin, *Aeschylean Drama* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 58. Each contributes to the creation of a unified identification of "house, family, mythical city, and contemporary city." The House of Atreus as represented by Agamemnon and Orestes "becomes identified with the city of Argos as a

political entity and, in the end, mythical Argos gives way to contemporary Athens." Thus, just as Orestes stands in place of both mythical and contemporary Argos, so to Athena stands in for Athens and its interests in the world of the contemporary Athenian law court.

3 For conservative, see P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on Aristotles' Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 261–63; W.M. Calder, "The Anti-Periklean Intent of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*" in *Aischylos und Pindar*, ed. E.G. von Schmidt (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1981), 220–23; J.R. Cole, "The *Oresteia* and Cimon," *HSPh* 81 (1977): 99–111; D.J. Conacher, *Aeschylus' Oresteia: a Literary Commentary* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 195–206; and Rosenbloom, "Myth," 91–130—though Rosenbloom does not directly state this view, it is implied in his arguments. For Aeschylus as a progressive, see K.J. Dover, "The Political Aspects of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*" *JHS* 77 (1957): 230–37; E.R. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); A.J. Podlecki, *The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 80–100; Sommerstein, *Aeschylean Tragedy* (Bari: Levante, 1996), ch. 12, especially. D.L Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), xi writes on the subject, "The *Eumenides* leaves little room for doubt that its author counted himself among the progressive." Both Simon Goldhill, *Aeschylus. The Oresteia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 89–92 and Christopher Pelling, *Literary Text and the Greek Historian* (London: Routledge, 2000), 164–88 like to see Aeschylus as breaking partisan boundaries. He is, they both suggest, looking to "national" well-being in his hope for a resolution to *stasis*. Griffith would also like to see the text bridging partisan lines (62–129). He argues that Aeschylus is in fact reconciling both groups by both praising the democracy and its institutions and by giving a crucial role to the traditional aristocracy in the government. For a good overview, see Maximillian Braun, *Die Eumeniden des Aischylos und der Areopag* (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1998), whose primary focus is establishing what the actual reforms and function of the Areopagus were. He concludes that Aeschylus was a democrat who saw the Solonian constitution as an ideal democracy and was thus supporting democracy while not supporting radical democracy.

4 C.W. Macleod, *Collected Essays*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 28.

5 Most scholarship on justice in *Eumenides* has tended to focus on Zeus and his role as opposed to Athena's specific connection to a form of justice. In most instances, Athena is seen as nothing but the instrument of Zeus' will: see especially Hugh Lloyd-Jones, "Zeus in Aeschylus," *JHS* 76 (1956): 55–67 and *The Justice of Zeus* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "Clytmnestra and the Vote of Athena" in *Oxford Readings in Greek Tragedy*, ed. Erich Segal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 84–103. For a scathing indictment of Zeus' justice see David Cohen, "The Theodicy of Aeschylus: Justice and Tyranny in the *Oresteia*," *G&R* 33 (1986): 129–40.

6 For example, Alan Sommerstein, *Aeschylean Tragedy*, 183–89 and 272–87.

7 Thalia Papadopoulou, "Representations of Athena in Greek Tragedy," in *Athena in the Classical World*, eds. Susan Deacy and Alexandra Villing (Leiden: Brill Press, 2001), 304.

8 A.M. Bowie, "Religion and Politics in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *CQ* 43 (1993): 18.

9 Some studies of this kind include Conacher, *Oresteia*; Herington, "No-Man's-Land of Dark and Light," in *Aeschylus's The Oresteia*, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea

House, 1988), 121–54; Anne Lebeck, *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Lloyd-Jones, "The Guilt of Agamemnon," in Segal, 55–72. Sommerstein, *Aeschylean Tragedy*; Winnington-Ingram, "Clytemnestra," 84–103; Froma Zeitlin,"The Dynamics of Misogyny: Myth and Mythmaking in the *Oresteia*," in Bloom, 47–72.

10 Sommerstein, *Aeschylean Tragedy*, 439. Michael Anderson suggests that the judiciary initiated allows for "productive political resolution" without "ethical objective judgment" of guilt or innocence; "Myth," in *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*, ed. Justina Gregory (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 124. For further discussion of the movement from retributive justice to legal justice, see Gagarin, 57–86.

11 The discussion of "political" language here will largely be confined to *Eumenides* since the focus of the discussion is on the figure of Athena herself and on the court, although I will address specific aspects of the other plays in the trilogy where needed. For discussions of the political aspects of the trilogy as a whole, see Dodds, 45–63 and Gagarin, 87–118.

12 The same linguistic equivalence found in *Persians* is found early in *Eumenides* (lines 10: ναυπόρους τὰς Παλλάδος; 79: πτόλιν Παλλάδος).

13 Pay for jurors: Aristotle *Politics* 1247a 8–9, *AP* 27.3–4 and Plutarch *Per.* 9.3–5. That pay for jurors was instituted sometime around 450 implies that juries themselves were around before then.

14 The Stoa Poikile and Stoa Basileos were both built sometime around 460 BC. For the Poikile, see. T.L. Shear, Jr. "The Athenian Agora: Excavations of 1980–1982," *Hesperia* 53 (1984): 13–18; and John H. Camp, *The Athenian Agora: Excavations in the Heart of Classical Athens* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1986), 64–72 and figs. 40–44. For the Basileos, see Camp 100–5 and figs. 75–77. For the Odeion, see Alan Boegehold, et al. *The Lawcourts at Athens: sites, buildings, equipment, procedure, and testimonia* (Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1995), 178 and "Philokleon's Court," *Hesperia* 36 (1967): 111–20; it is not known whether the Odeion was used as a court prior to 422 BC. For the Metoicheion, Boegehold, *Lawcourts*, 177–78. The Metoicheion may have been the building in which the Eliaia judged from the 440s to the 420s.

15 The Phaselis decree (IG i^3 10), dated by Meiggs and Lewis between 469 and 450 BC. The dating of this and many of the other inscriptions discussed in this article is debated. Meiggs and Lewis, Wade-Geary and de St. Croix all agree on a window between 469 and 450 BC. Fornara and Sealey suggest a date closer to 450 BC. Mattingly has argued extensively for a date of 428/7 BC or later for this decree and many others. A number of scholars have since agreed, though the arguments for down-dating are as inconclusive as those for earlier dates. While the debate over the date focuses in on the shape of letters, there is much at stake ideologically if we accept an earlier date. I am inclined to disagree with Mattingly's insistence that it only makes sense to date this decree (and many others) to the Peloponnesian War era when Athens was an unashamedly imperial power. Without any corroborating evidence, to say that the Athenians were not already using these methods in the 450s is just supposition. N. Papazarkadas (2009) has recently taken up Mattingly's arguments for re-dating Phaselis, Miletos and Chalcis to the 420s (67–88). Down-dating the inscriptions does not really change anything, however, since lack of knowledge or similar inscriptions from the earlier period does not mean the Athenians were not already "imperialistic." Arguments from silence are never strong, especially

given the sparse number of inscriptions from the fifth century that have been found and restored. Also, despite Papazarkadas' insistence, re-dating one inscription does not "drag[s] effortlessly the date" of others, unless one insists that there was a system to Athenian administration of the *archê*.

16 Mattingly/Papazarkadas: ca. 426/5 BC; Meiggs, Barron and the authors of the *ATL*: ca. 450 BC. Fornara: ca. 442 BC.

17 Mattingly/ Papazarkadas: ca. 424/5 BC; Gomme, Fornara, Sealey, Meiggs, Woodhead and the authors of *ATL*: ca. 446/5 BC.

18 The promotion of democracy was not systemic in the empire but was used were appropriate and in Athens' interests. See recently, Roger Brock, "Did the Athenian Empire Promote Democracy?" in Ma et al, 149–66.

19 Noel Robertson,"The True Nature of the Delian League," *AJAH* 5 (1980): 90 n.47.

20 As Godlewska and Smith put it, "[h]istorically, nothing characterizes geography so tellingly as its close contacts with those either seeking or holding territorial power;" Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith, "Introduction," in *Geography and Empire*, eds. Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 4. Rehm has commented concerning *Eumenides* that, "given Athenian extraterritorial activity in 459, concerns with its Empire do not seem far-fetched;" Rush Rehm, *The Play of Space: Spacial Transformation in Greek Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 94. This is, however, the extent of the comment. For thorough and enlightening discussions of mapping in the ancient world, see James Romm, *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) and Claude Nicolet, *Space, Geography and Politics in the Early Roman Empire* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

21 Kennedy, 40–1.

22 This runs counter to Euben's statement that, "unlike the unconfined daring of Thucydides' Athenians, those in the *Eumenides* are still patient with their inheritance," (76). The Athenians had a fleet roaming the Aegean, troops in Egypt and were about to embark upon a war with Aegina. "Patient" may not be the best word to describe them.

23 Kennedy, 42.

24 For a brief criticism of Rosenbloom's representation of Agamemnon as a negative example of naval adventurism, see Griffith, 79n.66.

25 On Agamemnon as negatively portrayed eastern tyrant, see Rosenbloom, "Myth," 106–9. There are a number of other "negative" terms that shift meaning from the first to third plays of the trilogy. The purple cloth upon which Agamemnon tramples (*Ag.* 946–8) becomes the purple robes symbolizing the Erinyes' new status as *metoikoi* (*Eum.* 1011; 1018). νίκη, originally associated with Clytemnestra (*Ag.* 941) and "fatally flawed," (Sommerstein, *Eumenides*, 239) becomes a νίκη μή κακή (*Eum.* 903) for Athena and Athens. It is a victory, moreover, explicitly tied to other positive forces such as δίκη (911) and σωτηρία (909) and gained not through force of arms but through persuasion. Thus there is a general shift between *Agamemnon* and *Eumenides*. Terms associated negatively with the House of Atreus in *Agamemnon* become positive when associated with Athena and Athens in *Eumenides*.

26 Saïd, 48.

27 Saïd, 48.

[28] Recall Meier, "...with what pride must the Athenians have listened to the long catalogue of Greek cities which had been conquered by Darius only to be liberated by Athens!" (70).

[29] Saïd, 48.

[30] Kennedy, 69.

[31] Alan Sommerstein, ed. *Aeschylus: Eumenides* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) points out that Lysias use this phrase in the fourth century to refer specifically to the Areopagus (219).

[32] Sommerstein remarks upon the juxtaposition of δίκη, σέβας and τάρβος all of which, he says are necessary for σωτηρία (*Eumenides*, 219).

[33] Sommerstein, *Eumenides*, 219.

[34] Douglas MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 117.

[35] According to the Phaselis Decree (IG i^3 10), the earliest known reference to judicial restrictions of allies, cases for allies would have been tried παρὰ τῶι πολεμάρχωι, not in the Areopagus. It is possible that the decree comes prior to the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 BC and it is thought that, before those reforms, magistrates such as the *polemarch* held more power in the courts.

[36] MacDowell, 27.

[37] Sommerstein, *Eumenides*, 15–17.

[38] A.J. Podlecki, ed. *Eumenides/Aeschylus* (Warminster: David Brown Press, 1989), 204. It is also interesting to point out that Greek homicide laws were of a different kind than most legal protections. In his discussion of pollution, Parker suggests that homicide laws themselves often ignore the concept of pollution and are actually throw-backs to the age of retributive justice. He sees this as especially the case when considering cases of inanimate objects. The idea is not to cleanse the population of a possible pollution threat, but rather to exact some payment for the crime or recover damages for irreversible harm done (R. Parker, *Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 116.

[39] Does Aeschylus intentionally represent the court this way? Yes, absolutely. But we can never know to what end exactly. It is more likely, however, that the larger context implied by his representation of the court is the product of forces working on and through Aeschylus rather than him intentionally creating a reference to a very recent Athenian judicial practice. The Athenians, I will argue above, came to identify their freedom and power specifically with courts. This is not in and of itself imperial. Only when we see the convergence of geography and the courts within the play with real imperial practice do we make the connection. Aeschylus, I think, was not in a position to recognize this convergence, but was caught up in it.

[40] It is also interesting that all of the regions mentioned both here and at 397–402 (Libya, Thrace and the Troad) are places taken by Darius in the years before Marathon. These regions were all among the first taken back during the early offensive activities of the Delian League. Rosenbloom ("Myth") and Meier see the same dynamic in *Persians*.

[41] Griffith argues that this phrase is referring to the fact that Orestes via Agamemnon and Zeus, and through him Athena, were δορύξενοι (100). Quincey, "Orestes and the Argive Alliance," *CQ* 14 (1964): 190–206, suggests that this refers to an alliance in which the Athenians would not be required to give military aid to those allies in the future. Neither of these views is mutually exclusive though, the reference in 773 to συμμάχωι δορὶ

suggests that Quincey is incorrect.

42 Robert Garland, *Introducing New Gods: the Politics of Athenian Religion* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992) states when discussing the nature of divine punishment under the *dêmos* in classical Athens that a broken oath amounted to "contempt for their [the dêmos'] majesty" (96). Thus the sort of oath Orestes was swearing would have been to uphold the *dêmos* and so the democracy.

43 The other uses in the *Iliad* are equally ambiguous: 4.235; 4.408; 21.360; 21.428; 23.574.

44 See *Eum.* 289 and 579 in this sense as well as *Supplices* 726 where Aeschylus uses the phrase ἀρωγὸυς ξυνδίκους θ' ἥξω λαβών. Both words for advocate are used together as if ἀρωγός alone were not clear enough. ἀρωγός is used as an adjective at 486 (ἀρωγὰ τῆς δίκης ὁρκώματα) in the sense of "useful" or "serviceable". In *Agamemnon*, the term appears at line 47 (στρατιῶτιν ἀρωγήν) to refer to the military expedition sent to Troy as a μέγας ἀντίδικος. Here it is made very clear that the military expedition itself is the opponent in a lawsuit of sorts, but one tried by strength of arms. In *Agamemnon*, the term is of ambiguous moral value since it refers to an expedition that is inaugurated by an unlawful sacrifice (θυσίαν ἀνομόν, *Ag.* 150) and that is characterized as retributive, violent justice (*Ag.* 525–26, 535; *Cho.* 935–36). For the relationship between ἀρωγός and ἀντίδικος specifically, see B. Daube, *Zu den Rechtsproblemen in Aischylos' Agamemnon*, (Zürich: Niehans, 1939), 96–98. For a more general discussion of the image of the Troajn War in *Agamemnon*, see Daube, 96–124. The association of *hubris* with the war is also discussed by Daube, 119–21. In *Eumenides*, however, Athena is ἀρωγός, a god untainted by the follies of men. Also, in *Eumenides*, Agamemnon himself is deemed δωμάτων ἐπίσκοπον (740) by Athena and ἐπίσκοπος is a term clearly associated with Athena herself within the context of *Eumenides*. ἀρωγός appears in Aeschylus as adjective, substantive and in its verb form first and then get picked up by Plato and the orators. It occurs especially frequently in Plato's *Laws* and it also becomes a common term in inscriptions from the 2nd century BC onwards.

45 Parker, *Religion*, 138.

46 Parker, *Religion*, 140. Apollo feels responsible for Orestes since he acted on the authority of the god's oracle. Perhaps this can also be understood as Apollo recusing himself because of prior involvement with the defendant. Similar logic may have been used to justify Athenian jurisdiction in reality. A Samian or Corcyrean jury might not be trusted to judge its fellow citizens according to Athenian interests.

47 G. E. M. de St. Croix, "Notes on Jurisdiction of the Athenian Empire I," *CQ* 11 (1961): 100–1. Fornara suggests that St. Croix's arguments are "labored" and instead he agrees with Wade-Geary that this inscription is proof of Athenian "judicial hegemony;" Charles Fornara, "The Phaselis Decree," *CQ* 29 (1979): 49–52. Also important, as Fornara points out, is the suggestion in line 10 that the regulations for Phaselis are to follow those already agreed upon regarding Chios. This suggests that this decree, which Fornara dates to the mid-fifth century, is part of a chain of such decrees—a trend, if you will. There is no proof, however, that the allies saw Athenian judicial hegemony as oppressive until the 430s at the earliest.

48 David Bradshaw,"The Aias Myth and the Polis," in *Myth and the Polis*, eds. Dora Pozzi and John Wickersham (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) states in passing, "[t]he Aeschylean trilogy is clearly related to the judicial reforms that made Athens the legal center for trying all homicide cases, indeed, all capital cases involving members of the confederacy" (123). Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this point.

[49] Although he has no evidence, Papazarkadas wants to move the Eryhtrai decree as well. He states: "Instinctively, I regard it as rather unlikely that one single 'imperialistic' text was produced in the 450s, and I wonder whether the Erythrai decree could not be placed along with those concerning Colophon, Miletos and Phaselis near or in the Peloponnesian War" (78). Such an argument is problematice for a number of reasons not least of which is the assumption that all inscriptions much link to already known hisotrical events. Our knowldege of the years between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars is far too limited to make that assumption.

[50] That this decree refers back to an earlier one is suggested by references in the decree to τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα at line 49, τὸ φσέφισμα at line 76 and the article in τὸν hόρκον at line 3; Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, eds. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 140.

[51] Meiggs, 221.

[52] A number of gains accrued to the Athenians from transferring certain court cases to Athens. Primarily would be reducing the ability of those with anti-Athenian or anti-democratic sentiments to pursue frivolous lawsuits against pro-Athenian members of an allied community. In this respect, the *proxenoi* of Athens in these states also would benefit, as de St. Croix suggests. However, those would seem to be the only non-Athenians to benefit from the arrangement.

[53] Kurt Raaflaub, "The Transformation of Athens in the Fifth Century," in Boedeker and Raaflaub, suggests that the Athenians and other Greeks were fully aware of the conversion of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire in the late 460s (20). This coincides precisely with the production of *Oresteia*.

[54] H.A. Shapiro, "Athena, Apollo, and the Religious Propaganda of the Athenian Empire," in *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World: Proceedings of the Uppsala Symposium*, eds. Pontus Hellström and Brita Alroth (Stockholm: Ubsaliensis S. Academiae, 1993), 101–14, gives as proof of this a number of vases which show Apollo and Athena flanking Orestes as well as other vases depicting sacrifices to Athena and Apollo. Euben, however, would disagree: "There is external, though inconclusive evidence that the Athenians regarded Apollo as pro-Spartan at precisely the time Athens was turning away from its onetime ally to that ally's foe, Argos. Moreover, Apollo had given bad—some thought traitorous—advice to the Greeks at the approach of the Persian armies in 480 BC. Finally, some Athenians were apparently critical of what they regarded as the meddling of the god in their internal politics" (80). Euben does not list his "external" sources. The fact that Apollo is representing Argos at Athens in *Eumenides* seems to counter Euben's first statement. Also, the prophecy of Apollo to "trust to your wooden walls" was well enough received by the Athenians—not so traitorous a statement. I find Shapiro's argument for the continued cooperative nature of Apollo and Athena's relationship much more satisfactory especially since the continued cooperation between the two gods would serve as further propaganda for the Athenians.

[55] Sommerstein also points out two moments in the play which seem to support the notion of Athena superseding Apollo (*Eumenides*, 230–34). The first is Athena's assertion at 736–8 of her relationship with Zeus. She says "I am strongly on my father's side" (κάρτα δ' εἰμὶ τοῦ πατρός; 738). The second is Orestes' farewell address. This address, Sommerstein writes, implies that Apollo has now "ceased to be relevant" and underscores Apollo's unmarked exit from the stage. For a different view on the exit of Apollo, see Oliver Taplin, *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: the Dramatic Use of Exits and*

Entrances in Greek Tragedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 403–7.

56 Euben writes, "The Athenians, in alliance with a god [Apollo], defined a way of life as well as a physical one; [that] they have charted a moral and political wilderness as well as a physical one" (32). I would amend that statement slightly. It was Athens, in league with Athena. Apollo just helped them get started. There also seems to be a trend that will emerge in Athenian mythography that supports this reading of Apollo's deference to Athena. The most striking instance is Euripides' *Ion* (see ch. 4).

57 One could think of the United States' hesitance to submit to the World Court or China's attempts to hold extra-territorial judicial control in Singapore. There seems to be something absolutely "submissive" in allowing one nation to provide "justice" for another. It basically means admitting one's own inability to do so or the superior ability of another to do it for you.

58 See Figuera for the definition of a cleruchy and how it differs from a regular colony (40–56). See also now, Alfonso Moreno, "'The Atic Neighbor': The Cleruchy in the Athenian Empire," in Ma et al, 211–21.

59 Meiggs, 260–62. In fact, the decree (IG II^2 43 lines 25–31 and 35–46) bans all types of Athenian ownership in allied territories.

60 This would be in keeping with the practice the Athenians had of creating mythical precedents as justification for colonization, especially myths about the Strymon River region (Parker, *Miasma*, 43).

61 Sommerstein, *Eumenides*, 271.

62 However, we do not know if allies were even in the audience in 458 BC.

63 Justice in *Agamemnon* is couched frequently in the technical terminology of the courts but invariably finds expression in physical violence and revenge. See Lloyd-Jones, *Justice*, comment on line 40; A.J. Podlecki, *Eumenides*, 40–5; and Sommerstein, *Eumenides*, 19.

64 This statement, while agreed upon by the majority of scholars, is contested by Cohen. Cohen argues that the emphasis of Aeschylus on the suffering of innocents such as Iphigeneia should lead one to the conclusion that Zeus' justice is tyrannical and immoral and based on force and fear (129–40). That Athena invokes fear of the Erinyes as part of her "new order" and must threaten them in order to get them to cooperate only confirms Cohen's belief. Cohen, however, has missed two significant points. First, the justice portrayed in *Eumenides* is a progression away from the forms of justice found in *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*. The justice Athena establishes is not based on retribution and it silences the cycle of murder perpetuated by such a concept of right and wrong. Athena's new justice also brings to light the very contradictions in such a system. In a retributive system, one man's right is always another's wrong. The justice embodied in the court of the Areopagus puts a stop to the cycle. The second point Cohen misses relates to fear. He emphasizes the fear that the Erinyes will supply as part of Athens' new order. This fear, he argues, makes the new justice just as tyrannical as the old. But fear does not necessarily mean that fair, impartial justice cannot be present. The Erinyes represent the fear of wrongdoing that should act as a deterrent against harming others.

65 Sommerstein suggests that we understand the jury decision at *Eum.* 711–53 as a mirror of the deliberation scene at *Ag.* 1346ff in which the chorus puts forth a number of views on how to react to Clytemnestra's actions, but, in the end, fail to act (*Eumenides*, 222). Athena, as a foil to Clytemnestra, who takes the indecision of the chorus and makes the

debate moot, takes indecision (the tie) and makes it effective decision (tie goes to the defendant).

66 Daube, 46–47.

67 Rosenbloom, "Myth," 94.

68 Whether her verdict is right or wrong is really irrelevant. In a sense, each party in the trial (and in the entire retributive cycle) is right in some way. What is relevant, however, is the suppression of the violence inherent in this cycle. It can be said that right or wrong, in most cases, are relative labels. The court removes the authority to decide from the individual and puts the good of the community over the good of the individual by disallowing ambiguity. Here is another fine message to send a subject-ally.

69 Richard Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: A Study of Peitho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) accounts for *peitho*'s association with such injustices by claiming that these are instances of false *peitho* (106–8). Clytmnestra's persuasion of Agamemnon is "deception masquerading as *peitho*." *Peitho* itself, according to Buxton, is really a cure or remedy. That this healing power of *peitho* is not present in either *Ag.* or *Cho.* emphasizes the false nature of the *peitho* involved.

70 στέργω δ' ὄμματα Πειθοῦς, ὅτι μοι γλῶσσαν καὶ στόμ' ἐπωπᾶι πρὸς τάσδ' ἀγρίως ἀπανηναμένας (For I love the face of Persuasion because she watched over my tongue and speech toward those goddesses refusing vehemently; 970–72).

71 Buxton, *Peitho*, 58–65.

72 Αγ. οὗτοι γυναικός ἐστιν ἱμείρειν μάχης. Κλ.τοῖς δ' ὀλβίοις γε καὶ τὸ νικᾶσθαι πρέπει. Αγ. ἦ καὶ σὺ νίκην τῆσδε δήριος τίεις; Κλ.πιθοῦ, †κράτος μέντοι πάρες γ'† ἐκὼν ἐμοί (940–43).

73 Buxton suggests that the dynamic emphasizing power and conquest overrides and subordinates *peitho*. It is this dynamic that drives Agamemnon to concede to Clytemnestra and also diminishes the healing power of persuasion itself.

74 Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), states in relation to Athena's threat, "...Tactfully, yet firmly, she reminds the Furies of the thunderbolt of Zeus—which had already been employed against recalcitrant divinities of an older generation (101). The will of Zeus for the evolution of human society is not to be frustrated." The threat, he surmises, is to remind the Erinyes that under the code of "justice" to which Orestes and Apollo subscribed, Orestes was not to blame since his actions were also the will of Zeus. The will of Zeus is absolute. See also Lloyd-Jones, "Zeus," 64.

75 Sommerstein, *Eumenides*, 246.

76 On the court as the embodiment of a new "democratic" justice, see Daube, 54–63.

•CHAPTER THREE•

And Justice For All

The Myth of Ajax Locrus

Aeschylus' *Eumenides* presented its audience with a bold vision of a divinely sanctioned court which promulgated a new type of communally based justice. It was a court that co-opted the audience into the performance itself, and emphasized the collective power of the Athenian people through a form of justice rooted in equality before the law and made manifest through the function of the courts. This justice was not only a fundamental component of democratic society in general, but also of imperial Athens in particular. Beginning in the 450s, and perhaps even earlier, Athens was using its courts as a way to exert control over the allies in the Delian League/Athenian Empire. One underlying principle within the play justified this use of the courts by establishing that this type of justice was desirable. Such justice helped to maintain the proper socio-political order and, given the alternatives, was an improvement over the vindictive justice represented in *Agamemnon* and *Libation Bearers*. Justice was a mechanism of control and an exercise in power, certainly, but one that *Eumenides* promotes as working for the good of the community as a whole—be it polis or *archê*.

A primary function of the justice of Athena's court in *Eumenides* is to put an end to the revenge/reversal cycle of the earlier two plays. Set squarely within the framework of this cycle of revenge and reversal is the sack of Troy (*Ilioupersis*). Agamemnon's death comes not only as a result of Iphigenia's sacrifice or Atreus' crimes against Thyestes but also because of the sack of Troy and the violence perpetrated there.[1] As early as the 6th century BC, the sack of Troy was represented as a hubristic event, in which the Greeks overreached their position as Zeus' sword of justice and instead became the ultimate *hubristai*. Their violations of the gods' temples led to the

scattering of the fleet as it left Troy, resulting in homecomings delayed or completely lost. Because of the crimes of a few, the entire army suffered—and Agamemnon, its leader, as much or more than most.

Eumenides focuses on the establishment of a type of justice, for and by the polis, that works to counter the individuality of the heroic code and instead embraces a democratic, communal ethos. The play emphasizes a justice that puts the community well-being above any desire for glory by an individual, and is thus able to mitigate the harm to the community that comes as a result of individual hubris. This focus on communality is rare in tragedy, although not in fifth-century art in general. As Mills puts it, "[i]n its emphasis on the collective, the *Eumenides* is unusual among tragedies in being closer to the conventions of much public art..."[2] The silent Athenian jurors reflect the same collective identity as the fighters depicted in the Amazonomachies on the Stoa Poikile and Theseion, and as represented in the Marathon painting of the Stoa.[3] What makes the communities represented in these works specifically democratic is not only the emphasis on community over individual, but also the type of justice practiced within those communities. In the Amazonomachy paintings and the Marathon painting, the heroic ethos is adapted to the community so that the people as a whole can gain martial glory, not just an individual hero. In *Eumenides*, Athena's court situates the polis as the new arbiter of Zeus' justice, instead of the wronged individual. These two aspects of democratic ideology—focus on the military glory of the *dêmos* and on communal forms of justice—come together in the myth of Ajax Locrus as found on the Stoa Poikile and in Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*. How one recasts the hubris of the sack of Troy as an Athenian democratic achievement, though, is difficult to say.

The *Ilioupersis* became prominent on at least one public monument in the first half of the fifth century in Athens, the Stoa Poikile. Adaptation of the stories of the sack as part of praise for accomplishments in the Persian Wars had a precedent in epigrams as early as the 470s. In both Simonides' Plataea epigram and the Eion epigram, the Greeks who fought the Medes are compared to king Menestheus and his Athenians who fought at Troy.[4] These simple analogies refer only to those fighting at Troy and do not compare the sack of the city to the actual battles of Plataea and Salamis. The story of the sack of the city does not lend itself to glory so easily. Nonetheless, the Stoa did represent the sack, and scholars have come up with a number of theories on how to reconcile such a hubristic act with the Athenian democratic ideology that informs the rest of the monument. I argue here that it was incorporated into Athenian democratic and imperial ideologies by altering the myth to contain a trial scene presided over (indirectly, perhaps) by Athena.

Just as the courts in *Eumenides* reconcile the vicious revenge/reversal cycle afflicting the House of Atreus, so too does this story appear to set up a similar court as a mechanism for reconciling another of the great transgressors at Troy to his community. Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus* appears to do just this by giving one of the *hubristai*, Little Ajax, his own day in court for violating Athena's temple during the rape of Cassandra. It was supposedly his crime and the failure of the Greeks to punish him for it that led to the scattering of the fleet as it journeyed homeward. In the act of avenging the rape of Helen, the avenger became the perpetrator, thus repeating the revenge/reversal cycle. But in at least one version of the myth even the *hubristai* get their day in court among Athena and her Athenians, because Athenian justice is a type of justice for all that puts an end to vendetta—even among the gods.

As many scholars as have considered the use of the *Ilioupersis* theme in Athenian art, almost as many have ignored the fragments of Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*. Perhaps this is because the majority of scholars writing on it are art historians or archaeologists who, while familiar enough with the extant tragedies, are not as familiar with the plethora of tragic fragments that remain. Neither Castriota nor Ferrari recognize any contemporary tragedies that have the *Ilioupersis* as subject, referring instead to the general outline of the myth of Ajax Locrus, and different parts of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, or *Persians*,

Figure 5. *Ilioupersis*. Ajax rapes Casandra as she clings to Athena's statue. Ca. 460–450 BC. London E470, British Museum, London, UK. © Trustees of the British Museum.

or the later *Trojan Women* for support for their interpretations. As a result, both of their interpretations, as well as those of others, are missing a key clue to unraveling the way in which a story of Greek hubris could be turned into a symbol of Athenian glory.

The traditional story with which most scholars frame their interpretation of the role of the crimes of Little Ajax in the fate of the Greeks at Troy is as follows. First, according to Arctinus' *Sack of Ilium* summarized by Proclus:

> Ajax son of Ileus, while dragging Cassandra away by force, draws along with her Athena's wooden image. On account of this, the Greeks, irritated, decide to stone Ajax to death. He, however, flees to the altar of Athena and is saved from the impending danger. . . Then the Greeks sail off and Athena devises destruction for them on the sea.

In addition, *Odyssey* 4.499–511 tells us that after being shipwrecked in a storm sent by Athena, Little Ajax boasts that he survived despite the gods' wrath. Poseidon then strikes the Gyrean rock where he sits, drowning him in the depths of the sea. Thus, the traditional story of Locrian Ajax has him commit the crime of knocking over Athena's statue. After he has escaped punishment from his fellow Greeks by seeking refuge at her altar, Athena devises his destruction (along with that of all the Greeks) at sea as they make their way home from Troy. Then, after Locrian Ajax somehow survives the storms contrived by Athena, Poseidon is able to kill him for boasting of his indestructible nature.[5]

It is within this frame that most interpretations of the *Ilioupersis* theme in Athenian art are understood. Scholars have looked for ways to ignore the crimes of the Greeks in the sack in order to read the just punishment the Trojans receive for stealing Helen as analogues for the Persians,[6] or reverse the analogy and read the Greeks during the sack (with the exception of the Athenians) as analogues for Persian hubris.[7] The fragments of Sophocles' play, however, suggest a slightly more nuanced approach on the part of the Athenians to this particular aspect of the *Ilioupersis*. Attempting to piece together Sophocles' version can help us understand more fully the prevalence of this myth in fifth-century Athenian public art and, thus, increase our understanding of how tragedies and the myths they contained participated in the process of identity formation in Athens specifically through myths about Athena and justice.

Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*[8]

Only fragments of Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus* remain and, as a result, there is debate as to the details of the play's plot, structure and, of course, date. We

do know that Athena appears on stage as a character, although exactly when in the play is unclear. Most scholars who have worked on the fragments believe that *Ajax Locrus* was produced sometime around 460 BC, although the evidence is, as always, circumstantial. The most frequently cited piece of evidence for this date is the relationship between the play and Polygnotus' *Ilioupersis* painting located on the Stoa Poikile and completed sometime before 460 BC.[9] Concerning this connection, Webster argues:

> I do not deny the connection is weak. . . And why Pausanias only mentions the assembly of the kings to judge lesser Ajax in the Sack of Troy when he describes it as one scene among twenty others in Polygnotus' Sack of Troy at Delphi? It must have dominated the Athenian picture and Sophocles' play may have been the cause.[10]

I will discuss my own theories on a connection between painting and play below, but it is enough to mention at this point that certain coincidental aspects of both play and painting suggest an affinity between the representations of the myth in Athens. Webster's argument presupposes that painting reflects tragedy and never vice versa. This is an attitude that has been under fire in recent years as being too dismissive of artistic developments in the material arts. Polygnotus was a genuine master of his art. There is no reason at all to assume that his painting must be derivative of a play but that does not mean the two are not connected.[11]

However, there are two vase paintings that contain an element that is, so far as we can tell, not part of the pre-Sophoclean versions of the myth. This suggests that at least some paintings may represent the play. In the first, one side of the vase depicts Cassandra clinging to the statue of Athena (Figure 6).[12] On the other side, are Ajax and an unnamed female figure fleeing the scene of the crime. This female figure has been identified as the priestess of Athena and wife of Antenor, Theano whose son Helicaon appears as a character in the play. If it is Theano, then, it would seem that these vases portray Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus* as suggested by the dialogue at *Oxy.* 3151, fr. 4. These vases are dated securely to the mid-fifth century BC which would mean Sophocles' play was produced some time earlier, though not necessarily too much earlier.[13] In addition, Sourvinou-Inwood has suggested that an increase in vases after 450 BC that depict Athena as both statue and god are influenced by Sophocles' play.[14]

In addition to appeals to external representations of the myth to secure a date, scholars have tried to find references within the play itself that may suggest early or late production. The most frequently cited are a reference in fr. 5.10 to captive women (αἰχμαλωτ-) and a reference in fr. 2.1 to Lycurgus. The first reference led Zielinsky to identify *Ajax Locrus* with another play, *Captive Women*, which told of the events after the sack of Troy and had as its

chorus a group of spear-won women and is known to have been one of Sophocles' earliest plays.[15] The simple occurrence of the word in a scene, however, does not mean it refers to the chorus. Halsam suggests that a reference to Lycurgus in one fragment may be an intertextual reference to versions of this myth that had been recently staged by both Aeschylus in another connected trilogy, the *Lycourgeia* (date uncertain) and by Polyphrasmon (467 BC).[16] The use of the name Lycourgus in a play does not necessitate intertextuality. He is a known mythical villain, so a reference to him is appropriate, just as reference to captive women is appropriate in a play about the sack of Troy.

Both of these identifications are tenuous. But Zielinsky's has been popular to the extent that most scholars mentioning *Ajax Locrus* say "produced around 460 BC," and so it merits further comment. Zielinsky states that the chorus of *Captive Women/Ajax Locrus* would have been made up of captured Trojan women. Halsam points out, however, that Athena addresses Argives in her speech.[17] This speech is followed in the text by a choral ode, and so we may reasonably assume that Athena was addressing the chorus—indicating that they are Greeks, not Trojan Women. Also contrary to Zielinsky, Halsam has suggested, based on fr. 4, that this play requires three actors, thus pushing its production date into the 440s at the earliest. Even given the weakness of Zielinsky's argument, a series of structural elements that can be discerned within the play suggest more strongly that this play falls into what Plutarch called Sophocles' "Aeschylean" period which lasted until around 460 BC and during which Plutarch (*Mor.* 79b) suggests Sophocles imitated the style of Aeschylus.

The first of these elements involves Zielinsky's disputed identification of *Ajax Locrus* and *Captive Women.* For his identification to hold up the chorus must be captive Trojan women. As Halsam argues, fr. 4 suggests a chorus of Argives. Both Zielinsky and Halsam can be correct if we posit a secondary chorus. Halsam sees no real justification for this, but exactly this type of arrangement occurs in *Eumenides* with a primary chorus of Furies and a secondary, silent chorus of Athenian jurors. If this *is* a trial scene similar to that of *Eumenides*, then a silent jury would not be unheard of. Even if we dismiss Zielinsky's identification of *Ajax Locrus* with *Captive Women*, we need not dismiss the possibility of a double chorus.

Halsam's suggestion that three actors are necessary for fr. 4 is also unfounded. This type of scene has precedents in Aeschylus' *Persians* and (if it does precede *Ajax Locrus*) *Oresteia.*[18] The scholiasts have marked speakers in the margins of the fragment and from those markings it appears that this is a scene between Helicaon (son of Antenor), the Chorus (one cannot tell whether it is men or women—either scenario can be postulated), and Talthy-

bios (Greek messenger). Three actors, in fact, are not needed, since the Chorus Leader would act as one. In *Persians* a similarly structured dialogue takes place between Atossa, the Chorus, and the Messenger. In the *Oresteia*, multiple incidents of this sort occur—between Clytemnestra, a messenger and the Chorus in *Agamemnon* as well as between Athena, the Furies, and either Apollo or Orestes in *Eumenides*. In each case, there are three figures on stage who speak (two actors and the chorus leader) but only two of them participate in conversation at a given time. The scene does not need three actors nor does it violate any early convention of two speakers in dialogue at a time. Such a dialogue structure also shows a chorus more integrated into the action of the play—a more common occurrence in Aeschylean tragedy than is found in later tragedy. The structural similarities between Sophocles' fragments and Aeschylean plays combined with Plutarch's assessment of Sophoclean tragedy as being more like Aeschylean strongly suggests an early date for *Ajax Locrus* in either the 460s or early 450s. Further evidence for a date close to that of *Oresteia* rests on both the existence of a trial within the play and the vision of justice such an insertion into the myth supports.

The date of the play, while seemingly a minor point, is actually an important consideration in any attempt to reconstruct the content of the play. The influence of ideologies and immediate historical context upon the way a myth is represented in tragedies can clearly be seen in the Electra plays. Would someone in 456 BC ever consider representing Electra and Orestes as Euripides does 40 years later? When *Ajax Locrus* was performed, then, is a matter of some importance. In the same way, reconstruction of the content may also help in better securing a date since trends in painting and tragedy might manifest themselves more in certain periods. Despite the uncertainty that will surround the content of *Ajax Locrus* without a complete (or, more complete) manuscript being found, one aspect of the plot seems to be universally accepted by scholars: Little Ajax was put on trial in the play, perhaps in a manner similar to Orestes in *Eumenides*.

The fragment from which this assumption derives is 3151 fr. 5:[19]

Κασ]άνδ[ρα
]φημιτ[
]εμης .[
]γταμ[
]ετο .[
]α . γτε[
]παιδατ[
]αργειων . [
]. προξενονδ[
]γαιχμαλω[τ
]δ' αποψη[φιζεσθαι

]ταδ' είμ[ι
]ταδραῖς . [
]ναγψ[
15 ψῆφος] . ἐκράν[θη[20]
] . τὰ ψηφ[ίσματα
] . ενογ[
] . [

The restorations, minimal as they are, have equivalents in the plays of Aeschylus and Euripides. The most important of the restorations, however, has no parallel in tragedy and is the one that most strongly suggests that the trial represented here is specifically cast in the terms of the Athenian democracy; line 11: ἀποψηφίζεσθαι "acquit."[21] This word occurs exclusively in prose. In fact, if this restoration is correct (which the remaining letters make very likely), it would be the only known occurrence of the word in extant poetry. The restoration makes sense, however, if we understand that this is a play staged by an Athenian, for Athenians. The term is a technical legal term, just as is τὰ ψηφίσματα in line 16.[22] In addition, ψῆφος ἐκράνθη in line 15 is found in trial/voting scenes in Aeschylus (*Supp.* 943 and 946; *Eum.* 347) and Euripides (*Androm.* 1237; *Trojan Women*, 785; *Hec.* 219). Fr 12.6 contains the letters μαρτ- which Halsam restores as a form of μάρτυς which again suggests a trial.[23] Thus the fragments suggest a vote (ψῆφος ἐκράνθη) which perhaps led to an acquittal (ἀποψηφίζεσθαι) and then the decision was issued as a decree (τὰ ψηφίσματα).[24] Nor should the notion of Sophocles inserting an Athenian democratic-style trial scene into the *Ajax Locrus* be surprising. For, as the plays of Aeschylus and Euripides also show, the idea of a democratic institution existing in mythical times was not viewed by Athenians as anomalous.[25] In fact, it was expected that the myth be translated into contemporary terms, and it may have been expected that certain important aspects of Athenian culture be shown to have their roots in the heroic period.[26]

The myth of Ajax Locrus as adopted into Athenian terms derives directly from the epic versions of Arctinos and Homer. According to the *Sack of Ilium*, the Greeks decided to stone Ajax for his crime; it is only his fleeing to the altar of Athena that saves him. Two possible reconstructions of the play are thus open when considering how the trial might be an adaptation of the traditional story. First, in Sophocles' version, the decision making process by which the Greeks decide to stone Little Ajax could be the trial itself. Thus, the deciding takes place in a courtroom setting, and the stoning becomes not literal, but rather a part of the trial-process. For what other stones did the Athenians themselves throw on a regular basis other than their voting pebbles (ψῆφοι) into their voting urns in courts and in the assembly (reflected in

line 15)? Ajax's fate is then decreed in a manner consistent with a trial in fifth-century Athens (τὰ ψηφίσματα).

A second reconstruction (and the one I think is stronger) entails the trial taking place after the decision to stone Little Ajax had been made by the Greeks, and after he had fled to the altar of Athena for refuge. This would coincide more with Aeschylus' myth-making in *Eumenides*, where Orestes seeks refuge with Athena and there finds justice in the form of the newly founded Athenian Areopagus. Within the framework of this reconstruction, Ajax would have been condemned already by the Argives, and then would have fled to the altar. This reconstruction may make more sense, as a fragment immediately preceding the trial scene is actually a speech by Athena. It would also explain why Little Ajax, having already been condemned to stoning, would have been free to venture home on the ships of the Argives later. He must be acquitted of his crime somehow, and a trial by jury allows for this in a way that simply cowering at Athena's altar until the other Greeks leave Troy does not. It also helps account for Athena's appearance in the middle of the play, rather than the beginning or end.

According to the epic sources, which are picked up by Euripides later in his *Trojan Women*, it is Athena who contrives the storms that destroy the Greeks as they sail home from Troy. She does so because the Greeks fail to punish Ajax for knocking over her statue—even though she tells us that they intended to stone him. Often it is within the framework of Euripides' version that the myth of Ajax Locrus is generally understood and within which these fragments have been read. I suggest, however, that we should not assume that the play ended with his destruction at sea or that Athena had anything to do with it. Instead, I propose that Athena's anger is what leads to the trial and acquittal of Ajax; the destruction of the ships, if it is alluded to at all within the play, is Poseidon's doing. I base this conclusion on four things. First, there is an alternate tradition of the myth in which Ajax does not rape Cassandra and so the play could, in fact, refelct this alternative, with Ajax being acquitted of a false charge at the end.[27] Second, as mentioned above, Ajax must avoid being stoned and contrive to make the journey home from Troy. Third, the positioning of Athena's speech in the play in relation to the trial scene and the nature of her words suggest that she discovers Ajax in her temple before any trial takes place. Only after her speech does legalistic language appear in the fragments. Fourth, I suggest that we should read Athena within the play by analogy with the Athena in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, not Euripides' *Trojan Women*, despite the fact that the opening of Euripides' plays addresses the myth of Ajax Locrus. Aeschylus' representation of Athena, closer in time and in political temper, offers a more

appropriate context for resonstruction of Sophocles' version of the myth and presentation on stage.

One of the most extensive fragments from the play is part of a speech by Athena. If this is a trial over which she presides, then how she is represented in the play is of central importance:

ποίου Δρύαντος κ[λ]εινὸς ἐγγόν[
Τροίαν ἐπεστράτευσεν, Ἀργεῖοι; τ[ίς ἦν,
ὃς τἄργα ταῦτα πρὸς θεοὺς ἐμή[σατο;
μῶν τῶν ἔνερθεν ἐξανέστηκ[εν
ὁ βυ[ρ]σοφώνης28 Ζηνὶ Σαλμωνε[υς ἔπι
τίν[ος γὰρ ἀνδρὸ]ς εἰκάσω τάδ' ἔργ[ματα;
ὅστι[ς . . . .c. ix. . .]ακόλλητον βρέ[τας κρηπῖδος ἐξέσ]τρεψεν,
ἐκ δὲ φοι[βαδος. . .

Did the famous offspring of one such as Dryas' son come to fight at Troy, Argives? Who was it who dared such things against the gods? Is it that Salmoneus who imitated the thunders of Zeus arose from among those below? What man's [work] shall I compare to these deeds? Whoever . . . overturned my image from its foundation, from Pheobus' priestess. . . (3151, fr. 2).

Athena is rather angry here, and this anger has caused a number of scholars to compare her with Athena in both *Ajax* and *Trojan Women*.[29] However, given the dramatic context, her anger is justified. The final line of the fragment suggests that Athena makes these comments upon finding her statue overturned. It is at the same time, I suggest, that she sees Little Ajax clinging to her altar, the evidence of his crime, the fallen statue, still lying where he had knocked it in his pursuit of Cassandra. Athena seems to appear in the middle of the story in order to drive some action within the play. Thus, the play to this point likely represented the crime itself and the decision of the Greeks to stone him. Although Halsam finds it difficult to reconcile an appearance of Athena in the middle of the play with other such epiphanies in Sophoclean tragedy,[30] it is not difficult to reconcile such an appearance with an Aeschylean tragedy—namely, *Eumenides*, where Athena appears once Orestes has made his way to Athens to her altar and sits clinging to it in supplication. The fact that the fragments containing the trial language follow this speech suggests strongly that Athena discovers Ajax at her altar and then initiates the trial. Again, parallels with *Oresteia* are not difficult to find in the structure of Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*.

If this play ended with the destruction of Ajax by Poseidon, or in some way in agreement with the epic version, Athena's angry speech here is not the impetus for it. What I suggest instead is that Athena's speech is actually the impetus for the trial. My reconstruction, based on the language and order of the fragments, is that the play began with Ajax's rape of Cassandra at the

altar of Athena, followed by the decision to stone him. Next he flees back to the altar for refuge where Athena appears on stage to discover both her statue overturned and the culprit seeking refuge. She then orders a trial which ends in an acqittal of Ajax on some grounds; this ends the play.[31]

This restoration of events in the play has parallels, as mentioned, in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. In *Eumenides*, Athena appears on stage in the middle of the play to find a suppliant at her altar, as well as his accusers. She initiates a trial by jury with Athenians as jurors (probably a silent chorus, with the audience implied as jurors as well) in order to decide the guilt or innocence of the suppliant, who leaves at the end of the play, a friend and ally of Athens. We can not know exactly how much Sophocles' play shared this structure, given the fragmentary state of the play, but we can know that it, too, has a hero supplicating at the altar of Athena, with his accusers (Cassandra, Theano, the other Greeks) present. In addition, Athena appears midplay followed by what appears to be a trial. Further parallels between *Ajax Locrus* and *Eumenides* can be seen if we examine the play in light of the *Ilioupersis* painting of Polygnotus in the Stoa Poikile.

Scholars have assumed that a direct link exists between the painting in the Stoa and Sophocles' play. Although that connection may not be one of painting reflecting play, it still makes sense to look at the two alongside of one another when attempting to understand the adaptation of this particular myth from its epic context to an Athenian one. While the difference between the epic and Sophoclean versions may seem a trifle to some, the implications are not insignificant when trying to understand developing civic and imperial identity in Athens between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. This can only be understood if we consider the central role of the myth of Ajax Locrus and its prominence in the Stoa Poikile, a Cimonian monument to Athenian victories in the Persian Wars.[32] They may have been produced independently of one another, but they both reflect similar cultural influences and perhaps a larger trend in Athenian representations of the *Ilioupersis* in civic contexts.

Polygnotus' Ilioupersis

The Stoa Poikile was completed sometime around 460 BC. According to Pausanius (1.15), it contained four paintings, three of which showed the battle of Marathon, the *Amazonomachy* and the destruction of Troy (*Ilioupersis*). The fourth was historical like Marathon and may have shown either a battle against the Spartans at Argive Oinoe or the arrival of the Plataeans before Marathon.[33] Two historical paintings, two mythical. Buxton says of the Stoa paintings:

> In this prominent location, the contrast between Athenian and non-Athenian received strong visual affirmation. At the same time, conflicts were assimilated to mighty combats of the heroic past, so that an implicit link emerged between various examples of "Other"—Spartan, Amazon, barbarians."[34]

Francis and Vikers also see this dynamic in the paintings. Specifically of the *Amazonomachy* and destruction of Troy they write, "Both express the triumph of Greeks over the Oriental, the one at home, the other abroad."[35] They see the *Ilioupersis* as an allegory for eastern victories at Mycale, Byzantium and Eurymedon.[36] Hölscher understands it less as an allegory of real military victories and more ideologically, saying, "The painting of the fall of Troy in the Stoa Poikile stressed the moral implications of the victory of the Greeks over mythical orientals."[37] This interpretation seems appropriate in the case of a parallel between the paintings of Marathon and the *Amazonomachy*, especially since the hero of the *Amazonomachy*, Theseus, was pictured rising from the dead to aid the Athenians at Marathon.[38]

Concerning the *Ilioupersis* painting, however, I find such an interpretation suspect. Lillian Jeffrey stated long ago that it was not immediately obvious why the sack of Troy would be so prominent on an Athenian monument, "since only a few meager Athenian notes of triumph could be struck from it." Others are also apprehensive about why the sack of Troy would have been so prominent. The sack, as texts like Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* and representations on vase paintings makes clear, was not an event noted for its piety. In fact, the chorus of *Agamemnon* gives the sack and desecration of the temples in Troy as a prominent reason for both Agamemnon's death and for the destruction of the Greek fleet journeying home. Visual images of the sack portray it as a savage slaughter.[39] It was not an act of triumph, but of great hubris on the part of the Greeks.[40] In the *Nekyia* painting at the Cnidian Lesche on the wall opposite that *Ilioupersis* (also by Polygnotus), the primary figures from the sack of Troy are all found among the *hubristai* in Hades. These associations make it difficult to understand the *Ilioupersis* painting in the Stoa as a monument to Athenian victory over the eastern "Other" on par with Marathon and the repelling of the Amazons.

Gloria Ferrari has forwarded an interesting theory that the painting (and the metopes on the Parthenon) actually assimilates the Persians to the Greeks at Troy. This is done, she argues, by representing the myth as a "tragic example of the use of violence as a means of justice."[41] Specifically, both the Persians and the Greeks at Troy burn the holy shrines of the city they sack, which angers the gods and leads to their destruction during their voyage home. For Ferrari, in order for the *Ilioupersis* to fit appropriately on the Stoa and the Parthenon, the myth must function as some sort of analogy, but she concludes it cannot have undergone the radical transformation supposed by

Castriota, Buxton, and others that would have turned the sack into a symbol of Greek glory.[42] Thus the *Ilioupersis* in Athenian art, she suggests, is a condemnation of the event that is meant not "to praise the Athenians but to blame the Achaeans."[43] The exception is in the representation of the Athenian contingent. Menestheus, Demophon and Acamas are not depicted as *hubristai* but as exemplars of *sôphrosunê*. I agree with this conclusion concerning the myth's general use in Athenian art, but in the case of the Stoa painting and Sophocles' play, I think we need to go further.

Ferrari comes very close to explaining, I think, the presence of the *Ilioupersis* on the Stoa (though her focus is primarily on the Parthenon). The answer to its presence on the Stoa, however, lies more in what is actually portrayed in the painting and represented in Sophocles' play, and less in the generalities of the myth. Only a limited number of analogies can be found between the sack of Troy and the Persian invasion since the sack itself is not the focus of the Stoa painting; the fate of Ajax Locrus is.

Reconstructions of the *Ilioupersis* on the Stoa Poikile are based primarily on Pausanias' description of both the Stoa and Delphic versions.[44] Pausanius describes the painting as follows:

> ἐπὶ δὲ ταῖς Ἀμαζόσιν Ἕλληνές εἰσιν ἡρηκότες Ἴλιον καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς ἠθροισμένοι διὰ τὸ Αἴαντος ἐς Κασσάνδραν τόλμημα· καὶ αὐτὸν ἡ γραφὴ Αἴαντα ἔχει καὶ γυναῖκας τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἄλλας τε καὶ Κασσάνδραν.
>
> After the Amazons are the Greeks having taken Troy and the kings gathered together on account of the outrage of Ajax against Cassandra. This picture holds Ajax himself and both Cassandra and the other captive women (Paus. 1.15.3).[45]

The painting is not like earlier representations of the Sack of Troy. In fact, there is no "sacking" represented in the Stoa painting so far as can be told. The Greeks have already sacked the city (ἡρηκότες Ἴλιον). What is central to the painting is Little Ajax with his hand on an altar as if swearing an oath.[46] The two Greeks on the opposite side of the altar are thought to be none other than Acamas and Demophon, the sons of Theseus. Menestheus is also conjectured to have appeared among the gathered Greeks trying Ajax.[47] Also present may be a few dead or captured Trojans[48] and then groupings of captured Trojan women. A female figure seated on the far left with head in hands is probably Cassandra. In likely contrast to the Delphic version in the Cnidian Lesche, there is no destruction, no violence, no sacking, only the trial. Thus, we have the "local" Athenian flavor Buxton claims for the painting[49] because it portrays the only Athenian figures at Troy as prominent in the trial. It is not the "fall of Asiatic Troy as a guise for the defeat of Persia" as Castriota would have it,[50] but rather the trial of one of the *hubristai* being

conducted by the Athenians at, I suggest, the altar of Athena where he sought refuge from stoning at the hands of the other Argives. Thus, it *is* a painting that condemns the Achaeans at Troy, as Ferrari suggests, but it also praises the Athenians.

This brings us back to Sophocles' fragments. What I am suggesting for the painting is that this scene represents a trial conducted by Athenians. This trial is not a metaphor for the Greek victory or moral superiority over Persian barbarians, nor does it necessarily make analogy between Achaean and Persian *hubris*. Rather, it is about Athenian *sôphrosunê* and moral superiority in light of other Greeks' hubris. Locrian Ajax, a fellow Greek, is submitting to the judgment of the only representatives of Athens at Troy (and so, to the justice of the Athenians). This is not a comment on Greeks and Persians, but on Athenians and other Greeks.[51] The painting is a nod to the rationale behind the growing Athenian practice of exporting democracy and, more specifically, the Athenian legal system to the members of the Delian League, which had by the 460s already become the de facto Athenian Empire and which we have already seen reflected in *Eumenides*.[52] Recall that Athenians identified jury trials quite closely with their democracy. For them, it was its defining characteristic, which this painting underscores. Hölscher argues that the Athenians justified their empire through certain monuments, and he includes the Stoa in this category.[53] The paintings of Marathon and the *Amazonomachy* clearly seem to fit here. The only way to make a hubristic act like the sack of Troy into a triumph for Athens is to make it a display of Athenian virtue. Thus, Athenian justice, embodied in their democratic institutions, put an end to the flow of blood and destruction at Troy.

The trial scene depicted in the painting makes better sense as a monument to Athenian moral superiority if understood in conjunction with Sophocles' play (as well as Aeschylus' *Eumenides*). As Boedeker puts it, "...Athens preferred to allude to its recent achievements with mythical parallels rather than show them directly."[54] While I agree with Small that Polygnotus was not compelled to follow any literary authority in his design of the paintings,[55] it is more than coincidence that Sophocles' insertion of a trial into his own, contemporaneous version of the same myth should contain a trial scene that uses fifth-century, specifically Athenian, legal language. Perhaps the play was meant to bring the painting to life? Perhaps the play was depicting, as Aeschylus' *Oresteia* does, a move from archaic forms of justice to the justice of the democratic courts which were becoming so prominent in Athens at that time.

Pearson refers to the Polygnotus painting in his discussion of Sophocles' fragments. He cites Wyse who sees a connection between the trial scene in the painting and what he describes as "the exculpatory oath which is pre-

scribed as a mode of trial by primitive systems of jurisprudence."[56] Pearson, however, had never seen fr. 5 since it was discovered many years after his volume was published. The language in the fragment is related directly to contemporary Athenian courtrooms, not "primitive jurisprudence." Sophocles has taken what may have been an exculpatory oath in earlier versions of the myth and contextualized it for a fifth-century Athenian audience. It was a contextualization an Athenian audience would have appreciated as being related to both the painting and their everyday courtroom process.

If we examine painting and play together, we can better reconstruct how the myth of Ajax Locrus was presented in fifth-century public art and how this was significant in understanding how the Athenians conceived of justice as a part of their democratic identity. We can also better understand how this was projected out to the allies, since both the tragedy and the Stoa painting were part of a trend of Athenian self-representation that was intended to promote a certain vision of Athens and her past to non-Athenians as much as to citizens.

Athens' Justice Culture

There is something important at stake in understanding Sophocles' fragment and Polygnotus' painting, as well as Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, as part of a larger ideological trend. Boedeker writes "In a sense, myths exist only to be 'manipulated' for contemporary purposes."[57] This particular myth is no different. Those contemporary purposes are dictated by one's geography and moment in time. In Athens of the mid-fifth century, this new, court-based justice was a central aspect of Athenian political life—civic and imperial. While the date of Sophocles' play is not certain, it most likely was produced sometime around 460 BC. This situates its performance around the time of the completion of the Stoa, and around the same period as Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. In fact, one of the strongest indicators for such a production date is its affinity with these other works. Justice, specifically Athenian, democratic justice, was the focus of all three.

In the *Oresteia*, Athena's court puts an end to the cycle of violence that threatens to destroy not only the House of Atreus, but also the polis itself. There is a clear line of descent in who can decide what is and what is not just. Zeus is the arbiter of justice. He authorizes Athena to act in his stead, and she authorizes the Athenians. Apollo, the Erinyes, and Orestes all acquiesce to this chain of authority and concede that the Athenian jury does have the right, via its relationship to Athena and Zeus, to decide what is and is not just.[58] This is not to suggest that the Athenians really thought that their laws, as defended by and arbitrated by the democratic courts, were divinely

sanctioned laws as such. There is a difference between the development of their real legal system and the myth-making process that defined it in popular culture.[59] This difference in descent may also be apparent in *Ajax Locrus*. Here, Athena is the offended party, and so orders a trial to be held to decide upon the guilt or innocence of Little Ajax. They are not in Athens but in Troy, so no jury of Athenians may be had as in *Eumenides*. Instead, the trial takes place at Athena's altar and the only Athenians thought to be at Troy, Menestheus and the sons of Theseus, lead the jury of Argives. Exactly how the trial proceeded is unclear.[60] All we know is that Ajax must have been judged innocent if his final watery destruction at the hands of Poseidon was to take place (though that destruction may not be alluded to or represented in this play). The point is that it is a divinely sanctioned trial headed by Athenians. As in *Eumenides*, the Athenians of *Ajax Locrus* preside over a non-Athenian Greek at the behest of Athena. The same sort of inferences concerning the relationship between Athenian democratic and imperial practices can be made.

Athena's justice in *Eumenides* puts an end to a cycle of violence via a court which has been granted jurisdiction over a non-Athenian. Most scholars understand the founding of the Areopagus by Athena in *Eumenides* as a nod to Athens' most treasured of democratic principles: the right to a trial by jury. The courts, however, were not only a right within democratic Athens, meant to secure the freedoms of its citizens. They were also becoming a tool for subjugating members of the Delian League/Athenian Empire. Perhaps as early as the 460s, but definitely by 453 BC, the Athenians were exporting their form of justice, represented by the court, to members of the League such as Erythrai and Phaselis whether those allies wished it or not.[61] The Athenians of Thucydides (2.34) argue that their democracy is one of the things that made Athens strong. The Empire showed them using democratic institutions like the courts to strong arm others.

It is also quite remarkable to consider, within an imperial framework, the implications of the goddess Athena appearing in the play and likely establishing the court that hears Little Ajax's case, for she is the wronged party, unlike her appearance in *Eumenides*, when neither Agamemnon nor Clytemnestra had anything to do with Athens. She is the one whose sanctuary was violated. This violation does bring to mind, however, Orestes' oath to uphold his alliance with Athens against those who break their oaths to Athens (*Eum.* 772–74) and it hints at some very real issues in the Delian League at this time. According to Thucydides, the first activity of the League under Athenian leadership was to take Eion in Thrace (1.98.1). After this, events move rapidly. Carystos was forced to join the Delian League (1.98.3) and, shortly after this, the Athenians captured Scyros and colonized it (1.98.2).[62] Naxos,

then, attempted to leave the League but was besieged and persuaded to remain a member (1.98.4).[63] Around the same time as affairs in Naxos were being settled, Thasos revolted and an Athenian colony was settled at Ennea Hodoi, near the Strymon River (1.100.2–3).[64] Amidst all of this activity, the Athenians earned a decisive victory over the Persian fleet at Eurymedon in 466 BC. Around 460 BC, Athens had a fleet in Cyprus so that when the Libyan king, Inaros, attempted to put Egypt into revolt against their Persian overlords, the Athenians were able to send aid. This they did and, by 458 BC, they had sailed down the Nile and taken most of Memphis from the Persians (1.104).

While League forces were fighting in the east, the Athenians, with their allies, the Argives and Thessalians, were butting heads with the Spartans. The Argive alliance was formed in 462 BC and another alliance with the Thessalians followed shortly thereafter (1.102.4). All of the actions of the Athenians and their mainland allies are not known; but the Athenians surely fought the Corinthians at Halieis and the Peloponnesians at Cecryphalia around 459 BC (1.105.1). Sometime after this, the theater of war shifted into Boeotia where the Spartans and their allies defeated the Athenians and theirs at Tanagra. The Athenians then countered with a victory at Oenophyta about two months later (1.108.1–2). Around this same time, the Athenians defeated the Aeginetans and brought them into the League (1.108.3–5).

All this activity, especially the struggles with Naxos, Thasos and Carystos, as well as the alliance with Argos, suggests an already aggressive expansionism on the part of Athens in the years between the Persian Wars and the productions of *Eumenides* and *Ajax Locrus*.[65] One aspect of this change involved the intensification of Athenian control over her allies through legal procedures. The mention of alliances in which the ally swears to help enforce the oaths of other allies suggests, as well, a slight anxiety about the allies. But Athena, when her sanctuary is violated and her statue overturned (or Athens when a once ally chooses to revolt), has no need to resort to violence or to call upon others to fulfill this oath. Instead, she can find justice through her courts. Even the most heinous crime by the most hubristic offender can be settled through the courts. Athena need not seek revenge. She has justice instead—another positive message from a benevolent hegemon to its allies.

This interpretation presupposes that the play actually ends with (or nearly ends with), the trial. It also suggests a close affinity in reconstruction with *Eumenides*, a theory that does have problems, especially given that *Ajax Locrus* is likely the earlier of the two plays. The myth-revision process makes better sense, however, if we consider the two plays in this order. The myth of Ajax Locrus at Troy always had as an element some sort of decision making

Figure 6. Voting on the Arms of Achilles . Athena stands as judge while the Achaeans, including Odysseus and Ajax, cast votes. Ca. 490–480 BC. Brygos Painter. London E69, British Museum, London, UK. © Trustees of the British Museum.

process, perhaps some form of archaic jurisprudence, whereby the Argives decided first to stone him and then to let him go unpunished. In addition, Athena was always already intimately related to the myth. It was her sanctuary violated, and her wrath that exacted final justice from Ajax. Thus, adapting the myth did not involve reinventing the myth to reflect favorably on the Athenians and their patron deity. It simply entailed shifting the terminology surrounding the decision making process from a reflection of archaic jurisprudence to Athenian-specific, democratic jurisprudence. It also likely entailed ending the play before Athena destroyed the fleet with storms and instead showing her, like the Furies, accept and support the jury's verdict. This is not a radical departure from the epic version and, as such, does not inhibit the use of the myth as an exemplar as much as reimagining the myth to serve as a Persian war analogy would—especially if such a reimagining entails aligning the Trojans with the Greeks and the Greeks with the Persians as Ferrari does.

Aeschylus' re-visioning of the myths of the House of Atreus does involve a radical departure from the epic versions of those myths, but perhaps the way for his revolutionary turn was paved by Sophocles' milder adaptation. Polygnotus' painting on the Stoa shifted the focus away from the sack of Troy (and thus away from hubris) to the trial of Ajax Locrus under the guidance of the Athenians at Troy. Sophocles' play moves the trial from archaic to Athenian and democratic jurisprudence, giving a prominent role to

Athena not as vengeful but as just in a new and truly Athenian way. Aeschylus then took a myth that had no original connection to Athens and adapted *it* to this new Athenian type of justice. His representation was all the more powerful because there were no associations for Athena or the Athenians with hubris within the myth as there were in the myth of Ajax Locrus. Instead, he was able to represent Athena's justice and, by proxy, her Athenians, as untainted by greed and worthy of reverence—a justice that others should stand in awe of and desire for themselves.

I am not suggesting that Sophocles was intentionally creating or supporting a justification for the judicial imperialism that emerged in the mid-fifth century. Rather Sophocles, like Aeschylus and Polygnotus, was subject to certain ideological constraints. Hölscher states of Athenian monuments:

> They proclaim a public message and demand its general and collective approval. In this sense, monuments represent and create identity; in fact, they are the concrete expression of such identity, be it of a whole community or groups or individuals within this community.[66]

Tragedy is, in many ways, no different than a public monument or a democratic institution, such as the assembly, in the way it participates in the creation and maintenance of civic identity. The interpretive community, however, would be just as much a passive recipient of these identities as it would be an active creator. The touting of Athenian judicial practices and the freedoms it guaranteed in the public sphere would perhaps lead to its becoming a tool of Empire and subjugation rather than a guarantor of freedom, because initially the Athenians were so proud of it, and because they became convinced that it *did* make them morally superior to other Greeks.

The patriotic fervor that carried them in the wake of the Persian Wars transferred to their political system. The victories in the Persian Wars were a result of the democracy in their minds and civic myths. Thus, their identity became intimately attached to both their system of government and their military victories, fueling not only their vigorous pursuit of the Persians in the Aegean up until the Peace of Callias in 454 BC,[67] but also the spreading of democratic institutions like the Assembly and the courts to allies. The desire to represent their most cherished of democratic institutions, the courts, as not only exceptionally fair and sanctioned by the gods, but also as very ancient, should not surprise anyone. As Greg Anderson argues concerning the democracy itself, the Athenians sought to show in their public works that almost as long as there had been Athenians, they had been a democracy. Just as the democracy dated back to Theseus, so too did the jury trial. Moreover, Athena, who received her authority directly from Zeus, sanctioned them.

Intentionally or not, Sophocles, Aeschylus and Polygnotus all became part of this process. It was a process that could only have existed in Athens where pride in their victories over barbarian invaders was coupled with an even stronger investment in their democratic institutions. This combination led to an Athenian identity that revolved around the concept of justice: justice as revenge on the Persians for their hubristic attempt to enslave Greece, but also justice embodied in the courts that guaranteed the freedoms that were essential to Athens' democracy. Both of these made the Athenians worthy of ruling in their estimation. Sophocles gives his Little Ajax a real Athenian-style trial just as Polygnotus' painting seems to have done, and just as Aeschylus gives to Orestes in *Eumenides*. Is it only a coincidence that they all seem so interested in connecting myths to Athens specifically through the representation of a courtroom and their goddess? It seems unlikely. Rather, the Athenians were conscious that their mode of justice and the freedoms it guaranteed set them apart from others, Greeks and barbarians alike, and that their patron goddess, majestic, serene and born directly from Zeus, served as the perfect symbol for them.[68] Therefore, they created versions of myths that reflected their view of the superiority of their system. Aeschylus' conversion of the Atreus myths was so compelling that it superseded the epic versions. Had Sophocles' play survived intact, perhaps we would take it just as much for granted that Ajax Locrus was originally saved from death by an Athenian led jury as we do that Orestes was. Perhaps this was the point of incorporating these myths within the Athenian tradition. It established a history for Athens' democratic, court-based justice as sanctioned by the gods and rooted in the heroic past. It helped to define Athenians against other Greeks and justified their self-proclaimed superiority to them as well. In other words, because Athena's justice was most fair and divinely sanctioned, others not only should submit to it, but should desire to do so.

NOTES

1 Goldhill, *Oresteia*, 24–41.

2 Sophie Mills, *Theseus, Tragedy and the Athenian Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 56.

3 Mills discusses in some detail the idealized image of the *Eumenides* and its role as a predecessor to the *epitaphioi* (56–78). These funeral speeches participated directly in shaping the national identity of Athenians and in revealing how the Athenians wished others to perceive them. For a full discussion of the role of *epitaphioi* in Athenian civic ideology, see Loraux, *Invention.*

4 Simonides' Plataea epigram: M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi II (2)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 118–20 no. 11; Eion epigram: D.L. Page *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 255–59 no. xi.

5 The story of the boast is also found in Pseudo-Apollodorus, *Epitome* 5.25. See also Dana Sutton, *The Lost Sophocles* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 7–9.

6 For example, Castriota, *Myth*; Richard Buxton, *Imaginary Greece: The Contexts of Mythology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Eric Francis and Michael Vickers, "The Oenoe Painting in the Stoa Poikile and Herodotus' Account of Marathon," *BSA* 80 (1985): 99–113; Tonio Hölscher, "Images of Political Identity: The Case of Athens," in Boedeker and Raaflaub, 153–83.

7 Ferrari, 119–50; Casey Dué, *The Captive Woman's Lament in Greek Tragedy* (Austin: Universtiy of Texas Press, 2006).

8 Ajax Locrus is also known as Little Ajax, Ajax son of Ileus or Locrian Ajax. I will use the names interchangeably.

9 The paintings in the Stoa Poikile are, like the structure itself, dated roughly to 460 BC. The painting in question is an *Ilioupersis* painting and is peculiar in that its focal point is the figure of Locrian Ajax with his hand on an altar as if swearing as oath (Pausanias 1.15.3; and for Polygnotus' other version of the *Ilioupersis* in the Cnidian Lesche at Delphi, 10.31.2).

10 T.B.L.Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1936), 202. Arguments for a connection between the painting and the play have been based primarily on assumptions about the relationship between Sophocles and Polygnotus. See Whitman, 13–15 and 45–46; Castriota, *Myth*, 72–84, 90–94, 96–133; and T.B.L Webster, *Athenian Culture and Society* (London: Batsford, 1973), 151.

11 Sutton states that, despite the comment at *Life of Sophocles* 5 that Sophocles had been painted into the Stoa, it would be rash of us to see all of Polygnotus' paintings as being inspired by Sophoclean plays, although it is known that he did, on occasion, represent scenes from Sophocles. For an overview of recent discussions on the relationship between art and tragedy, see Small.

12 A second painting (Oslo OK 10155, CV Norway, 1. pl 37) contains a similar figure in the same scene.

13 Webster, *Sophocles*, 147.

14 Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood, *Tragedy and Athenian Religion* (Latham: Lexington Press, 2002), 485.

15 This play was identified by Thaddeuas Zielinsky, "De Aiacis Locrensis Fabula Sophoclea," *Eos* (1925): 37–43, as a very early play, though the grounds are shaky at best and if *Captive Women* is similar at all to Euripides' *Trojan Women* this would suggest a different focus than on Ajax's crime. Sutton does not link the two plays in his overview of Sophocles' tragic fragments. He in fact dismisses any connection between the two (8–9). Nor does he offer any possible evidence for a date for either play.

16 M. Halsam, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri v. 44* (London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1976).

17 Halsam, 2.

18 Sourvinou-Inwood, 485.

19 All text for *Ajax Locrus* is from Halsam, 1–26 with supplements from Diggle, 34. Translations are primarily my own with suggestions on certain words taken from Halsam. Restorations are primarily by Halsam with supplements by me.

20 Or, ψῆφος κεκράνται / κραίνεται.

21 By Athenian "democratic-style" trial I mean one that mirrors actual procedure in the fifth-century. Specifically, this means trial by jury, with the casting of votes using the voting pebbles and urns.

[22] The term occurs 2700 times in Attic inscriptions, but see especially IG II^2 977. All other occurrences of the term in the fifth and fourth century are found in the orators (or in trial scenes such as that of Socrates in Plato and Xenophon).

[23] Halsam, 15.

[24] It is also possible that this is a speech in defense of Ajax and is asking the jurors to cast their votes to acquit.

[25] That Sophocles himself was not adverse to such insertions has been demonstrated by Knox of *Oedipus Tyrannos* (*Oedipus*, 78–98 and 114–98, especially). Thus, instead of a stoning, we have voting. See as well Fig. 6 where the decision on the arms of Achilles is represented as a democratic voting scene over which Athena presides.

[26] Greg Anderson's discussion of the democratization of Theseus in the years immediately following the founding of the democracy is rather important. He demonstrates quite well that the Athenians intentionally reshaped myths to reflect specifically democratic traditions and to push back their foundations to the earliest times (134–46, especially).

[27] The alternate version can be pieced together from Pausanias (10.31.2) who says that it was Odysseus who suggested stoning Ajax, combined with Philostratos *Heroic.* 9 and a scholiast on Lycophron 326 who both state that Ajax did not rape Cassandra but that Odysseus spread a "trumped up" charge about him (Halsam, 10).

[28] This word is not attested anywhere else in extant Greek, thus its meaning is somewhat uncertain.

[29] Akiko Kiso, *The Lost Sophocles* (New York: Vantage Press, 1984), says of this Athena that she is "as malevolent as the Athena in the extant *Ajax*." This seems a bit hyperbolic given the justification for her anger and the lack of any further text. Kiso seems to be interpreting what is an angry (though surely not malevolent) Athena in light of *Ajax* and also seems to assume that she destroys Ajax and the fleet at the end of the play. This simply may not be the case.

[30] Halsam places the speech near the beginning, but not as a prologue, since a prologue appears to be impossible because the papyrus contains the remains of a choral ode just above the Athena fragment (2). He finds difficulty with an appearance in the middle since, he wrongly concludes, the only extant example of a mid-play epiphany is the *Rhesus*, a play of unknown author and date. He also finds the vehement tone of the speech inappropriate for an end speech. In the end, a mid-text epiphany, perhaps closer to the beginning, is the only logical conclusion based on the order of the fragments. Parallels to *Eumenides* render this interpretation even more appealing.

[31] Sutton suggests that the play probably ended with Ajax' acquittal and escape from legal justice (9). A.C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917), 9 believed that the play also included his destruction at Gyrea and suggests that his acquittal may have been a result of perjury, for which reason Athena sought to further punish him. Neither suggests grounds for acquittal. Perhaps a case was made for conditions of war? Or, more likely, this play follows an alternative version of the myth.

[32] After 425 BC, the shields of the Spartiates captured at Pylos were also displayed in the Poikile. This suggests strong associations perceived by the Athenians between their glorious past and the war against Sparta to defend their empire. It also cast the mythic representation in a more "Athenian" light.

[33] Pausanias says it was Oinoe but this battle is not known from any other source and so the assertion has left scholars puzzled. Francis and Vickers believe the painting actually

shows the Plataeans arriving to aid the Athenians at the small village of Oinoe near Marathon instead of Argive Oinoe (100). It could also, given its position next to the trial of Ajax Locrus, be the Oath of Plataea.

34 Buxton, *Imaginary*, 62.

35 Francis and Vickers, 107.

36 Francis and Vickers, 112.

37 Hölscher, 168.

38 Theseus in the *Amazonomachy* supposedly had a striking resemblance to Miltiades.

39 Castriota, *Myth*, 76–89; Ferrari, 120–23. A good example of this type of representation in vase painting is on an Attic red-figure hydria (the *Ilioupersis*) by the Cleophrades Painter (Naples, Museo Nazionale 2422). There we see Ajax rape Cassandra and Neoptolemus kill Priam among other things.

40 Michael Anderson, *The Fall of Troy in Early Greek Poetry and Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

41 Ferrari, 128.

42 Ferrari, 126.

43 Ferrari, 139.

44 The painting in the Cnidian Lesche is given fuller treatment by Pausanias. It includes not only the trial where the sons of Theseus and Menestheus are included, but also the Trojan Horse, the slaughter of Priam and Cassandra clutching the Palladium.

45 A reconstruction of the Stoa Poikile and Cnidian Lesche paintings can be found in Castriota, *Myth*, 110 and 129 and M.D. Stansbury-O'Donnell, "Polygnotos's *Iliupersis*: A New Reconstruction," *AJA* 93 (1989): 203–15.

46 Earlier interpretations of Ajax at the altar include a scene of ritual atonement (M. Robertson, "Conjectures in Polygnotos' Troy," *BSA* 62 [1967]: 11–12) and Ajax "contemplating his degree of guilt" (J.J. Pollit, *The Ancient View of Greek Art: Criticism, History and Terminology*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 188).

47 Lillian H. Jeffrey, "The *Battle of Oinoe* in the Stoa Poikile: A Problem in Greek Art and History," *BSA* 60 (1965): 41–57; Castriota; *Myth.*

48 The captured and dead Trojan warriors are conjectured to have looked a great deal like Persians, clothed in animal printed pants similar to those worn by Persians.

49 Buxton, *Imaginary*, 61.

50 David Castriota, "Justice, Kingship and Imperialism: Rhetoric and Reality in Fifth-century Representations Following the Persian Wars," in *Not the Classical Ideal*, ed. Beth Cohen (Leiden: Brill Press, 2000), 462.

51 Ferrari comes to essentially the same conclusion concerning the Parthenon *Ilioupersis* though for different reasons (126, 130–41). She suggests that we read the Parthenon's version in light of the Persian sack of Athens and wherein the Achaeans, distinguished from the Athenians are like Persians in their hubris.

52 Fornara and Samon give a systematic treatment to the orthodox view of the gradual development of the empire (76–113). They argue instead that the battle of Eurymedon (466 BC) was the watershed marker for the beginning of empire (89–90); for additional arguments on the reflection of judicial practices in the in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, see Kennedy.

53 Hölscher, n.92.

54 Boedeker, 195.

55 Jocelyn Small, *The Parallel Worlds of Classical Art and Text* (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2003), 166–67.

56 Pearson, 9.

57 Boedeker, 194.

58 C.J. Herington, "Athena in Athenian Literature and Cult," *G&R* 10 (1963): 64, writes that dating back to the time of Solon, we see a strand in Athenian myth and cult that created a hierarchy of "*Zeus—his favoured daughter—that daughter's favoured city*." This hierarchy is reaffirmed by Aeschylus in *Eumenides* (997–1002, especially).

59 What I mean to say is that this has nothing to do with the reality of the process by which Athenian courts functioned in the legal system nor of the concept of justice as "rule of law," in Sealey's usage. Rather, it is about the perceptions of the Athenians regarding the significance of their juries and justice.

60 Both the Athenians and the Greeks of Homer distinguished between voluntary and involuntary infractions (Raphael Sealey, *The Justice of the Greeks* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 92–100). If this play did not follow an alternate version in which Ajax was falsely accused, he could have been declared innocent of intent to knock over Athena's statue.

61 Kennedy, 58ff.

62 It was at this time that Cimon is said to have recovered the bones of the Athenian hero Theseus. Theseus, as a result of a crime he committed, was forced to leave Athens and wound up an exile on Scyros where he died. His bones were taken back to Athens and reburied by Cimon after their discovery. For a discussion on the significance of Cimon's act, see Castriota, *Myth*, ch. 2 especially; W.R. Connor, "Theseus and his City," in *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World: Proceedings of the Uppsala Symposium*. Eds. Pontus Hellström and Brita Alroth. Stockholm: Ubsaliensis S. Academiae, 1993), 115–20; Robert Garland *Introducing New Gods: the Politics of Athenian Religion* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 82–98; Mills, *passim*; Erika Simon, "Theseus and Athenian Festivals," in Neils, 9–26; and Henry J. Walker, *Theseus and Athens* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

63 Thucydides remarks here that by the time Naxos was beaten into submission, the Athenians "were not the old popular rulers they had been at first" (1.99.2).

64 This is the precursor to Amphipolis. The colony at Ennea Hodoi was wiped out in the 450s by Thracians, but was successfully resettled as Amphipolis in 437/6 BC.

65 Fornara and Samons, 79–85.

66 Hölscher, 156.

67 Whether there was an actual treaty known as the Peace of Callias is irrelevant. There must have been some sort of peace accord between the Athenians and the Persians in this period since fighting against Persia effectively ceased until the later years of the Peloponnesian War. For arguments in favor of the peace, see Meiggs 129–51. For arguments against, see Ernst Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 73–107.

68 Kurt Raaflaub, *Freedom*, 172-73, argues that one strand of Athenian propaganda suggested that those Greeks who had Medized during the Persian Wars or who had already been subject to Persia before the wars were unworthy of such freedoms, being innately slavish like the Persians themselves.

•CHAPTER FOUR•

Justice *ex Machina*

Athena in Euripidean Tragedy

Euripides is recognized as, perhaps, the most politically engaged of the great three tragedians. Although he never held political office, many of his extant plays, such as *Orestes* and *Heraclids* show a keen interest in the political and social life of Athens. His plays in which Athena appears are also all deeply interested in the politics of his polis. In four extant plays, Athena appears either as a *dea ex machina* or in the prologue: *Suppliants, Iphigenia among the Taurians, Ion*, and *Trojan Women*.[1] While not all of these plays appear to fall under the heading "patriotic" and not all are even considered political, Athena's appearance in them serves a patriotic purpose and the plays ultimately focus on political subjects. Specifically, each of these plays has at its center an attempt to understand the nature of justice as a political issue. Two of the plays, *Iphigenia among the Taurians* and *Trojan Women*, refer back to the plays and myths discussed in chapters 2 and 3, wherein myths not previously associated with Athens, the destruction of the house of Atreus and the *Ilioupersis*, were resolved by Athena and the Athenians. The other two, *Suppliants* and *Ion*, address Athenian myths specifically and function to reinforce the principle promoted in Athenian civic myths that Athens is the seat of true justice.

In this chapter I look at the contexts in which Euripides' affirmations of Athenian justice are made in order to understand how the justice of Athena and Athens was re-conceptualized in the period of the Peloponnesian War. The Peloponnesian War stands out in many ways, not just because of its length or the preparedness and strength of the opponents, which Thucydides

reported. Rather, it is the move towards "total war," manifested in the changed relationship between Athens and her allies and in the treatment of captured cities by both sides that marks the Peloponnesian War as significant in terms of the concept of justice. By focusing on the aftermath of battle, failed diplomacy, and unity in the face of conflict, the plays of Euripides reflect an awareness of this shift in warfare and the role of justice in times of war. Specifically, Euripides' Athenas seek to reassure and reaffirm the hegemony of Athens and its sanctioning by the other gods, especially Apollo.

Martial Justice in *Suppliants*

In Euripides' *Suppliants*, which is usually dated between 424 and 421 BC, Theseus, the legendary unifier of Attica, serves as the spokesman of Athens in foreign policy.[2] The story follows the failed attack on Thebes by King Adrastus of Argos in support of his son-in-law Polyneices, son of Oedipus. After the battle, the Thebans refused to allow Adrastus to reclaim the bodies of the dead for burial and so he turns to Theseus and Athens for help.[3] Adrastus asks for military intervention as a way to enforce the laws of Hellas. In *Suppliants*, we find Theseus (and through him the Athenian audience) grappling with the problems that arise when military force substitutes for diplomacy and judicial procedure in the name of justice. Even Theseus cannot fully reconcile the ideals of Athens and her allies with the realities of war toward which Adrastus pushes him. Only Athena, the goddess who is simultaneously the patron of the city and its political institutions as well as the goddess of *technê* in war, can.

The implications of how Theseus and his Athenians uphold Greece's sacred laws may prove troubling to the audience. The use of force has the potential to put Athens in a position of hubristic overreaching in the name of justice, just as Adrastus and the Thebans had done. When Theseus first chides Adrastus for attacking Thebes impulsively and contrary to the will of the gods, Adrastus declares:

> οὔτοι δικαστὴν <σ'> εἰλόμην ἐμῶν κακῶν
> οὐδ', εἴ τι πράξας μὴ καλῶς εὑρίσκομαι,
> τούτων κολαστὴν κἀπιτιμητήν, ἄναξ,
> ἀλλ' ὡς ὀναίμην.

I did not come here seeking a judge of my faults nor, if I am discovered to have acted improperly, a punisher and censure of them, king. I came for help (253–56).[4]

A *dikastês* is a judge; it is what Orestes goes to Athens to find in *Eumenides* (81–83). Theseus has assumed (Adrastus thinks) that he has been asked to follow his patron goddesses' model and to serve the same function of arbiter

between two wronged parties. The Athenians went to a great deal of effort to promote Athens as the seat of true, non-violent justice in their public art (see chapters 2 and 3 above) and in the administration of their *archê*. In *Eumenides* and, likely, *Ajax Locrus*, such judgment is specifically what Athena says those who come to Athens should expect to find through the agency of the Athenian court system (especially *Eum.* 700–3).[5] In declaring that he does not want a *dikastês*, Adrastus declares that he does not want Athenian justice. If Adrastus does not want the kind of justice Athens is known to provide, then what kind of justice does he expect Theseus and the Athenians to render?

As Mark Anderson notes, whenever Athens answers a supplication, they place themselves in a certain amount of danger.[6] Theseus, as king of Athens, feels it is his duty to mitigate those dangers as much as possible. Thus, at first, Theseus rejects Adrastus' appeal that Athens recover the bodies from Thebes because he does not think it right to ally himself with someone who acted unjustly and impulsively (246–49).[7] But Theseus is drawn into reconsidering the situation in part because both Adrastus and Aethra appeal to the greater benefits that could be achieved through Athenian intervention. If the benefits outweigh the risks, then, perhaps, justice *can* be achieved for the dead.[8] In the end, though, it will not be the benefits that Theseus can gain for Athens but the fact that he has Athena to support him and assure Athenian *sophrosûne* which allows him to seek justice through military intervention.

What benefits, then, does Adrastus offer to Athens? Adrastus first makes clear that he has come to Athens because he feels that Athens "is the only city with the ability to shoulder this burden, for she has seen pitiful sights and has in you a vigorous, outstanding leader" (πόλις δὲ σὴ μόνη δύναιτ' ἂν τόνδ' ὑποστῆναι πόνον: τά τ' οἰκτρὰ γὰρ δέδορκε καὶ νεανίαν ἔχει σὲ ποιμέν' ἐσθλόν, 188–91). He appeals to Theseus' and Athens' vanity—and also their sympathy—but introduces the idea that Athens and Athens alone can succeed in solving this particular crisis for Greece.[9] Aethra continues this line of thought when she asks Theseus to reconsider his decision to help Adrastus, taking into account the way his refusal would impact Athens' reputation. If Theseus refuses, it will seem that he did so because he was afraid to stand in the ranks and fight (δείσας ἀπέστης, καὶ συὸς μὲν ἀγρίου ἀγῶνος ἥψω φαῦλον ἀθλήσας πόνον, οὗ δ' ἐς κράνος βλέψαντα καὶ λόγχης ἀκμὴν χρῆν ἐκπονῆσαι, δειλὸς ὢν ἐφηυρέθης; they will say that you undertook the unimpressive challenge of hunting a wild boar, but turned out to be a coward when, faced with the might of helmet and spear, you had a job to complete, 316–19). She says that some might claim that he puts personal glory (manifested in the labors) before the glory of the city.

Theseus' decision to help Adrastus, then, rests in part on his desire (and Aethra's) to project a certain image of Athens to the larger Greek world. Athens had built up a certain reputation for martial prowess through the labors of its king but the heroic deeds of one man are not enough to sustain the glory of a city. The citizens of the city need a share in that glory. That share comes from standing in the battle line and facing down another army. More importantly, that glory is not won for its own sake, but to prevent taunts from the enemy and to preserve a specific image of Athens as a brave leader and a friend of suppliants.[10] In other words, it is about public image and the appearance of power more than it is about whether recovering the bodies is the right thing to do.

This is not just about saving face, though, but the importance of Athens having its reputation to begin with. Although Theseus seems content to have the reputation of a *dikastês*, this is not enough if the Athenians are to maintain the reputation that drew Adrastus to Athens. Athens, Adrastus says, is the only city that can shoulder the burden. If Theseus refuses, then another city may step up to take their place. Loss of reputation leads to loss of trust by others. Indeed, Theseus' refusal could lead to loss of faith in the gods. Since Adrastus appeals to Theseus as a suppliant at the temple of Demeter, to reject his supplication undermines the effectiveness of such supplications (258–62). Theseus' refusal not only risks Athens' reputation but serves to undermine the laws of Hellas as well.[11] He must take up the defense of one sacred law (burial of the dead) in order to preserve the validity of another (rights of suppliants).

Indeed, these are the grounds upon which Aethra bases her appeal to reputation. Refusal to accept the supplications of Adrastus and the mothers of the dead dishonor the gods (ἐγὼ δέ σ', ὦ παῖ, πρῶτα μὲν τὰ τῶν θεῶν σκοπεῖν κελεύω μὴ σφαλῇς ἀτιμάσας, 301–2). Aethra puts Theseus' refusal to help those suffering injustice (ἀδικουμένοις) on par with the Theban refusal to allow burial for the bodies. Dangerously, however, she agrees with Adrastus that Theseus must use force:

> νῦν δ' ἴσθι σοί τε τοῦθ' ὅσην τιμὴν φέρει
> κἀμοὶ παραινεῖν οὐ φόβον φέρει, τέκνον,
> ἄνδρας βιαίους καὶ κατείργοντας νεκροὺς
> τάφου τε μοίρας καὶ κτερισμάτων λαχεῖν
> ἐς τήνδ' ἀνάγκην σῇ καταστῆσαι χερί
> νόμιμά τε πάσης συγχέοντας Ἑλλάδος
> παῦσαι· τὸ γάρ τοι συνέχον ἀνθρώπων πόλεις
> τοῦτ' ἔσθ', ὅταν τις τοὺς νόμους σῴζῃ καλῶς.

But, as things are, you should appreciate, my son, how much honor it will gain you to do what I feel no qualms about advising—to use force of arms to compel men

> who are committing the outrage of denying bodies burial and funeral rites to stop undermining the established practices followed by all Greeks. For you can be sure that preserving well these laws is what holds together the cities of men (306–13).

Both Adrastus and Aethra expect Theseus and Athens to answer the pleas for justice with military force. Military force, however, is what got Adrastus into trouble (he refused a treaty offer from Thebes; 739–41) and it is what also marks Thebes as hubristic. The Theban Herald threatens the Athenians with military force if they do not reject Adrastus' pleas and drive him from Attica (εἰ δὲ μή, πολὺς κλύδων ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοὶ συμμάχοις τ' ἔσται δορός, 474–75).[12] In both cases, the use of military force reinforces a blood for blood conceptualization of justice. As with the feud in the house of Atreus that culminates in the haunting of Orestes by the Furies, vengeance by the sword stands for justice to Thebes and Adrastus. As it failed Orestes, however, so it fails Thebes and Adrastus. They lose because, in the world of Athenian civic myth to which the play belongs, vengeance was declared unjust and unnecessary with the founding of Athena's court.[13] And yet, this is exactly what Theseus is called upon to do—use the sword instead of the courts to defend the laws of Greece.

Theseus alone seems to recognize that this type of justice must be carefully enforced, since it can easily become vengeance. This was, in part, why he hesitated to support Adrastus' claims (229–37). Therefore, Theseus seeks his own grounds for military intervention before committing himself. He decides that helping recover the bodies is the just thing to do and that he must act in order to preserve Athens' reputation as the seat of justice—even if he defends that reputation as a *stratêgos* and not a *dikastês*.

Theseus decides that recovering the bodies is just by appealing to pan-Hellenic law (τὸν Πανελλήνων νόμον, 311–13; 525) and positions Athens, if it chooses to recover the bodies, as the defenders not only of their own laws but of the sacred laws of all Greeks and the ancient laws of the gods (νόμος παλαιὸς δαιμόνων, 562–63).[14] Theseus suggests that his duty to bury the bodies rests ultimately on Athenian distance from the conflict (νεκροὺς δὲ τοὺς θανόντας, οὐ βλάπτων πόλιν οὐδ' ἀνδροκμῆτας προσφέρων ἀγωνίας, θάψαι δικαιῶ, τὸν Πανελλήνων νόμον σώζων, 524–27) since this positions them as arbiters of the disputes of others. It is another aspect of glory (besides martial) that both Adrastus and Aethra appeal to.[15] The act of recovering the bodies is just and Athens always acts justly and protects others from injustice.[16]

The danger of using military force to exact justice is set in relief by the dialogue with the Theban Herald.[17] While Theseus concedes to the Thebans that the attack by Adrastus was not just (ἠμύνασθε πολεμίους καλῶς, αἰσχρῶς δ' ἐκείνοις, χἠ δίκη διοίχεται; you defended yourselves against the enemy well, to their shame, and justice has been done, 529–30), to violate

Greek sacred law and refuse burial of the bodies is an unjust act beyond the will of Zeus; it is *hubris* (ἐξαρκέσας ἦν Ζεὺς ὁ τιμωρούμενος, ὑμᾶς δ' ὑβρίζειν οὐκ ἐχρῆν τοιάνδ' ὕβριν; Zeus' punishing them was sufficient. Such overbearing arrogance is unnecessary, 511–12). By stepping beyond the boundaries of justice themselves, the Thebans sacrificed their position as defenders of justice thus allowing Theseus and Athens to intervene as a "punisher of evils" (κολαστὴς τῶν κακῶν) and punishers of *hubristai* (ὅσοι γ' ὑβρισταί: χρηστὰ δ' οὐ κολάζομεν, 575). The Thebans were just in defending their land from attack but went too far when they refused to honor the laws of all Greeks. Theseus, too, is just in his decision to recover the bodies but the example of the Thebans (and Adrastus) warns him that he, also, must be careful not to cross the line into *hubris*. The attempts by the Herald to goad him to anger (476–77) and Theseus' refusal to yield to it (581–82) emphasizes the dangers such exertion of power run.

To help him restrain his anger and uphold the laws of Greece properly, Theseus calls upon the gods to support him (ταῦτα γὰρ ξυνόνθ' ὁμοῦ νίκην δίδωσιν. ἀρετὴ δ' οὐδὲν φέρει βροτοῖσιν ἢν μὴ τὸν θεὸν χρῄζοντ' ἔχῃ; all I need is for those gods who revere justice to be on my side, since their support brings victory, 595–96) and is certain that they will. Their support is proven when Theseus wins the battle and is able to return with the bodies, which he does without sacking Thebes—a mark of his restraint and understanding of the limits of justice at 723–25.

One would think, then, that the play should end on a positive note with no real "tragedy" in sight. The tragic act of the play was the supplication and request for help and it was resolved through Theseus' just and moderate defense of sacred Greek law. However, Euripides does not see it in such clear terms. The concern of the play seems to be, more than anything else, the delicate nature of war as justice which Theseus can only partly resolve. As the many representations of the *Ilioupersis* discussed in chapters 2 and 3 make clear, it is too easy for the sword of Zeus' justice to cross the line into *hubris*. We saw it already in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* and in the discussion of the myth of Ajax Locrus. The danger of such a violation of justice is ever present when it is enacted through force of arms instead of the courts. Even though Theseus recovers the bodies, he does not end the cycle of violence that vengeance encourages. Theseus himself acted with moderation and with the gods of justice and the *dêmos* on his side; the other parties involved, however, (both the Thebans and the Argives) still want blood.

The first evidence that Theseus' victory and recovery of the bodies is not enough to staunch the flow of blood and suppress excessive passions is the suicide of Evadne (990–1113). The chorus and the sons of the Seven (the Successors) further connect violence to justice. Even before Theseus returns

from Thebes, the chorus issues a warning to Thebes that justice calls forth to justice as blood calls out to blood (δίκα δίκαν δ' ἐκάλεσε καὶ φόνος φόνον; 614). The chorus is cheered by the thought of the punishment they believe Thebes will receive at Theseus' hands, but the threat of continued bloodshed lingers whether Theseus succeeds or not. What is to prevent Athens and the Athenians from reveling in their victory, too, and overreaching? What is to prevent the Thebans from seeking vengeance on Athens for interfering as the herald warned? And what is to say that the sons of the fallen heroes will recognize the reclaiming of the bodies as justice done for their deaths?

The sons of the Seven, in fact, see no such closure in the recovery and funeral rites of the bodies. Instead they cry out:

> πάτερ, †σὺ μὲν σῶν† κλύεις τέκνων γόους;
> ἆρ' ἀσπιδοῦχος ἔτι ποτ' ἀντιτάσσομαι
> σὸν φόνον; εἰ γὰρ γένοιτο †τέκνον†.
> ἔτ' ἂν θεοῦ θέλοντος ἔλθοι δίκα
> πατρῷος.

> Father, do you hear your sons lamenting? Will I ever take up my shield and repay your blood? Would this come to pass for you sons? If the gods will it, justice may yet come for our fathers (1142–46).

To this the chorus responds: οὔπω κακὸν τόδ' εὕδει; (Does this evil not yet sleep? 1146). In their happiness over the victory of Theseus, and in their ignorant view that one act of war could somehow stop the tit-for-tat nature of violence, the chorus failed to realize that its earlier pronouncement that blood calls for blood, justice for justice, applied to Theseus and the Athenians as much as to others. Nor did they recognize that the recovery of the bodies and the performance of funeral rites did not sufficiently end the cycle. Something more is needed to prevent the continuation of bloodshed. Something else is always needed to ensure that an act of war can function as justice. That something is Athena.

As Theseus and Adrastus prepare to part, both give appropriate words of gratitude and respect, seemingly oblivious to the grief of the sons and their calls for vengeance. This obliviousness is broken with the sudden appearance of Athena as a *dea ex machina*. In terms of the action of the play, her appearance is entirely unnecessary; she appears only in order to give closure to the theme of justice and to the cycle of violence. Her first words to Theseus suggest that the benefit of an Argive alliance is not sufficient after all the dangers Theseus and Athens have hazarded. Instead, Athena, acknowledging that Thebes may wish to hold Athens accountable for the actions of the Argives, and recognizing that a general cannot provide the type of final justice

that a judge can, orders that a treaty be struck between Argos and Athens and that it be sealed by specific, binding religious rituals.

The oath the Argives are to swear (1191–95) is very close to that which Orestes swore to Athena and Athens in *Eumenides* (762–74). In both cases, the Argives swear never to attack Athens and to take up arms against any other who does. The burial of the sacrificial knife assures against any attack by the Argives as well.[18] The extent of this ritual and its specification by Athena is in strong contrast to the rather casual agreement between Athena and Orestes in *Eumenides*. Perhaps this reflects a reality for the audience: in the world of the 420s, more assurance was needed that an ally would, in fact, keep their oath.[19]

After carefully dictating the oath and rituals to Theseus for the Argive alliance, Athena then turns to the Successors. She seeks to contain the violent justice they have invoked. She tells them that their time will come and that their sack of Thebes will, in that time, be sanctioned by a god and so will be successful (1220–26). Contrary to "encouraging fresh bloodshed,"[20] Athena's prophecy functions to forestall any premature attack and to also ensure that when it does happen, it does so within the control of the gods and not as a form of wild justice. In doing so, she undermines the chorus' earlier declaration of justice as blood for blood and reclaims justice from the threat that violence poses to it. Although Theseus' victory suggests that an act of war can be an act of justice as well, and that a *stratêgos* can substitute for a *dikastês*, it can only do so under certain conditions sanctioned by the gods. Such unsanctioned and uncontrolled actions cannot be permitted. As the chorus earlier recalled, the will of the gods and the will of men did not always align. In the case of the Successors, Athena assures us that their will is part of the gods' will and so their sack of Thebes, when it occurs, will be successful and within the boundaries of justice.

Although mythically, the events of *Suppliants* fall before the events of *Eumenides*, the chronology of the tragedies themselves privileges Aeschylus' Athena and the oaths Argos and Athens swore there, so that we can understand Athena's appearance at the end of *Suppliants* as a reaffirmation for the audience of the oaths and of Athens' position in the Greek world as an arbiter of justice represented there. Both Theseus and Adrastus recognize, wisely, that it is only through the will of Athena that their alliance will succeed. Theseus himself goes even further. For him, it is only the intervention of Athena that assures that he (and so Athens) did not err as well:

> δέσποιν' Ἀθάνα, πείσομαι λόγοισι σοῖς·
> σὺ γάρ μ' ἀπορθοῖς, ὥστε μὴ 'ξαμαρτάνειν·
> καὶ τόνδ' ἐν ὅρκοις ζεύξομαι. μόνον σύ με

ἐς ὀρθὸν ἵστη· σοῦ γὰρ εὐμενοῦς πόλει
οὔσης τὸ λοιπὸν ἀσφαλῶς οἰκήσομεν.

> Queen Athena, I shall do as you say, for it is you who guide me and keep me from error. I shall bind Adrastus herre with oaths. But pray that you may keep on the right path, since so long as you are well-intentioned toward the city we will manage the future safely (1227–31).

It is not simply that Athena helps them to forge proper alliances. She also protects the Athenians from themselves. The threat of *hubris* always exists when justice is enforced through war and violence. Although Thebes justly defended itself against the unjust attack of the Argives and the Seven, it overreached and violated sacred pan-Hellenic laws when it refused burial of the bodies and also rejected (preemptively) Athenian arbitration. What Athena assures is Athenian *sôphrosunê* and, so, Athenian success and reputation.

The Athenians and Theseus need to ensure they avoid the same fate as Thebes and Argos, which they can only do when they act in accordance with the will of Athena and those other gods (Zeus and Apollo) whose will she also represents in this and other plays. Theseus' restraint at the walls of Thebes was a result of Athena's will as he recognized later on—she always keeps him from erring. He could not have shown such restraint on his own. When Adrastus came to Athens not for a judge but for a general, he put Athens in danger of overreaching. Only the intervention of Athena at the end of *Suppliants* could ensure that such *hubris*, the taint of power on justice, did not attach to Athens. Thus, *Suppliants* validates a type of justice that Athena rejects in *Eumenides* but does so in a way that shows how violence can be harnessed to true justice, as when it is yoked to *sôphrosunê*. Unlike in *Eumenides*, however, there is a consciousness that such a corruption of justice could occur (and, perhaps, has occurred) and it is only the watchful eye of Athena and the due diligence of Athenian leaders that prevents it from happening.[21]

Reaffirming Justice in *Iphigenia among the Taurians*[22]

Although *Suppliants* does not directly refer to *Eumenides* as part of its story, the rejection of the *dikastês* and request for a *stratêgos* to exact justice in *Suppliants* suggest a rejection, under certain circumstances, of the type of justice praised in Aeschylus' play. Also, the focus on the Argive alliance, an alliance which would be renewed in 420 BC but which may not yet have been so at the time of *Suppliants'* production, suggests a hearkening back to the patriotic *Eumenides* as well. *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, in contrast, does make direct reference to the events of *Eumenides* and asks its audience to consider that Athena's judgment may not have been as final as they had

thought and that justice may not yet have been done.[23] In *IT*, the authority of Athena, the power of her persuasion, and the power of her courts are all called into question. Her appearance at the end of the play serves to reconfirm her judgment in *Eumenides* but does so only by undermining the absolute nature of her justice there and, therefore, the justice of her Athenians.[24]

The plot of *IT* rests upon an assumption that not all of the Furies accepted the Athenian court's verdict nor were they persuaded by Athena's speeches after the trial. Instead, Orestes is charged with completing one more act of atonement for murdering his mother. He must go to Tauris and steal the cult statue of Artemis and bring it back to Attica. By bringing Artemis away from the barbaric Taurians, who practice human sacrifice in her name, to the civilized world of the Greeks and, specifically, to Athens, he will appease the recalcitrant Furies and at last be free from their punishment. It is more likely that his real task (though unexpressed) is to bring Iphigenia back to Greece. Since it was her supposed death that set off the chain of events leading to Orestes' matricide, her symbolic return from the dead could put an end to it. Cropp suggests that her "survival exposes the futility of the revenge-murders which stemmed from her supposed death" and so highlights the problem of vengeance as justice.[25] Thus, the play is premised on the faultiness of Athena's justice but also calls into question vengeance as justice. In effect, the plot of the play is a direct questioning of what justice is in the terms delineated in *Eumenides*, and how one can safely navigate its pitfalls.

As the play opens, however, it is unclear whether Euripides has presented his audience with an entirely new version of the House of Atreus saga or if he will be working within the framework of the authoritative version by Aeschylus. When we first learn why Orestes came to Tauris, it is ambiguous whether he had ever been to Athens or had a trial there:

> ὦ Φοῖβε, ποῖ μ' αὖ τήνδ' ἐς ἄρκυν ἤγαγες
> χρήσας, ἐπειδὴ πατρὸς αἷμ' ἐτεισάμην,
> μητέρα κατακτάς; διαδοχαῖς δ' Ἐρινύων
> ἠλαυνόμεσθα φυγάδες ἕξεδροι χθονὸς
> δρόμους τε πολλοὺς ἐξέπλησα καμπίμους·
> ἐλθὼν δέ σ' ἠρώτησα πῶς τροχηλάτου
> μανίας ἂν ἔλθοιμ' ἐς τέλος πόνων τ' ἐμῶν
> [οὓς ἐξεμόχθουν περιπολῶν καθ' Ἑλλάδα]·
> σὺ δ' εἶπας ἐλθεῖν Ταυρικῆς μ' ὄρους χθονός,
> ἔνθ' Ἄρτεμίς σοι σύγγονος βωμοὺς ἔχει,
> λαβεῖν τ' ἄγαλμα θεᾶς, ὅ φασιν ἐνθάδε
> ἐς τούσδε ναοὺς οὐρανοῦ πεσεῖν ἄπο·
> λαβόντα δ' ἢ τέχναισιν ἢ τύχῃ τινί,
> κίνδυνον ἐκπλήσαντ', Ἀθηναίων χθονὶ
> δοῦναι (τὸ δ' ἐνθένδ' οὐδὲν ἐρρήθη πέρα)
> καὶ ταῦτα δράσαντ' ἀμπνοὰς ἕξειν πόνων.

> O Phoebus, what is this net you have led me into now with the instruction you gave me, when I had already avenged my father's murder by killing my mother, and the Furies' repeated attacks were driving me into exile from the land, and I had already completed many winding laps. I came and asked you how I might reach the end of my wheeling madness and of my ordeals [*through which I was struggling, wandering over Hellas*]. You said I must go to the borders of the Taurian land, where your sister Artemis possesses altars, and take the goddess' image which they say fell here into this temple from the sky—must take it by trickery or some stroke of luck, and then when I have seen the peril through, must give it to the land of the Athenians (of what should follow that, nothing was said), and after doing this would have respite from my ordeals (77–92).

At the opening of *Eumenides*, Orestes has gone to Apollo's temple to ask how he can be purified and set free from the Furies. He has already undergone purification by Apollo himself but Apollo directs him to go to Athens and stand trial. If acquitted there, he will be free of the Furies. In *IT*, however, we only know that Orestes has suffered madness and seeks an end to his troubles (τέλος πόνων τ' ἐμῶν). Relief this time will come from stealing the statue of Artemis and taking it to Attica. This could be setting up an alternate version of the myth in which the offering of the statue of Artemis is a precursor to his standing trial in Athens. Or, it could stand in place of the trial altogether. In this case, we should expect that the cycle of vengeance as justice is not yet broken and Euripides' Orestes is still looking for a way out. That way out of the cycle of vengeance seems to be his death. That death, however, means being sacrificed by his own sister whose supposed sacrifice by their father started the entire cycle and which would be an unintentional continuation of kin-slaying.[26]

The problem of revenge as justice is as central to *IT* as it was to the *Oresteia*, even though the later play is not as oppressive and dark. Initially, when Iphigenia learned that Greeks had come ashore, she saw it as an opportunity to avenge herself upon all Greeks for her sacrifice, as the Herdsman suggests:

> ηὔχου δὲ τοιάδ', ὦ νεᾶνί, σοι ξένων
> σφάγια παρεῖναι· κἂν ἀναλίσκῃς ξένους
> τοιούσδε, τὸν σὸν Ἑλλὰς ἀποτείσει φόνον
> δίκας τίνουσα τῆς ἐν Αὐλίδι σφαγῆς.

> Young lady, pray to have strangers like these for victims. If you can execute such strangers as these, Hellas will be making amends for your murder and paying the price for your sacrifice (336–39).

To this Iphigenia responds that while she used to have compassion for her victims, a dream in which she saw (or thought she saw) the death of Orestes stripped her of such compassion, leaving her cruel (348–50). She wished more than anything to sacrifice Helen or Menelaus to the goddess (354–57)

but in their absence, any Greek would do.[27] It is only when she learns that Orestes and Pylades come from Argos and that Orestes is not dead that she lets go her desire for vengeance on these particular Greeks.[28]

The issue of vengeance as justice is, then, rooted in the action of the play.[29] Although Iphigenia may do her duty in the temple otherwise without any strong emotions and with compassion for her victims, the fact that they are Greeks (and that she imagines her brother is now dead) removes any vestige of compassion; these particular Greeks arouse, instead, a sense of utility. She can use one of them to get her message home to her brother on the chance that he is still alive and, hopefully, find release from her exile in Tauris thereby. Even so, the risk of continuing the bloody curse of the house does not itself disappear, since she will still sacrifice one of the Greeks and Orestes insists that it be him.

In addition to Iphigenia's need for vengeance, the specter of Orestes' crime hangs over the play. The murder of Clytemnestra is presented as a "righteous wrong" (κακὸν δίκαιον, 559) and one which lingers in the background throughout. Orestes murmurs that even though he acted justly (he is δίκαιος, 560), he still receives no favor or release from his troubles at the hand of the god who ordered him to murder his mother. This lack of support from Apollo even seems to drive him to prefer being sacrificed to continuing to live (691–92).[30] He cannot even bring himself, once they have recognized each other, to tell Iphigenia the details of his murder of Clytemnestra nor of Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon. Orestes experiences guilt over his slaying of Clytemnestra in no small part because he feels abandoned by the gods, Apollo especially. His explanation to Iphigenia about how he came to be in Tauris shows just why he feels abandoned. It also shows the weakness of Athena's justice, setting the stage for her appearance (instead of Apollo's) at the end of the play.

At 961–78, Orestes finally makes it clear that he has undergone a trial at Athens, but that it failed to free him. He describes, however, a slightly different sequence of events than was represented in *Eumenides*:

> ὡς δ' εἰς Ἄρειον ὄχθον ἦκον, ἐς δίκην
> ἔστην, ἐγὼ μὲν θάτερον λαβὼν βάθρον,
> τὸ δ' ἄλλο πρέσβειρ' ἥπερ ἦν Ἐρινύων.
> εἰπὼν <δ'> ἀκούσας θ' αἵματος μητρὸς πέρι,
> Φοῖβός μ' ἔσωσε μαρτυρῶν, ἴσας δέ μοι
> ψήφους διηρίθμησε Παλλὰς ὠλένῃ·
> νικῶν δ' ἀπῆρα φόνια πειρατήρια.
> ὅσαι μὲν οὖν ἔζοντο πεισθεῖσαι δίκῃ,
> ψῆφον παρ' αὐτὴν ἱερὸν ὡρίσαντ' ἔχειν:
> ὅσαι δ' Ἐρινύων οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν νόμῳ
> δρόμοις ἀνιδρύτοισιν ἠλάστρουν μ' ἀεί,

ἔως ἐς ἀγνὸν ἦλθον αὖ Φοίβου πέδον
καὶ πρόσθεν ἀδύτων ἐκταθείς, νῆστις βορᾶς,
ἐπώμοσ' αὐτοῦ βίον ἀπορρήξειν θανών,
εἰ μή με σώσει Φοῖβος, ὅς μ' ἀπώλεσεν.
ἐντεῦθεν αὐδὴν τρίποδος ἐκ χρυσοῦ λακὼν
Φοῖβός μ' ἔπεμψε δεῦρο, διοπετὲς λαβεῖν
ἄγαλμ' Ἀθηνῶν τ' ἐγκαθιδρῦσαι χθονί.

When I came to Ares' hill, I stood my trial, I taking one platform, the eldest Fury the other. We exchanged speeches about my mother's murder, and Phoebus saved me with his testimony. The arm of Pallas awarded me equal votes, and I left as victor in my murder-trial. Now, the Furies who settled there, persuaded by the judgment, had a sanctuary marked out for their possession right by the court. But those of them who were unpersuaded by the legal process drove me continually in a ceaseless chase, until I came back again to Phoebus' sacred ground and laid myself before the sanctuary, starving myself for food, and I swore I would break off my life and die right there is Phoebus, who had ruined me, would not save me.[31] Then making his voice heard from the golden tripid, Phoebus sent me here to take the sky-fallen statue and set it up in the land of Athens.

Athena's powerful persuasion speeches (*Eum.* 794–949) failed to induce all of the Furies to take up homes in Athens and to let Orestes go. Did they also follow through, those same resistant ones, the threat to strike Athens with plague and civil strife (*Eum.* 778–93; 808–23)? The alteration of the established Athenian version of the myth suggests alteration of some of the underlying values contained within that version.[32] Aeschylus' *Eumenides* was not simply one version of a myth among many. It was the initial version of this particular myth and contained within it, as well, a myth of the foundation of one of Athens' oldest courts and the court system of Athens as a whole. It established mythical precedents for fundamental aspects of Athenian civic identity and imperial practices. As such, to alter the myth is to suggest change within those fundamental characteristics or values. Or, at the least, such change suggests that those characteristics were not as definitive. Athena, then, must again appear and put an end, somehow, to Orestes' troubles. She must prove the infallibility of Athenian justice.[33]

The appearance of Athena as a *dea ex machina* at the end of *IT* serves primarily to end the pursuit of Orestes, Pylades, and Iphigenia by the Taurian king Thoas. It also serves to reaffirm her previous judgment on the Areopagus though it gives no proof or reason why the resistant Furies will listen now when they did not before. Her first command is to Thoas:

παῦσαι διώκων ῥεῦμά τ' ἐξορμῶν στρατοῦ·
πεπρωμένος γὰρ θεσφάτοισι Λοξίου
δεῦρ' ἦλθ' Ὀρέστης, τόν τ' Ἐρινύων χόλον
φεύγων ἀδελφῆς τ' Ἄργος ἐσπέμψων δέμας
ἄγαλμά θ' ἱερὸν εἰς ἐμὴν ἄξων χθόνα,

τῶν νῦν παρόντων πημάτων ἀναψυχάς.
πρὸς μὲν σ' ὅδ' ἡμῖν μῦθος· ὃν δ' ἀποκτενεῖν
δοκεῖς Ὀρέστην ποντίῳ λαβὼν σάλῳ,
ἤδη Ποσειδῶν χάριν ἐμὴν ἀκύμονα
πόντου τίθησι νῶτα πορθμεύειν πλάτην.

Cease your pursuit, stop launching the flood of your forces. It was destined that Orestes should come here through Apollo's oracles, fleeing the Furies' wrath, to convey his sister's person back to Argos and bring the holy image to my country, achieving respite from his present troubles (1435–44).[34]

Athena, as in *Eumenides*, seeks to end the pursuit of Orestes by a wrathful figure (a barbarian king here substitutes for the raging Furies) and does so by demonstrating that Orestes' actions were part of a divine plan. In *Eumenides*, because the Furies are also gods, the court acts as a decision maker through the authority of Zeus between the Olympian gods and the older gods. It, with Athena, decides between justice as vengeance and justice as reasoned judgment. Because Thoas is not a god, he has no basis for challenging the authority of Athena so that, when she tells him that Orestes took the statue (and Iphigenia) according to the will of Apollo (and with her aid and that of Poseidon), he concedes that he must accept the will of the gods, for only an insane man disobeys the gods (1475–76). She asks him to restrain his anger, and he does (1474). Athena can, in *IT*, command a barbarian king to heed her words, although she seemed unable to convince a Fury to do so.

This is the most interesting challenge *IT* poses to the traditional, established myth of Aeschylus. Where Athena had the authority, or at least the persuasive power, in *Eumenides* to end Orestes' torments, in *IT*, she has no such force behind her words except with mortals. And when she returns to the issue of her previous decision at the trial, she can only affirm not his freedom from the Furies, but that equal votes means acquittal (1471–72). It is as if she can guarantee the fairness of the verdict, but only for those who willingly agree to her jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the text is corrupt at the end of her speech and we are missing two lines where she addresses that earlier judgment. This much can be certain, however: Athena sees this act as her final word on the issue and, finally, enough to stave off the attacks of the Furies entirely:

<... > ἐξεσωσα δὲ
καὶ πρίν σ' Ἀρείοις ἐν πάγοις ψήφους ἴσας
κρίνασ', Ὀρέστα· καὶ νόμισμ' ἔσται τόδε,
νικᾶν ἰσήρεις ὅστις ἂν ψήφους λάβῃ.

> <...> having rescued you also before, when I judged the votes equal on Ares' hill, Orestes. And this too will be a rule, that he who gets equllay balanced votes shall prevail (1469–72).

In her second rescue of Orestes from a savage pursuit, Athena at last confirms his purification and release from the guilt of his mother's murder. The "righteous wrong" is now finally atoned for.[35] We are left to assume that the unrelenting Furies have agreed that the rescue of Artemis from the Taurians, and establishment of her cult in Attica, has somehow appeased them.

There is a true incongruity in the play, however: how does the rescue of Artemis' statue finally serve as purification for Orestes when it is the Furies, not Apollo or Athena, he must appease? Or is it the return of Iphigenia that secures it? Or, is it that, at last, when in a situation where one family member is about to murder another (a reenactment, almost, of Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon), such a murder is avoided?[36] It is odd that the blame for Orestes' troubles rests on resistant Furies and on Apollo's ineffectiveness when the beneficiary of Orestes' action in *IT* will be neither of them, but, rather, Athena and Athens.[37] There is no attempt by Euripides to explain this. All we have is a seemingly ineffective judgment by Athena and the Athenian jury in the first place followed by the establishment of temples to Artemis under the control of Athens at both Halai and Brauron.[38]

It is unlikely that the answer to this conundrum would be found in the two and a half lines of missing text, but there must be some answer. Perhaps the answer is that Athenian justice is not free and that would-be allies need to give more than their word to earn it. The absence of any mention of the Argive alliance Athena made Orestes swear at the end of *Eumenides*, or even of Orestes' return to Argos at all (though it is hinted at), suggests a lack of interest in emphasizing that aspect of the myth on Euripides' part—perhaps because alliance to Argos had not proven useful in previous years and was no longer part of larger Athenian policy and so propaganda. It also suggests a lack of true finality in Athena's words, yet again. Already, she proclaimed Orestes free from the Furies and got in return an alliance with Argos, but it availed Athens nothing. Orestes was still chased by the Furies, and the alliance came to naught. So, if Orestes' freedom is tied to gain by Athens, then the value of the payment rendered for judgment must match the value of his release from torment. An alliance was worth little, but the incorporation of another god, taken from a foreign land into Athens' control, and under Athena's thumb, could be worth it. There is no indication that the Furies themselves would gain from this exchange except that it might be more worth Athena's time to be more persuasive with the holdouts in return for Orestes' good deed.

In the end, *IT* offers us an Athena who is as calm, majestic and authoritative as her Aeschylean counterpart.[39] And yet, she is put almost in a defensive position, since she must somehow make right or make final the judgment she already rendered once before. That her final word was not final enough undermines the authoritativeness of that particular foundation myth, as well as the confidence and surety such a myth represents in its creators. There is also a hint of coerciveness. Although Orestes directs most of his ire at Apollo, his bitterness at the overall lack of favor he has received from the gods is also clear. Athena was just as ineffective at freeing him from torment as Apollo, although she seems to have tried a little harder, and did get a few of the Furies to concede. Thus, Orestes' actions (and his almost apathetic acceptance of his sacrifice) suggest that he has little faith that this task will be his last or that he will even survive it. Already he has jumped through any number of hoops. How can one more make any difference? And yet, he makes one last attempt under the constraints of the gods and under the torments of the Furies. His wrong, no matter how righteous, seems unable to be righted. Even in the end as he sails off to Greece on calm seas with the statue, his sister and best friend, the certainty that his trials are over is anything but certain. Athena has pronounced the end to his trials before, only to have it not be the case. The happy ending could be just another feint, like the happy ending of *Eumenides*.

Although it is a happily-ever-after tragedy with elements of comedy and romance, the specter of the Peloponnesian War and Athenian struggles to maintain its image as just among its allies looms large in *IT*. In times of war and uncertainty, there is no such thing as a clear divine will nor is that will, if known, necessarily in the best interests of humans. In the same way as *Suppliants* reflects the disgruntlement or tiredness associated with a war then nearly a decade long, so too, *IT* reflects a sense of fatigue. Although a performance date is not certain, meter, structure, and content suggest a date in the same period as *Trojan Women*, *Ion* and *Helen*, with a window likely between 417 and 412 BC.[40] This would fall in the period of strained peace with Sparta and during the period of the ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. If it falls into the period near the end of the expedition, as Cropp suggests, around 413 BC, when the peace with Sparta was on the verge of collapse, then war fatigue could very well be a concern. It also could reflect the final commitment to total war which events like the sack of Melos attest to. And, as will be discussed below, *IT*, *Ion*, and *Suppliants* all reflect the uncertain commitment of the allies to Athens' cause. Orestes' bitterness, his doubt that this task will be his last, reflect, perhaps, a nagging doubt that the benefits Athens offers its allies are real or desirable.

If *IT* does follow *Ion* in sequence, though, it is interesting to have a play that reflects uncertainty about Athenian authority and justice performed so closely on the heels of a jingoistic call for pan-Ionianism under Athenian leadership. But again, as in *Suppliants*, we find any doubts about the value and nature of Athenian justice overcome through additional praise of Athens. In *Suppliants*, Athena's assertion of the Argive alliance, her incorporation of the Successors' desire for vengeance into the divine plan and her support for the leadership of Theseus and Athens all help to overshadow the problem of using war as a form of justice. In *IT*, the incorporation of the cult of Artemis and the return of Iphigenia to Greece (and so life) shows once again the ability of Athens to end blood sacrifices and blood vengeance where others failed. Even Orestes' doubts will be put aside.

Cleaning up the Mess: Athena and Apollo in *Ion*

A common thread that links many of the tragedies in which Athena appears is that she is there not only to stop the violence of men, but also to restore trust in the gods, especially when the cycle of vengeance is initiated by the mandates or actions of a god. In the Orestes tragedies we saw that Orestes' actions—his murder of his mother and stealing the statue of Artemis—were all dictated by Apollo. His defense in *Eumenides* was that Apollo had ordered his mother's death and so Apollo, not he, was at fault (*Eum.* 465–67). His bitterness in *IT* resulted primarily from feeling that he continued to be unjustly haunted by the Furies since he acted in all instances at Apollo's behest (*Iph.* 570–75; 711–15, 723). Further, in *Suppliants*, when Theseus asked Adrastus why he would marry his daughter to a foreigner, he replied that an oracle from Apollo sanctioned it (*Supp.* 138). In *Ion*, the problem of gods and justice is even more acute than in these other plays since Apollo himself commits the act of injustice (not just orders it) while Creusa seeks vengeance, not on a human, but on him. Once again, though, Athena is there to fix the problem of justice as vengeance.[41]

Athena's epiphany at the end of *Ion* comes within the context of Apollo's rape of Creusa and his (failed) attempts to atone for it. The rape and the position it forced Creusa into (the secret birth and abandonment of Ion) are considered unjust by everyone in the play, including Apollo and Athena. As Hermes tells us at the opening, Apollo slept with Creusa by force (10–11) and, although he accepts paternity of Ion (35), he does not want it known that he raped Creusa (72–73). When Apollo fails to appear at the end of the play to answer the questions of Ion, it is because he is ashamed and fears the righteous anger of Creusa (1557).[42] The problem of the play is captured most clearly in Creusa's lament, "Where do we go for justice when our masters do

us wrong and ruin us?" (252–53). The gods are typically called upon to help right wrongs. How can they avenge injustices, though, that they themselves have committed?

Although Ion is devoted to Apollo and lives, as he says, as his grateful servant because Apollo has always protected him and given him a home, he nevertheless recognizes that, as a god, and as someone vested with upholding justice, Apollo should set an example by acting within those limits:

ἀλλ', ἐπεὶ κρατεῖς,
ἀρετὰς δίωκε. καὶ γὰρ ὅστις ἂν βροτῶν
κακὸς πεφύκῃ, ζημιοῦσιν οἱ θεοί.
πῶς οὖν δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ὑμᾶς βροτοῖς
γράψαντας αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ὀφλισκάνειν;
εἰ δ' (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ χρήσομαι)
δίκας βιαίων δώσετ' ἀνθρώποις γάμων
σὺ καὶ Ποσειδῶν Ζεύς θ' ὃς οὐρανοῦ κρατεῖ,
ναοὺς τίνοντες ἀδικίας κενώσετε.
τὰς ἡδονὰς γὰρ τῆς προμηθίας πέρα
σπεύδοντες ἀδικεῖτ'. οὐκέτ' ἀνθρώπους κακῶς
λέγειν δίκαιον, εἰ τὰ τῶν θεῶν καλὰ
μιμούμεθ', ἀλλὰ τοὺς διδάσκοντας τάδε.

> Since you have power, you should make virtue your goal. Human wickedness is punished by the gods, so how can it be right for you gods to make laws for us and then to be guilty of breaking those same laws yourselves? If—not that it would happen, but just for the sake of argument—if you and Poseidon and Zeus, the lord of the heavens, are going to be brought to book by humans for all the rapes you've committed, the penalties will empty your temples. Where you go wrong is in indulging your whims beyond the limits of prudence. It stops being fair to call men "bad" if all we're doing is imitating what is acceptable behavior among the gods. No, it should be those who educate us in these ways who are called "bad" (439–51).

The question of justice is not only what constitutes it, but also who is subject to it. When those who make the laws break the laws, what value do the laws have? Apollo seems to admit guilt in Creusa's suffering and plans to make it right by returning Ion to Athens with her and later revealing to her that Ion is their lost son. In this way, he can feel less ashamed of his own injustice while giving them a measure of "happily ever after" as recompense. But Apollo's plan fails, in no small part because he fails to understand the humans he engages with. His plan to pretend that Ion is Xuthus' son sets in motion a series of attempted revenge murders that stem from his own shortcomings and mistreatment of Creusa and Ion as much as from the prejudices of the humans characters.[43] The situation and the absurdity of it likely falls under the auspices of what Conacher considers Euripides' Sophistic understanding of the gods. The situation emphasizes the absurdity of imagining gods as human-like, as emotional, and as having intercourse with humans. What Conacher

says of *Herakles* is equally applicable here: there is an emphasis on the "unreality, the incredibility even, of this traditional view of the gods."[44]

Creusa's anger against Apollo manifests itself, at first, in her crying at the sight of the shrine (241–46) and by her revulsion at the mention of the cave on the side of the Acropolis where he raped her (284–86). She has forced herself to seek out Apollo, to ask him what happened to their child after she abandoned him and if she will ever have another child to replace him. Her frustration and anger are only increased when Ion informs her that no member of Apollo's community will support her query—what the god wants hidden, he will ensure remains hidden (369–80).[45] For Creusa, this is a further injustice that she will combat later by revealing to her old tutor and anyone else who will listen (including Ion through the feint of the "friend") that she was raped by Apollo and that he abandoned her and his child. This revelation sets off the chain of events forcing Apollo to reveal his actions at last. It begins, however, with a diversion of Creusa's anger away from Apollo onto Xuthus and Ion. When she learns that Ion is Xuthus' son (a misinterpretation), she sees this as a final injustice Apollo inflicts upon her. Not only did he rape her and take her virginity, he also took away any future children from her (67–68), and now provides her foreign husband with a son who will surely become Athens' king, thus ending the rule of her family, the Athenian autochthons.

The old tutor encourages this interpretation of events (as slaves often do in tragedy) when he imagines a scenario in which Xuthus, using Creusa's barrenness as an excuse, impregnated a slave and hid Ion at Delphi, only to feign a surprise reunion later (809–56). Inflamed by these imaginings, and since vengeance cannot be had upon Apollo, the beneficiaries of his crime become the scapegoats. Although earlier she found herself sharing her pain with Ion (she as a childless mother and he a motherless child),[46] now he and Xuthus become complicit in the rape, complicit in her child's (apparent) death, and complicit in her barrenness. She will turn on all her betrayers (876–80) and Ion, because he is Xuthus' son, not hers, becomes the ultimate symbol of Apollo's betrayal, his irresponsibility, and his shame (912–15).

The old tutor's explicit call for Creusa to avenge herself on Apollo by killing Xuthus and Ion (972) brings to the surface Athenian chauvinism—something Apollo did not reckon on in his planning but which Ion feared (589–620) and which the play questions and, yet, reinforces. The very idea that someone not of Athenian descent should rule in Athens has both Creusa and the chorus at wits' end. The perceived threat the foreign blood poses to Athens brings to the surface the duality of Athenian friendship.[47] The Gorgon's blood, given by Athena to Erichthonius as a gift, has the power to both give and destroy life. Blood from the veins can cure disease and sustain life

(1011–13). Blood from the snaky hair can bring a painful death (1015). Athens, like the Gorgon's blood, can help friends and harm enemies—an old axiom that embodies the logic behind vengeance as justice and one that Ion, too, appeals to in order to justify the sacrilege of killing Creusa in Apollo's shrine (1334). But vengeance as justice was precisely the cycle the Athenians worked so hard in their tragedies to be above and this play is no different. Apollo drives Ion and Creusa to murder, just as he drives Orestes.[48] Athena, however, will help them find a way out of the cycle.

Although both murder attempts (by Creusa and by Ion) appear to be thwarted by Apollo—Apollo gives a sign that Ion interprets as meaning they need fresh wine and so he pours out his cup (1190–1206) and the priestess chooses the moment when he is about to kill Creusa to show him the birth tokens (1335–55)—the situation is not remedied fully until Athena steps in and makes it explicit. When she appears, she declares:

> μὴ φεύγετ' οὐ γὰρ πολεμίαν με φεύγετε
> ἀλλ' ἔν τ' Ἀθήναις κἀνθάδ' οὖσαν εὐμενῆ.
> ἐπώνυμος δὲ σῆς ἀφικόμην χθονὸς
> Παλλάς, δρόμῳ σπεύσασ' Ἀπόλλωνος πάρα,
> ὃς ἐς μὲν ὄψιν σφῷν μολεῖν οὐκ ἠξίου,
> μὴ τῶν πάροιθε μέμψις ἐς μέσον μόλῃ,
> ἡμᾶς δὲ πέμπει τοὺς λόγους ὑμῖν φράσαι·
> ὡς ἥδε τίκτει σ' ἐξ Ἀπόλλωνος πατρός,
> δίδωσι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν, οὐ φύσασί σε,
> ἀλλ' ὡς κομίζῃ 'ς οἶκον εὐγενέστατον.
> ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνεῴχθη πρᾶγμα μηνυθὲν τόδε,
> θανεῖν σε δείσας μητρὸς ἐκ βουλευμάτων
> καὶ τήνδε πρὸς σοῦ, μηχαναῖς ἐρρύσατο.
> ἔμελλε δ' αὐτὰ διασιωπήσας ἄναξ
> ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις γνωριεῖν ταύτην τε σοι
> σέ θ' ὡς πέφυκας τῆσδε καὶ Φοίβου πατρός.

Don't flee! You are running from one who is not your enemy but is well disposed towards you, whether you are here or in Athens. I am Pallas, she who gave her name to your land, and I have sped here from Apollo, who chose not to come to meet you himself in case past deeds should provoke you to open criticism. Instead he sent me to deliver this message: this woman is your mother, and Apollo is your father; he gave you to that man not because he is your natural father, but so that you might be received into a house of high nobility. But once this whole business had been revealed, he was afraid you might be killed as a result of your mother's plotting, and that she might die at your hands, and so he saw to it that you were rescued. Despite his long silence, however, it was his intention that in Athens she would be made known to you and that you would discover that she was your mother and Phoibus your father (1553–68).

Having seen the birth tokens and heard the story, Ion is still uncertain, distrusts Apollo, and needs further guidance. Apollo, however, will not come. Athena has come on Apollo's behalf because he was too ashamed to come and feared their just accusations. And so, just as Apollo surrenders his authority to Athena in *Eumenides* when he agrees that only Athena can try Orestes' (and so Apollo's) case, so too he surrenders here his ability to prevent kin-slayings and bring his plans to fulfillment. In effect, he admits that he is incapable of doing so.[49]

The real reason for Athena's intervention, however, is not to deliver Apollo's affirmation of Ion's position but to assert the right of her Athenians to assert their authority over the Ionians (among others). She deals with the first portion of her message quite quickly and then moves to her real point: Athens, through Ion and Creusa, will become the founders of the Ionian, Dorian and Achaean races. She comes to address the root problem—the issue driving the attempted murders—Athenian chauvinism, but does not suggest any *hubris* attaches to it. Instead, she justifies it:

ἀλλ' ὡς περαίνω πρᾶγμα καὶ χρησμοὺς θεοῦ,
ἐφ' οἷσιν ἔζευξ' ἅρματ', εἰσακούσατον.
λαβοῦσα τόνδε παῖδα Κεκροπίαν χθόνα
χώρει, Κρέουσα, κἀς θρόνους τυραννικοὺς
ἵδρυσον. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν Ἐρεχθέως γεγὼς
δίκαιος ἄρχειν τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ὅδε χθονός,
ἔσται δ' ἀν' Ἑλλάδ' εὐκλεής. οἱ τοῦδε γὰρ
παῖδες γενόμενοι τέσσαρες ῥίζης μιᾶς
ἐπώνυμοι γῆς κἀπιφυλίου χθονὸς
λαῶν ἔσονται, σκόπελον οἳ ναίουσ' ἐμόν.
Γελέων μὲν ἔσται πρῶτος· εἶτα δεύτερος
< >
Ὅπλητες Ἀργαδῆς τ', ἐμῆς <τ'> ἀπ' αἰγίδος
ἓν φῦλον ἔξουσ' Αἰγικορῆς. οἱ τῶνδε δ' αὖ
παῖδες γενόμενοι σὺν χρόνῳ πεπρωμένῳ
Κυκλάδας ἐποικήσουσι νησαίας πόλεις
χέρσους τε παράλους, ὃ σθένος τἠμῇ χθονὶ
δίδωσιν· ἀντίπορθμα δ' ἠπείροιν δυοῖν
πεδία κατοικήσουσιν, Ἀσιάδος τε γῆς
Εὐρωπίας τε· τοῦδε δ' ὀνόματος χάριν
Ἴωνες ὀνομασθέντες ἕξουσιν κλέος.

But now listen to what I have to say, so that I may bring this business to an end and fulfill the god's oracles, which were the reason I harnassed my chariot. Creusa, you are to take this child with you to Cecrops' land and establish him on the royal throne. As a descendant of Erechtheus, he has a right to rule over my land, and his fame will spread throughout Greece. For his sons—four from the one root—will give there names to the land and to the native tribes of the land, the inhabitants of

> my cliff. The first-born will be Geleon, then the second <...> the Hopletes and the Argades, and the Aegicores, named after my aegis, will constitute a single tribe. Then in due course of time the children of these four will found communities on the islands of the Cyclades and the coastal mainland, whose might will support my land. They will also colonize opposite sides of the straits on the two continents, Asia and Europe. They will be named Ionians, after your son here, and they will win great renown (1569–88).

Here, Athena reminds us of the geographic boundaries of Athenian hegemony just as we are reminded in *Eumenides* by Aeschylus.[50] She reminds us, as well, of the colony status of Athens' allies. She also introduces a justification for the inclusion of non-Ionians within the scope of the *archê* when Athena tells them that the children of Creusa and Xuthus will be Doros and Achaios (1589–94).[51] Although there were ample practical and policy reasons for incorporating Dorian islands like Melos (as most of the surrounding islands already paid tribute), Athena's new genealogy hints at a well-thought out ideological position as well, one that can be recognized as far back as the creation of the ten tribes and the selection of Antiochus, a son of Heracles, as an eponymous hero. Euripides manages through his *dea ex machina* to extend the privilege of autochthony to all Greeks through Creusa's status as parent of Ionians, Dorians and Achaeans alike.[52]

Figure 7. Birth of Erichthonius. A primary example of Athenian chauvenism in their political myths. Athenian red-figure, ca. 470–460 BC. London E182, British Museum, London, UK. © Trustees of the British Museum.

We should not be surprised, however, to see a link between Apollo's inability to solve the problems he creates and the authority of Athens as progenitor of the Ionians. In *Oresteia*, he drove on the cycle of violence when he ordered Clytemnestra's murder. In *Eumenides*, *IT* and *Ion*, he hands off responsibility for cleaning up the messes he made to Athena. I suggested above that we should understand Apollo's submission to Athena's jurisdiction in *Eumenides* as a pre-figuration of the transfer of patronage of the Delian League to Athena from Apollo. In *Eumenides*, such transference of authority was presented within the framework of Zeus' justice and Athena's role as his proxy. There was no hint of the almost comical incompetence his failings reveal in *Ion*. Here, the transfer of authority from Apollo to Athena is set clearly in terms of the transfer of Ionian loyalty to Athens. Athens becomes the undisputed mother city in myth, which reflected the colonial status Athens had, by this time, affirmed for her Ionian allies in the *archê*.[53]

Whereas, in the myths of Orestes, Apollo ordered Orestes to commit a righteous wrong (murdering his mother), here, he commits a wrong himself that then drives others to attempt murder since their vengeance against the god cannot be directed at the god himself. His complicity in the vengeance as justice cycle, however, is clear in both cases. The difference lies primarily in the fact that, while Orestes was justified to an extent for murdering Clytemnestra (even without Apollo's oracle), there is no such justification for Creusa's attempt on Ion or Ion's attempt on Creusa. Driven by Apollo's indifference and incompetence, Ion and Creusa nearly become kin-slayers. In the end, however, Athena comes down from on high, once again, to clean up the mess Apollo has made. The results of her actions in this instance are not a court and a new kind of justice, but a new race of Greeks who will owe their position in the world to her and her Athenians. Once again she thwarts the cycle of vengeance as justice and instead introduces to Greece a foundation for cooperation and peace. Since all Greeks, especially the Ionians, ultimately descend from Athenians, they are all of one house and so to kill one another amounts to kin-slaying. Athena calls upon the shared blood of all Ionians and their duties to their mother city, Athens.

Within the context of Euripides' other Athena plays and within the framework of the Peloponnesian War, this play, more so than *Suppliants*, seems to be a reminder to non-Athenians and Athenians alike of the position of Athens in the Greek world. It does so, however, not from a position of loss, as one might expect in the aftermath of the Sicilian expedition, if it was produced around that time. Rather, it is more reflective of Athens' perseverance. As Thucydides reminds us (8.1), at the moment when they could have collapsed after the total defeat at Sicily, the Athenians were able to remem-

ber those values that made it strong and made others ally with them in the past: *sôphrosunê* and justice.

While the date of this play cannot be secured by more than a decade, it is intriguing to consider it in the context of so many varied events: peace treaties made and broken, great expeditions leading to devastating losses, and revolutions at home and abroad. *Ion* itself is about dramatic changes in fortune, centered around past, but not forgotten, crimes committed by those who are meant to uphold the laws of gods and men. There are so many twists in the plot, it is hard to know just how it will turn out even though Hermes has told us in the prologue how Apollo would like it to turn out. In the end, though, despite the chaos, despite the failed plans of Apollo, despite the murderous rage of Creusa and the vengefulness of Ion, Athena steps in and returns them to calm. It is as if to remind the audience that no matter what mistakes individual Athenians or even the city as a whole may make, however far they may overreach, their goddess will return them to their senses and will ensure, as she did in *Suppliants*, that they govern fairly and moderately.

Athena's Wrath and Justice in *Trojan Women*

In each of the plays discussed so far, Athena appears to ensure that Athenian justice, *sôphrôn* and sanctioned by the gods, is administered and that Athenian interests are served. In *Suppliants*, she protects Athens from vengeance by Thebes, solidifies alliance with Argos and protects Theseus from overreaching and becoming one of the *hubristai*. In *IT*, Athena ends the wrath of Thoas allowing Iphigenia, Pylades and Orestes to escape Tauris with the statue of Artemis. She also ensures, at long last, Orestes' freedom from the Furies, and establishes a series of cult sites in Attica under Athenian supervision for Artemis. Finally, in *Ion*, she puts an end to the murderous plans of Ion and to Creusa's need for vengeance against Apollo. She also proclaims the birth of the Ionian and Dorian races from Athenian stock (the Ionians from Ion, the Dorians from Creusa), thus reaffirming Athenian claims to preeminence in Greece. Connections with Athens are easy to see, and the appearance of Athena in the guise of representative of Athens easy to accept, given that many of the characters in these plays are Athenian, or, as in the case of *IT*, the play builds from a well-known Athenian version of a myth. This is not the case with *Trojan Women*, where Athena must seemingly don her Homeric guise and leave her Athenian identity at home.

The primary reason why scholars read her in her Homeric guise is because justice in *Trojan Women* is not a matter of courts or assemblies or arbitration. Instead, Athena takes out Zeus' thunderbolts (an action she has avoided in other situations) and rouses Poseidon to administer a violent chas-

tisement to the Greeks. This violence is often read by scholars as a failure of justice, yet another in a series of failures which haunt the trilogy.[54] A close look at the play within the context of other Athenian representations of the *Ilioupersis*, however, reveals that Athena's decision to destroy the Greek fleet is neither unjust nor rooted in anger or vengeance. Nor are we to read it within a Homeric context. The prologue hints a number of times that we are to view the play against the backdrop of representations of the myth like those found on the Parthenon and Stoa Poikile and in plays like Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*—all of which re-conceptualized the story as an Athenian national myth of sorts.[55] Treating the play within the scope of Athenian versions of the myth, we see, first, that Athena is not being unjust, cruel, or erratic but is functioning within the parameters of acceptable Athenian definitions of justice.[56] Secondly, we must accept that the failures of justice within the play are not linked to failures or *hubris* on the part of the Athenians. In fact, Athena (and, so, the Athenians) are the corrective to those failures.[57]

To suggest that this play has to do with Athens at all, especially its peculiar concept of justice may seem a stretch given the absence of Athenian characters within the play. But scholars have long understood this play, more than most, to have everything to do with Athens, by reading it as a direct allegory for the destruction of Melos in 416 BC and as predicting potential retribution for this act in the Sicilian expedition that launched shortly thereafter. The promised destruction of the fleet is understood as a warning to the Athenians of the comeuppance due them for imperial *hubris*.[58] The appeal of this reading is enhanced by considering it alongside Thucydides' Melian Dialogue and the antiwar sentiments it arouses.[59]

Understanding *Trojan Women* as generally antiwar or particularly anti-imperialist has been challenged on a number of grounds, including that such pacifist sentiments are not consistent within the play,[60] and that such twentieth-century notions of pacifism would not have been recognized by fifth-century Athenians.[61] Reading the destruction of Troy as a direct allegory for the destruction of Melos (which was not the first polis destroyed in this manner during the war)[62] or the unsympathetic figure of Helen within the play as an allegory for Athenian naval imperialism (as does Rosenbloom) ignores the peculiar role of this myth within the larger cultural matrix of the period. As I have argued for every previous play, we must look at the (absence of) justice in the play within the context of how justice was conceptualized in this period of the fifth century in Athens. If we do so, we see that the play rejects, as do the others, justice as vengeance because it recognizes such violence as an individualized form of justice that is harmful to the political community. As such, it specifically defines justice as a function of the political community whose absence renders justice moot.

Within the Melian interpretations, Athena has been seen as harsh and cruel, "Homeric," and often paralleled with Athena in *Ajax*. This simply is not the case. The dialogue between Poseidon and Athena which opens the play introduces them as antagonists and Poseidon as a friend of Troy—a role he inhabited in Athenian civic myth, not in Homeric myth, and thus offers the first hint that we ought to look to an Athenian context for understanding the play. Some scholars have noted that seeing Athena and Poseidon on stage together in the prologue might invoke in an Athenian audience the myth of the contest over patronage of the city. This myth had recently been set in stone on the west pediment of the Parthenon wherein Athena and Poseidon, possibly being forcibly separated by Zeus' lightning, fought over the right to call Athens their own.[63] It has even been suggested that this competitiveness between Athena and Poseidon dated back to her birth, the depiction of which inhabited the east pediment of the Parthenon and represented Poseidon beside Athena, possibly feeling threatened by or angered at her sudden appearance.

The change in Poseidon's loyalty, which the play quietly assumes, does not work within the Homeric context.[64] Ignoring this Athenian context leads to interpreting Athena's appearance on stage as Goff, among others, has, as a demonstration of "terrifying capriciousness" on the part of the gods.[65] In this view, a universalizing approach, the justice that the play will (fail to) enact is a divine judgment disconnected from human suffering and merely part of a continuing game between deities (Poseidon proclaims that Hera and Athena "bested him," (νικῶμαι γὰρ Ἀργείας θεοῦ Ἥρας Ἀθάνας θ', 23–24). To support this view, Goff cites the switch in loyalties between both Poseidon and Athena from the Homeric to Euripidean contexts. Poseidon is introduced as a friend of Troy, who lovingly helped build its walls. He harbors no hatred. His affections, he says, have not faded (οὔποτ' ἐκ φρενῶν εὔνοι ἀπέστη τῶν ἐμῶν Φρυγῶν πόλει, 6–7). Not mentioned, of course, is the Homeric tradition that Poseidon fought against Troy because the Trojans cheated him and Apollo of payment for those same walls (*Iliad* 21.441). We are not reminded of this change in support by Poseidon, although Athena's change in loyalties is explicitly mentioned and made much of.[66] Reorienting our interpretive context from an imagined general "Greek" one to a specifically Athenian one can help explain why.

Athena and Poseidon fought alongside each other against Troy, and the assertion that her anger alone led to the destruction of the city (εἴ σε μὴ διώλεσεν Παλλὰς Διὸς παῖς, ἦσθ' ἂν ἐν βάθροις ἔτι, 46–47) ignores his own complicity and so asks us to recognize that the anger Poseidon is being asked to put aside is not anger at Athena for destroying his beloved Troy, but a constant animosity he had felt toward her from her birth over the threat she

posed to his spheres of influence.[67] Once again, as with the myths of the house of Atreus and the myth of Ajax Locrus, the audience is expected to read the gods and the story within an Athenian context.[68] Simply because there are no Athenians on stage does not mean that the play ceases to have an Athenian context and that Athena ceases to represent the Athenian conceptualization of justice. While a modern audience may seek more universal relationships, an Athenian would have had a more immediate context in the Agora and on the Parthenon for this play.

It is not obvious, however, why Poseidon places such emphasis on Athena's change in allegiance while obscuring his own. Scodel suggests that Euripides "did not want to attribute any real consideration of justice to the gods he depicts."[69] Thus, he has Poseidon emphasize Athena's change of heart towards the Trojans. In fact, Athena does not have a change of heart towards the Trojans. Instead, holding to the same conception of justice with which Euripides endowed her in the other plays, she realizes that the Greeks whom she supported have crossed the line between justice and *hubris* and so punishes them. The desecration of her sanctuary and the failure of the Greeks to properly punish the violator transcend her hatred of Troy (69–71). So this shift in allegiance is not really a shift, despite what Poseidon might think. She is not now a friend of Troy. When Poseidon asks her if her hatred has turned to pity (59–60), she cuts him off and says: Answer me first. Will you make common cause with me and join in on what I want to do?[70] (ἐκεῖσε πρωτ' ἄνελθε· κοινώσῃ λόγους καὶ συνθελήσεις ἂν ἐγὼ πρᾶξαι θέλω; 61–62). First she says she wishes to act "on account of Troy" (Τροίας οὕνεκ', 57). Once Poseidon probes her on her motivation, she tells him she wishes to gladden her Trojan enemies by destroying the Greek fleet (τοὺς μὲν πρὶν ἐχθροὺς Τρῶας εὐφρᾶναι θέλω, στρατῷ δ' Ἀχαιῶν νόστον ἐμβαλεῖν πικρόν, 65–66). She does not, however, state that she now favors the Trojans or wishes to act on their behalf, as Poseidon interprets her desire to destroy the Greeks. There is no capricious change of heart. When Poseidon asks her about this move against the Greeks (67–68), she is very clear that it is neither pity nor regret for her actions, nor simply pleasure at watching the Greek fleet destroyed. Her action is a matter of punishment for a crime (69), a crime Poseidon himself recognizes as such (95–97). Athena does not randomly "leap" from love to hate as Poseidon first assumes (67). She, the arbiter of justice on behalf of Zeus, is punishing an act of *hubris* which the Greeks, despite the favor Athena has shown them, failed to judge themselves.

In a sense, Athena stands here as a substitute for the jury that other Athenian representations of the myth of Ajax Locrus' crime conjure up. I argued in chapter 2, concerning the *Ilioupersis* painting in the Stoa Poikile and

Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*, that these represented specifically Athenian versions of the myth in which the sons of Theseus and Menestheus, the only representatives of Athens at Troy of any note, held a trial for Ajax. It is unclear how his eventual guilt and punishment were resolved in the play, and the painting, of course, only represented the moment of the trial. Athena's appearance here assumes that either there was no trial or he was acquitted. Within the Athenian-specific context, this acquittal could be the failure to punish she refers to, which would make sense in light of the corrupted justice of the second play of the trilogy, *Palamedes*, and the positive references to the Athenians in *Trojan Women*. The myth of the Trojan War as represented in Athenian art admits susceptibility to *hubris* of military victors.[71] Athena stands in to correct the corrupted justice and hubris of the Achaeans where her Athenians by themselves may have been unable.

It is also quite clear that she already has the approval of Zeus and the other gods for her actions and now only needs the help of the storm god, Poseidon, her long-time rival. She tells him that she already has the thunderbolts of Zeus (80–81) which implies that she has his sanctioning. This means that she has given serious consideration to her actions. She is not suddenly changing her mind and acting irrationally. Although neither *Trojan Women* nor *Palamedes* tell of a council of the gods concerning the destruction of their temples, a council is represented elsewhere, such as in Quintus of Smyrna's *Posthomerica* (14.422–72) and also frames the *Ilioupersis* on the Parthenon (metopes 31 and 32) and, as we have already been directed towards the versions of myth presented on the Acropolis through the relationship between Athena and Poseidon, it is likely we should look there as well to understand the context for Athena's decision against the Achaeans.

Although the central metopes are missing in the *Ilioupersis* group and the others are severely damaged, it has been suggested that the Parthenon, like the Stoa Poikile, contrasted Achaean *hubris* with Athenian *sôphrosunê* by representing Demophon and Acamas rescuing their grandmother, Aethra.[72] *Trojan Women* also makes this contrast through carefully inserted praise of Athens within the play.[73] The praise is sometimes thought to sit awkwardly in a Homeric context since the Athenians were hardly a presence at Troy, since there are no Athenians in the play to warrant such praise, and since the play itself seems to be about an overall failure of *sophrosûne*.[74] Those scholars who read the play as anti-imperialist or antiwar often have difficulty integrating the praise into their interpretations as something other than nostalgia. But if we accept the Athenian and not Homeric context for the action, the inconsistency of a praise of famous Athens within the frame of a condemnation of Athenian foreign policy and morality disappears. Without a

Melos or Sicily to refer to, Athena and her Athenians are, again, arbiters of justice instead of its abusers.

That such is the case can be seen more clearly by reexamining Poseidon's final words, which some scholars have taken as a condemnation of war:

> μῶρος δὲ θνητῶν ὅστις ἐκπορθεῖ πόλεις
> ναούς τε τύμβους θ', ἱερὰ τῶν κεκμηκότων·
> ἐρημίᾳ δοὺς <σφ'> αὐτὸς ὤλεθ' ὕστερον.
>
> That man is a fool who plunders the cities of men,
> its temples and tombs, the sacred places of the dead,
> For, he dies in the end, guilty by default (95–97).

Poseidon does not condemn war, he condemns *hubris* and it is, as we have seen already in *Suppliants*, the Athenians through their goddess who have the task and right to punish such deeds.[75] The sack of Troy was represented as a notorious act of great *hubris*.[76] Recall the representations by Polygnotos in the Cnidian Lesche and the Stoa Poikile as well as Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (e.g. 338–50; 524–28). Each hero who violated the laws found himself punished in a different way. Agamemnon paid for his crimes at the hand of his wife Clytemnestra (as Cassandra so hauntingly and gleefully reminds us at 353–64). In the same way, Theseus refrained (in *Suppliants*) from crossing the line between *hubris* and justice, a line made finer when military force functions as justice. The Greeks at Troy did not. This is the crime for which Athena justly punishes them and it is the standard of punishment for overreaching that Poseidon reaffirms in his final words.[77]

But is this punishment justice as the Athenians conceived of it or merely another instance of vengeance by a god? I argued in chapters 2 and 3 concerning *Eumenides* and *Ajax Locrus* (two plays intimately connected to the sack of Troy myths in Athens) that Athena institutes courts to replace the use of violence as justice. *Ajax Locrus* and the Stoa Poikile painting specifically addressed this myth and this crime. I suggested that in both, the Athenian representatives at Troy, Menestheus, Demophon and Acamas, act as Athena's proxies and try the crime of Ajax in a court, thus ending the cycle of violence that left Troy burning. The lost *nostoi* of the other Greeks and Ajax's own death do not appear as part of the tale. The re-visioning of the story transforms the sword of justice into a court of law—a peaceful resolution that puts an end to vengeance as justice. Here, no such re-visioning is made, but the absence of a trial does not make the act any less just or any more vengeful.[78] Nor should we expect such a transformation within Euripides. As the discussion of *Suppliants* especially makes clear, Euripides made allowance for, and even argued the appropriateness of, contained violence as a

proper mode of justice. However, it must be enacted under the guidance of Athena, the only god who knows how to contain such violence.

There is no mention in *Trojan Women* of the epic tradition that the Greeks attempted to stone Ajax for his deed, nor that he found refuge at her altar. According to this tragedy, at least, there was no attempt at punishment. The absence of any aspect of judgment against Ajax by the Greeks, the myth which was represented on the Stoa Poikile and in Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*, is intentional but not because the play undercuts the prospect of divine justice. The Athenian concept of justice has been represented repeatedly as a communal ideal. Justice is not had by an individual and it sometimes has little to do with a moral right or wrong. Justice functions within the community for the good of the community and Ajax's crime, as represented as early as Alcaeus, was a crime that harmed the entire community. The crime of Ajax is not what the Greek fleet will suffer for, but, rather, they suffer for their failure to properly punish that crime. Again, as in *Suppliants*, the failure to properly uphold sacred Greek law is as great a wrong as breaking those laws. While it may seem appropriate to feel remorse for the countless soldiers who will meet their deaths in Athena's storms, their failure as a community to enact justice condemns them as much as if they had committed the crime themselves. The purpose of justice is to prevent individuals from overreaching or from acting in a way that harms the community. The act of an individual in the name of justice is not justice, it is vengeance. Although there is no reference directly to the earlier (and official) Athenian version of Ajax's fate, Athena's punishment highlights the communal nature of justice in *Trojan Women* as much as in other plays. The fact that there is no justice beyond Athena's appearance is because there is no community left to enact it.[79]

In a way, then, the prologue's foreshadowed destruction of the Argive fleet provides a balance within the play.[80] The knowledge that the Greeks will pay for their outrages gives the audience a sense of relief from the moral outrage they might feel witnessing the suffering of the women.[81] Others see no relief and, instead, an ambiguous and discomforting image of justice, which rests on the "vast inequality of power obtaining between human and divine."[82] For Goff, the fact that the Greeks are not being punished for the suffering of the women and for the deaths of Polyxena and Astyanax seems to negate any type of real justice from existing. She points out the fact that nearly every one of the Greeks who appears or is mentioned in the play will survive the storms (37–38). This is enough, she argues, to negate the moral balance their preordained demise may have given the play. But, this is the culmination of a trilogy's worth of failures of justice—the culmination of these failures is the loss of both Trojan and Achaean communities. In *Alexandros*, the failure of the Trojans to sacrifice Paris for the sake of the city

sets the stage for their demise. Unlike the Athenian king Erechtheus, who willingly sacrificed his daughter to save Athens (a story which was told by Euripides in *Erechtheus* not long after this trilogy and which was also memorialized on the Acropolis),[83] the Trojan queen does not.[84]

For the fifth-century Athenians, self-sacrifice and the subsuming of the individual to the good of the polis was an integral part of democratic ideology. Their justice system was conceived of as the best mechanism for assuring the greater good. Justice, however, came with conditions. Only *hubristai* were punished. No individual could decide what was and was not proper justice. Nor could he use the courts to further his own ends. Only the gods could sanction justice. Thus, the corruption of the courts in *Palamedes*, the second play in the trilogy, which led to the death of an innocent, marks the failure of Greek justice, mirroring the failure of the Trojans in *Alexandros*.[85] If the first crime of the trilogy was failure to sacrifice an individual for the good of the people, the second failure of justice emphasizes the corruption of justice and *hubris* of the Greeks.[86] The first two plays of the trilogy prepare the audience for the final destruction of both Troy and the Achaean fleet.

In another way, as well, by understanding justice as a communal concept, we can read Athena's justice not only as punishment of Ajax's crime and the Greek failure to address it,[87] but also as justice for any further crimes the Achaeans commit. Justice was not conceptualized by the Athenians as an individual accomplishment. Play after play debates whether the community should listen when blood calls out to blood, or whether justice is about stopping the flow of blood and preserving the peace of the people. Astyanax is killed in *Trojan Women* specifically in order to prevent his rising up to avenge his father's death (721–23). Hector's death in battle is not an injustice that needs avenging but, in the world of epic, blood does call to blood. Just as the Successors in *Suppliants* wish to avenge their fathers' deaths, Astyanax would have felt the urge to avenge Hector and Troy. Polyxena is also killed in order to stop the cycle of vengeance, only her death puts to rest not a potential vendetta but a wrathful spirit (Achilles'). The storms that will destroy much of the Greek fleet (though not all) will put to rest the sacrilege of Ajax Locrus. Who benefits from all of this? This is the test that justice must pass. Will the deaths of Helen and Menelaus benefit anyone? Who will benefit from the death of Odysseus? Or will these deaths simply satisfy a need for revenge by the Trojan women? The deaths of Polyxena and Astyanax, as gruesome as they may seem, put an end to vengeance coming from the now destroyed Troy. There will be no sleeping snake to strike unawares and start the cycle again. The destruction of the Argive fleet will serve, as well, as a final judgment by preventing the taint of the sacrilege from returning to Greece and thus damage even more communities.

While many scholars find justice in *Trojan Women* elusive outside of a condemnation of Athenian imperialism or war in general, in truth, Athena's justice (not wrath) is firmly within the domain of justice as presented in other Athenian tragedies and art. Justice is a communal endeavor that must be sanctioned by the gods. It does not obey the whims of humans; it will not attach itself to revenge. Instead, justice is a punishment for the evils of hubristic men. The only figure in *Trojan Women* who is explicitly associated with *hubris* is Little Ajax, and he will die for his actions. That a great many others will also die implicitly suggests collusion and shared responsibility (their failure to punish him, or else their participation in sacking the temples themselves; Ajax did not burn all those temples alone). Those who survive, like Agamemnon, go home to a different punishment in which Athena has no part, until she is called to end vengeance for the Atreidae as well. Those who survive (Helen, Menelaus, and Odysseus) may be unsavory, but their lives hold no threat to the community. They are not *hubristai*.[88]

Through the destruction of the fleet, Athena reasserts the responsibility of the community to exact justice. If the community fails to do so, the community itself suffers. Although the suffering community in *Trojan Women* has nothing to do with Athens (the Athenians are there but one gets the impression that they are exempt from coming danger), the play (indeed, the trilogy) lays bare the flaws and abuses to which justice is subject and even imagines a world for the Athenian audience in which no justice can exist. The democratic ideology of subsuming the individual to the state is underscored without direct reference to any events—not Melos, Sicily or another. *Trojan Women*, by refusing a space for revenge by Hecuba, Andromache, and even Menelaus, rejects once again the notion of vengeance as justice as do the other Euripidean plays in which Athena appears. Thus, while the play may question one strand of Athenian ideology,[89] it reasserts another.

Euripides and the Reaffirmation of Athenian Justice

Although *Trojan Women* presents Athena somewhat differently than *Ion*, *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, and *Suppliants*, there is still a consistent thread in the way justice is associated with her and conceptualized. Euripides does not alter the fundamental understanding of justice among the Athenians as communal, as an answer to vengeance, and as a mark of *sôphrosunê*. It is not surprising, therefore, that words for "justice" appear infrequently in *Trojan Women* while they appear with high frequency in the others. In *Trojan Women*, there is no community. The Greeks who captured Troy are not a single community, but divide between Argives, Spartans and Athenians (among others), each representing a separate political community. The Tro-

jan women are all that remains of what were once the Trojan people. But they are women and children, not citizens, and so not the political community—and justice is a political concept as the Athenians have constructed it in their myths. Justice, therefore, is disembodied, unable to be staged as clearly and firmly as the other plays where the people of Athens and their interests are a concern. This is, perhaps, one reason why Athena appears at the beginning of the play and not the end. There is no resolution for a disintegrated community. They simply cease to exist.[90]

The overall conceptualization of justice, however, is one that reaffirms essentially Athenian notions of democratic justice as an answer to vengeance. The harnessing of violence to this justice, instead of its dissipation (as in *Eumenides*), is also a concern of Euripides and one that reflects quite clearly the need to rethink what justice is in times of war and hardship. It is easy to be just when there is peace and prosperity, but harder when fear and death become part of everyday existence. Conditions of war do not excuse sacrilege which harms the entire community, not just the individual, as Adrastus discovers in *Suppliants* and as the Greeks will discover on their voyage home from Troy. This seems to be the undercurrent in Euripides' presentation of justice. It is not corrupted or dishonest. Because it is anchored by Athena, justice remains fair and a benefit to the many. Thus, it is hard to read in Euripides' plays from this period any strict critique of Athenian imperialism or even of the democracy. Such a reading of *Trojan Women* is incongruous with the chauvinism in *Ion* and *Suppliants* and even *IT* and, given the proximity of their performance dates, it is difficult to reconcile the drastic change in attitudes that such an anti-imperialist interpretation entails. Only when scholars read *Trojan Women* as a direct response to Melos can they justify such a shift. But if the defeat at Sicily did not dampen the patriotism of *Ion*, performed shortly after the worst losses occurred, can we automatically assume such a reaction to the destruction of a resistant island? Because we are repulsed by the destruction of Melos (in part because of Thucydides' presentation of it) it does not follow that Euripides or his fellow Athenians (or even the allies) were.

These plays are not anti-imperialist or anti-war. What all of these plays may reflect, however, is a general fatigue with war and recognition that the values that adhere in times of peace cannot always be maintained under the pressures war brings to bear on institutions and people. Euripides does not see these values, justice in particular, as corrupted by Athens' exercise of power. In the end, from *Suppliants* to *Ion*, we see a commitment to a notion of justice that is communal and anchored by Athena so long as the community continues to hold accountable those who transgress the laws and so long as they have their goddess to guide them. There is a risk involved with using

violence in the name of justice but Athena can help the Athenians navigate such risks.

The emphasis on justice as a communal value, especially in *Trojan Women* (though it is seen as a benefit to the community as well in the other plays), highlights an insufficiency of Athena's proclamation of punishment in the prologue. It is not that she is cruel but that it seems too little for the scope of the *hubris* of the Greeks. This should remind us of Athena in *Iphigenia among the Taurians* who must make a second attempt at justice when, so it seems, her verdict in the Areopagus failed to acquit Orestes completely. But even more than there, the failure of justice Athena seeks to correct in *Trojan Women* is left mostly uncorrected. Not all the Greeks die in the storms (though this may not have been her objective). And she appeals to her brute strength here instead of her *mêtis* and *technê*. Whereas in *Eumenides* she refrains from using Zeus' thunderbolts to sway the Erinyes, here she does not refrain. There is recognition, as in *Suppliants*, that sometimes force is necessary in the pursuit of justice, but that force must be tempered. Although Euripides does not necessarily criticize the *archê* Athena represented and watched over, there is a recognition of the dangers power poses to even the truest justice. Without *sôphrosunê*, no justice can exist.

NOTES

1 I have chosen not to include *Erechtheus*. One of the largest fragments of that play (Diggle, 4) is a speech by Athena in which she initiates the cult of Poseidon Erechtheus after Erechtheus' death at Poseidon's hands. I do not wish, however, to make generalizations about how the theme of justice as a political concept functioned within the play given its fragmented state. I also do not include *Rhesus* among Euripides' plays since it is likely from the fourth century.

2 Theseus is also here credited with being the first democratic king. Walker suggests this is the earliest version of this part of Theseus' mythology (145–46). G. Anderson, however, argues that it was invented as part of the myth-making process that accompanied Cleisthenes' reforms (48–51). I find Anderson's arguments compelling.

3 Scholars have long seen the events at Delium in 424 BC lingering behind the play. The battle was a defeat for Athens and a humiliation on account of the Thebans' refusal to allow Athens to collect its dead for burial citing the Athenian occupation of the sanctuary of Apollo in the vicinity. The actions of both the Thebans and the Athenians were considered violations of the customs of Greece but, in times of war, customs have a way of being overlooked. Athens, in fact, suggests in their defense that the gods understand the hardships of war and make allowance (Thuc. 4.90–100). Mills focuses attention on the discrepancies between reality and tragedy as a way of undermining such historicism (91–97). A.M. Bowie, "Tragic Filters for History: Euripides' *Supplices* and Sophocles' *Philoctetes*," in Pelling suggests the use of tragic "filters" through which an audience could simultaneously see a reflection of a current event and still have tragic distancing. Discrepancies were one such filter.

4 All translations for Euripides' *Suppliants* and *Ion* are adapted from Robin Waterfield, *Euripides: Ion, Orestes, Phoenician Women, Suppliant Women* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Translations of *Trojan Women* are adapted from Vellacott and *Iphigenia* from Cropp, *Euripides: Iphigenia in Tauris* (Warminster: David Brown Press, 2000). Texts follow Diggle except where noted.

5 As Mark Anderson writes of the *Oresteia* (which defined Athenian justice in tragedy and to which Euripides frequently, if not always seems to respond), "The *Oresteia* celebrates the city of Athens as a distinctive site of conflict resolution, a city that tames violence with persuasion and transforms the weaknesses of other states into its own strengths" ("Myth," in *A Companion to Greek Tragedy*, ed. J. Gregory (Malden: Blackwell Press, 2005), 123). The same can be said of what Theseus attempts here. Also, this may be a rejection, yet again, of an standard version of events made popular or exploited by Aeschylus. In his *Eleusinioi*, the conflict between Thebes and Argos was solved without a battle through a truce brokered by Athens. See T.B.L. Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides* (London: Metheun, 1967), 124; and Gunther Zuntz, *The Political Plays of Euripides* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955), 22–5.

6 Anderson, "Myth," 127.

7 I do not see much of Walker's assessment that Theseus is "self-centered and authoritarian" here (147).

8 N.T. Croally, *Euripidean Polemic: The Trojan Women and the Function of Tragedy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 86.

9 Adrastus attempts to elicit sympathy by appealing to Athenian suffering but this does not work within the context of mythical Athens. Instead, it seems to be aimed at the audience. An Athenian audience might think, for instance, about the horrors of the plague that had ravaged Athens only a few years earlier and that resulted in countless deaths and unburied corpses. Or, of course, they might think of the very recent events following the battle of Delium in which Thebes denied the Athenians the right to bury their dead. His appeal to Theseus assumes that the mythical Athenians shared the experiences and character of the contemporary audience. See Zuntz, 9–11 on Aethra's compassion and its role in persuading Theseus.

10 Mills, 107.

11 Bowie, "Filters," 49.

12 The entire passage reads: ἐγὼ δ' ἀπαυδῶ πᾶς τε Καδμεῖος λεὼς Ἄδραστον ἐς γῆν τήνδε μὴ παριέναι· εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἐν γῇ, πρὶν θεοῦ δῦναι σέλας λύσαντα σεμνὰ στεμμάτων μυστήρια τῆσδ' ἐξελαύνειν, μηδ' ἀναιρεῖσθαι νεκροὺς βίᾳ, προσήκοντ' οὐδὲν Ἀργείων πόλει. κἂν μὲν πίθῃ μοι, κυμάτων ἄτερ πόλιν σὴν ναυστολήσεις· εἰ δὲ μή, πολὺς κλύδων ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοὶ συμμάχοις τ' ἔσται δορός (467–75). It is also interesting to note the reference to the allies here. This is the only reference within the play to allies of Athens other than to the alliance Adrastus and Theseus will forge between the two cities.

13 Anderson, "Myth," 123–27.

14 Walker, 160-62.

15 This seems to become the standard version (or already was by 424 BC). See, for example, Lysias 2.7–10. On the relationship between *Suppliants* and *epitaphioi*, see Mills, 91–97 and Zuntz, 14–16.

16 Adrastus went to Thebes to right the wrongs done to Polyneices, passing judgment (ταύτῃ δικάζων ἦλθον, 154), but he failed. His failure, as Theseus figures out, was that this was not justice sanctioned by the gods (οὐκ ἦλθες, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐνοίᾳ θεῶν, 157).

Adrastus and Argos are marked as incapable of discerning true justice or of acting justly because they act out of confidence instead of good counsel (εὐψυχίαν ἔσπευσας ἀντ' εὐβουλίας, 161). For a list of the religious mistakes made by Adrastus which lead to his failed attack on Thebes, see Bowie, "Filters." 48.

17 Bowie, "Filters." 46, suggests that the arrival of the Theban herald and the dialogue that follows would have resonated with the Athenian audience bringing to mind the sequence of events at Delium while the Athenians tried, unsuccessfuly, to negotiate the return of their dead.

18 Anderson, "Myth," 128.

19 Or, perhaps it simply reflects more accurately how such alliances were formed whereas *Eumenides* represented it symbolically. The oath between Argos and Athens represented here has been one of the traditional focuses of historians. Although it may help with dating the play (it seems unlikely that a play performed after the defeat at Mantinea would support the doomed alliance), as Bowie reminds us, the play is far too complex to be focused solely on this alliance. No one would suggest that the *Oresteia* or even just *Eumenides* is solely about the Argive alliance of 462 BC. This play is no less complex. On the oath as an indication of mistrust, see Mills, 127.

20 Mills, 127.

21 The messenger comments specifically that Theseus, in his restraint at the walls of Thebes, is just the kind of *strategos* the Athenians need in times of trouble to run the city (726–30).

22 The text for *Iphigenia among the Taurians* is corrupted in many places. For the most part, I have followed Diggle but follow Cropp, on most lines considered later additions to the text. Such lines are noted with brackets and italics.

23 See Caldwell, "Tragedy Romanticized: The *Iphigenia Taurica*," *CJ* 70 (1974–5): 23–40 for discussion of the various interconnections between *Iphigenia among the Taurians* and the *Oresteia.*

24 Cropp notes that both *Electra* and *Orestes* also question the authoritative version of Aeschylus (46n.51). Neither of those plays, however, question the finality of Athena's verdict. In *Electra,* Castor states that Orestes will be acquitted in Athens but diverges from Aeschylus in that Orestes will be exiled from Argos (1249–75). In *Orestes*, Orestes is condemned in a trail in Argos, spends a year in exile in Arcadia and only then goes to Athens for his trial and acquital (1643–65).

25 Cropp, 36.

26 See David Sansone, "The Sacrifice-Motif in Euripides' *IT*," *TAPA* 105 (1975): 286, especially.

27 The chorus also wishes that Helen could be sacrificed to pay the penalty for Iphigenia's sacrifice (439–46) though they wish some Greek would arrive as well to release them from their slavery in Tauris (447–51). It is a bind, in some ways, to want both vengeance for a wrong and freedom from the same source.

28 The focus on Helen does not recede. Upon learning of Helen's successful return with Menelaus to Sparta, she becomes annoyed (521–25). Her disappointment at Helen's survival is tempered slightly, however, by news that Calchas, the prophet who insisted upon her sacrifice, was dead (531–33). Anne Burnett, *Catastrophe Survived* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 52, states, however, that Iphigenia lets go her desire for vengeance, even on Helen, at 565-69 when, first, she includes Agamemnon among the pitiable and then denounces her false dream.

29 Burnett, *Catastrophe*, 49-52.

30 Burnett writes that Orestes makes it clear here that before the recognition he saw Apollo as "the enemy," (*Catastrophe*, 56–7).

31 Cropp suggests that these lines refer to the visit Orestes makes to Apollo's shrine to be purified which happen before the trial in Athens according to Aeschylus. So, according to Cropp, there is a difference in sequence and the retrieval of the statue acts as Apollo's purification of him. But, the αὖ suggests that this is a second trip. Both Apollo's initial purification and the judgment by Athena have failed.

32 The simple fact that Euripides returns directly to Aeschylus' version of the myth time and again suggests that it had a status in Athens rivalled by neither the Homeric nor Pindaric versions of events. Given the patriotic nature of the story and the tendency of Athenians to promote their own versions in public art, we should not be surprised that Euripides felt it necessary to return repeatedly to Aeschylus' version. Burnett goes so far as to suggest that *Iphigenia* was intended by Euripides as a proto-satyric alternate to *Proteus*, the fourth play in the *Oresteia* tetralogy. She admits, however, that we know next to nothing about *Proteus* (*Catastrophe*, 71).

33 Froma Zeitlin, "Redeeming matricide? Euripides Rereads the *Oresteia*," in *The Soul of Tragedy*, eds. Victoria Pedrick and Steven Oberhelman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 199–225, sees in the play an attempt to preserve Apollo's "mantic prestige." Orestes' continued haunting by the Furies is Apollo's failure, not Athena's (202). But Apollo ceded his authority over the matter to Athena in *Eumenides* so that the failure is now hers (and, perhaps, Zeus').

34 The problem of destiny should be obvious. When was this destiny declared? Before the trial in Athens? After the trial? Did Athena and Apollo know that her verdict would fail to resolve the problem of the Furies before they made Orestes go through the trial?

35 See Burnett, *Catastrophe*, 63-4 on the redemption of the House of Atreus.

36 When Orestes asks Iphigenia who will sacrifice him, she says that it is her duty to do so to which he responds: αὐτὴ ξίφει θύουσα θῆλυς ἄρσενας; (You yourself will kill me with a sword, female killing male? 621). This invokes the murder of Clytemnestra by Agamemnon as well as the logic behind Athena's final judgment in favor of Orestes at *Eumenides* 734–43. There she proclaims that she supports τὸ δ' ἄρσεν (the male) in all things. See Zeitlin, "Matricide," 202–4, where she argues that the pollution can only be redeemed by returnign to the source of the pollution, i.e. Iphigenia's sacrifice which Artemis ordered and then saved her from.

37 Christian Wolff, "Euripides' *Iphigenia among the Taurians*: Aetiology, Ritual, Myth," *CA* 11 (1992), suggests that the rite Athena establishes compensates both for Orestes' escape from sacrifice in Tauris and as repayment for the matricide (314). For furthur discussion of the benefits Artemis' cult brings to Athens and the purpose behind its move to Attica, see Wolff, 318-30 and 327-29, especially In a sense, Oresetes needs to compensate for carrying his pollution to Athens in addition to finding redemption for the matricide.

38 See Cropp, 50-51 for a summary of scholarship and E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica* (London, Institute for Classical Studies, 1989), on the cult of Artemis at Brauron.

39 Burnett puts Athena and Poseidon together into a "noble and well-regulated family, respectful of law and interested in mortality..." (*Catastrophe*, 66–67). This is quite different from how scholars have interpreted the same pair in the opening of *Trojan Women*.

40 Cropp, 61. *Helen* is fairly securely dated to 412 BC and *Iphigenia* is thought to precede it. *Ion* and *Trojan Women* seem to date to no earlier than 419 BC. Also, there may be direct references to *Iphigenia* in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* which dates to either 411 or 410 BC (Cropp, 62).

41 Nicole Loraux, "Kreousa the Autochthon: A study of Euripides' *Ion*," in Winkler and Zeitlin, 206 n.125, notes that the *Ion* is implicitly linked to *Eumenides* in a number of ways including association with Apollo, the female role in birth, vengeance, and the promise of benefits to Athens.

42 Anne Burnett, "Human Resistance and Divine Persuasion in Euripides' *Ion*," *CP* (1962): 89–103 and Vincent Rosivach, "Earth-borns and Olympians: The Parados of the *Ion*," *CQ* (1977): 284–94, both suggest that Creusa is acting ungratefully toward Apollo who has favored her so highly and brought her such benefits. Rosivach even compares her attempt on Ion to the Giants attacking Olympus and considers the fact that Apollo had to use force when he raped her a similar form of opposition (291). This position seems hard to defend give the specific critiques offered throughout the play as well as Athena's confirmation of Apollo's shame. Also, as Loraux points out, the play is really presented from Creusa's position so that within the dynamic of the play, Apollo is unjust ("Kreousa," 173).

43 Arlene Saxonhouse, "Myths and the Origins of Cities: Reflections on the Autochthony Theme in Euripides' *Ion*," in *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, ed. Peter Euben (Berkeley: University of Caligornia Press, 1986), 254, argues that Euripides' examination of the autochthony myth in *Ion*, which partially drives Ion's fears for going to Athens and Creusa's murder attempt, is meant to get the audience to focus on how the myth shaped their prejudices and beliefs.

44 D.J. Conacher, *Euripides and the Sophists: Some Dramatic Treatments of Philosophical Ideas* (London: Duckworth, 2003), 19. Gilbert Murray, *Euripides and his Age* (New York: Holt and Company, 1936), 60 calls the play "blasphemous."

45 Diggle considers 374–77 an explanatory interpolation. These lines are unnecessary to get Ion's point.

46 See Stanley E. Hoffner, "Violence, Culture , and the Workings of Ideology in Euripides' *Ion*," *CA* 15 (1996): 303–10, on the shared oppression of Ion and Creusa.

47 Recall as well Theseus' dismay that Adrastus would marry his daughter to a foreigner (even though a Greek).

48 See Hoffner, 302–3 for judicial language surrounding Creusa's attempted murder of Ion and his reaction.

49 As Donald Mastronarde, "Iconography and Imagery in Euripides' *Ion*," in *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Euripides*, ed. Judith Mossman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), comments, Apollo is "ill-equipped to understand or deal with human emotions; and, of course, in the end, a less flawed representative of the Olympian order, Athena, must speak on his behalf" (296). Less flawed and also intimately bound to Athens. Again, Athena repeats her role as the one who covers for Apollo's mistakes or inefficiencies.

50 Kennedy, *passim*.

51 See Hoffner, 313–14 and n.71 for a discussion of the geographic refernces as an allusion to Athenian military setbacks in the years preceeding Ion's performance. He also discusses the ways in which the play undercuts the status of Delphi (313-16). This fits in with what we have already seen of Apollo conceding his authority to Athena and also

reminds us of repeated attempts by Athens to emphasize the importance of Delos at the expense of Delphi.

52 Contrary to Saxonhouse who states that Euripides offers only an unfavorable view of the myth and its exclusivity (268). For *Ion* as an imperialist play, see Loraux, "Kreousa," 179-79; and Barron, "Propaganda," 35-48.

53 Meiggs, 293.

54 Barbara Goff, *Euripides: Trojan Women*. London: Duckworth, 2009; Ruth Scodel, *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1980); Francis Dunn, *Tragedy's End: Closure and Innovation in Euripidean* Drama (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 101–14 points out that the beginning of the play seems more like Euripidean endings and suggests that this may be a function of the role of the play within a (somewhat) connected trilogy that included *Alexander* and *Palamedes*. As Goff states, the play does not "work through the consequences" of the previous plays in the trilogy as *Eumenides* does, thus the justice of this *deus ex machina* fails (27).

55 Peter Burian, "Myth into *Muthos*: The Shaping of Tragic Plot," in Easterling, 190-93, speaks of the "mythic matrix" which informs tragic plots. Frequently, scholars limit this matrix to Homer and the epic cycles for precedents that exert pressure on tragic plots (what Burian calls its metatheatrical element). Other tragedies (especially those of Aeschylus) and other repositories of myth like public art also exerted pressure—perhaps even more pressure since their context was more immediate. The overused excuse that art only imitates tragedy has allowed scholars to avoid looking at Athenocentric representations specifically.

56 See Goff for an overview of scholarship.

57 Dué suggests (with reference to *Hecuba*) that the Athenians are implicated in the sack but not condemned (150). I suggest that the positive references to the Athenians are playing on the general trend of representing the Athenians as a moderate force in the sack thus relieving them of complicity in *hubris*. Sacking a city is not an act of *hubris*, only going too far and destrying the temples of the gods is.

58 Murray, 62–68; Scodel, 142; Croally, *passim*; Rosenbloom, "Empire," *passim*.

59 There are elements within the Melian Dialogue that are relevant to a larger discourse on the changing nature of war and politics in the late fifth century but using them to create an allegorical reading of a play simply because it evokes wrenching anti-war sentiments in the twentieth century is questionable and has rightly been challenged. I will argue in the next chapter that the use of such comparisons are possible but should rest not on the emotional appeal of those texts but rather on the strong connection between cultural terminology, conceptions of political institutions, and a shared view of politics and its progression in the fifth century—in a nutshell, they must be able to prove that the texts share the same underlying cultural and political values.

60 Goff, 31–63.

61 Dué, 150; A. Maria van Erp Taalman Kip, "Euripides and Melos," *Mnemosyne*, Ser. 4, 40 (1987): 414-19, argues on chronological grounds that the play could not possibly have been written in response to the destruction of Melos. See Heinrich Kuch, *Mnemosyne*, Ser. 4, 51, (1998): 147-53, for counter arguments.

62 Scione was the first city treated in this manner by the Athenians in 421 BC (Thuc. 5.32.1). Plataea was first given this treatment by the Spartans, in fact, and one might have expected to see some reaction to that act as opposed to the much later destruction of Melos. Erp Taalman Kip suggests that scholars have seen Melos as more innocent than

Scione and so unworthy of their demise (419). Melos, however, was not as neutral as Thucydides would have us believe. They had been assessed a tribute by Athens in 425 BC along with a number of other islands in their region. They likely refused to pay but did twice give money after that to the Spartan war fund (Meiggs, 50 and 328). Thucydides emphasized Melos because it suits the design of his narrative and emphasizes the tyrannical venture to Sicily. We need to avoid imposing Thucydides' artistic analysis with the way the Athenian audience in 415 BC would have viewed the play and such destruction of a (non-allied) city.

63 Hurwit, 128–33.

64 Their anymosity in *Odyssey* is not as obviously personal as it is in Athenian myths. Nor do they function as smoothly together as they seem to in *IT* where Athena simply asks Poseidon the favor (*charis*, 1444) of calming the seas and he does. As with the myhs of Poseidon flooding Attica after losing the contest and the death of Erectheus, Athena seems here to always find a way to appease the violent god of the sea and win him over to her side (and that of her Athenians).

65 Goff, 36.

66 Scodel suggests that the shift in Poseidon's loyalty is needed to emphasize the unspoken motivation of the Judgement of Paris on the action of the trilogy (65–6). The Judgement represents to her the ultimate failure in justice and points to the lack of a "right" scenario. It is not "the right or wrong of the plaintiff and defendant..." but the "moral status of the judge or the situation" (100). By focusing on the anger of the goddess as her motivation as opposed to a sense of "justice" (which Scodel defines as a "right" opposite a "wrong" and even equates at times with vengeance), in Scodel's view, Euripides undercuts any notion of justice, human or divine.

67 See also 9–12 and 23–25 where Poseidon mentions the horse Athena contrived as well as her league with Hera and others to destroy the city. The opposition between Athena and Poseidon in this play and in Athenian civic myth was personal.

68 Also lingering in the background would be Poseidon's killig of Erechtheus who killed his son, Eumolpos, in the war with Eleusis. One large fragment of the lost *Erechtheus* (fr. 4, lines 55–101) is a speech by Athena establishing a cult to Poseidon Erechtheus on the spot where Poseidon drove Erechtheus into the ground with his trident. Thus, twice, once after the Athenians chose Athena as patron and again after the war with Eleusis, Poseidon had attacked Athens in some way. Despite this, Athena strikes a concilatory tone with him in *Erechtheus* and here in *Trojan Women.*

69 Scodel, 67.

70 Athena's tactful refusal to acknowledge the Trojans as deserving of pity removes a moral component from the play. Is the audience morally obligated to view the Trojans as worthy of pity? Of course, this question is better answered if we know how they were presented in the first play of the trilogy, but by having Athena refuse to acknowledge such a possibility, Euripides leaves it less clear whether we should as well.

71 Dué, 99.

72 See Castriota, *Myth*, 168; Ferrari, 132. The scene also appears on vase paintings such as Attic red-figure Berlin F2408 (*CVA*: Berlin, Antiquarium 3, 30-31, PL.(1078) 149.1-5; ca. 475–425 BC).

73 Most commented upon is the chorus' prayer that they go to Athens as slaves above any other place (208–9, 218–19). The fact that they ask to be sent to Siciliy as a second choice has led some scholars to see a reference to the Sicilian expedition here (especially

Rosenbloom, "Empire"). Perhaps, instead, it is a reference to another city friendly to tragedy as it was well-known that Aeschylus performed plays there and Euripides was popular there as well.

74 Justina Gregory, *Euripides and the Instruction of the Athenians* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 50–85; Croally, 66–69.

75 Scodel suggests that the use of *hubrizein* by Athena implies a selfish motivation on her part. She punishes the Greeks because she was disrespected by Ajax. But the role of the gods is frequently in Greek literature to punish *hubris*. Hubris by its nature is an affront to the gods and so a sacrilege. Punishing it does not make one selfish.

76 Ferrari, 119–26.

77 In *Eumenides*, as Athena attempts to persuade the Furies to give over their anger and become friends of Athens, she reminds them that she alone of the gods knows where Zeus keeps the keys to the thunderbolts. In that instance, she says, she has no need of them since the Furies will listen to persuasion. At Troy, however, in the aftermath of the sack, the thunderbolts do come out (ἀλλ' ἔρπ' Ὄλυμπον καὶ κεραυνίους βολὰς λαβοῦσα πατρὸς ἐκ χερῶν καραδόκει, 92–3) since there is no persuasion that can take back the destruction that has already occurred and because the Argives themselves failed to act justly to make recompense.

78 If we still allow that a trial of sorts did take place (whether a formal one as represented in *Ajax Locrus* or an informal decision as found in the epic cycles), we must assume that Ajax was acquitted. We may be able to assume based on the miscarriage of justice under an Achaean court in *Palamedes*, that the Greeks at Troy (with the exception of te Athenians) are represented as incapable of knowing justice and properly enacting it.

79 As the chorus mourns at the end of the play, Hecuba asks if her torments are just. P.E. Easterling, "Form and Performance," in Easterling, 174, asserts that the absence of any divine apparatus at the end of the play "strongly suggests that no divine explanation exists for the suffering that constitutes the action of the rest of the play." But the mother of cities is no city now. Troy is no longer Troy (1291–1332). We should recall as well that Athena is a civic goddess who oversees not people but *poleis*. Where there is no *polis*, there is no Athenian justice.

80 P.E. Easterling, 174.

81 Croally, 128–29.

82 Goff, 38.

83 One may, of course, also think of Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia before the Trojan expedition which was represented by Aeschylus and Euripides himself as a morally questionable act. But it is hard to decide whether Agamemnon acted out of a desire to save face or for the good of all.

84 Although Paris was exposed as a child by Priam and Hecuba, the *Alexandros* reveals that, when Hecuba learned that he was still alive, despite protestations from Cassandra and the knowledge of her dream that he would cause the destruction of Troy, she refused to sanction his death and returned him to Troy instead.

85 One question that always casts a shadow the idea of justice among the Achaeans is who decides what is just since the communitiy is really a collection of separate peoples. The acquittal of Ajax implies and the condemnation of Palamedes suggests that justice is not functional in such a disunified situation. It is remeniscent of the emphasis in Herodotus and Aeschylus' *Persians* on Persian disunity as a source of their inferiority. Such

reminiscents strengthen Ferrari's suggestion that in representations of the Trojan War in Athens, the Achaeans are aligned with Xerxes and the invading Persians.

86 It is not surprising either to see that Athena's Homeric association with Odysseus, mastermind of the sham trial against Palamedes, is reduced or even ignored in later tragedies as he is represented more and more negatively. She likely did not appear in *Palamedes* as support for him nor does she in *Hecabe* or *Philoctetes.* When she finally does appear in the Trojan trilogy, it is to announce the death of his men and the destruction of his fleet. The audience will, of course, recall her help (after 10 years) in returning him safely home in the *Odyssey*, but that is a Homeric, not Athenian connection. See Ch 5 for the relationship between Odysseus and Athena in *Ajax*.

87 M. Anderson, *Fall*, 77–80; Dué, ch 5.

88 We should also assume that the Athenians at Troy, though never named, survive. Athens is, of course, praised multiple times within the play as a golden, blessed and sacred place. They are not *hubristai* either. Also, we should distinguish between those who were considered *hubristai* and those who may be represented hubristically in the play. Helen was never counted among the *hubristai*.

89 Croally and Duè.

90 A major theme within the trilogy is freedom vs. slavery (Scodel, 110–11) which contributes to the overall reinforcement of a communal ethos. Without a community, there is no guarantor of freedom nor any type of justice. Slavery is a result of loss of community.

•CHAPTER FIVE•

Justice Abused

Sophocles' *Ajax*

It is not a question of justice...Rather it is a matter of the inhumane and even brutal manner of her exaction of justice.

—A.J.Podlecki

Sophocles' *Ajax* has always troubled scholars. It is a dark play that raises more questions than it answers. The figure of Athena as she appears here, however, has not frequently made the top of the list of dark and troubling aspects. Unlike almost all other known representations of Athena on stage or in Athenian art, this goddess is cruel and relishes in her cruelty. As minor as one might consider her appearance in the more general scope of the play, she actually not only sets the tone for all that follows but introduces the major themes as well, primary among them being the nature of justice and the meaning of *sôphrosunê*, both inextricably linked, as well, to what it means to be a *summachos*. All of these issues, (justice, *sôphrosunê* and what it means to be a *summachos*) have arisen in earlier chapters. Here, I take a look at them all and Athena's relationship to them in the context of Athens' fully developed *archê* to see how their meanings may have shifted within this new context.

As with the analyses of Athena in the previous chapters, there is a basic assumption here that Athena stands as the representative of Athenian interests and institutions whenever she appears in Athenian art. The question is, again, how interpretation of the play changes when we consider her within that context. As part of this reading, I will offer arguments concerning the date of the play. While most scholars have dated *Ajax* from the early to mid 440s, I think this is a misdating.[1] The representation of Athena, the relationship she shares with Ajax and the shifting meanings of the concepts of

sôphrosunê and *summachos* within the play all reflect more appropriately, I argue, the years after the start of the Peloponnesian War.

As the patron of Athens and of the *archê*, Athena was represented, as we have already discussed in the previous chapters, in many contexts in Athenian public art—on temples, sculptures, vase and wall paintings, and, in tragedy. In most of these representations, she is serene, queenly. In Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, she acts as an arbiter of justice putting an end to the vicious cycle of revenge that plagued the house of Atreus. I have argued that she also served the same role in *Ajax Locrus* where she initiated another mythical trial, this time to try one of the *hubristai* at Troy. The pattern of associating Athena with court-based or arbitrated justice, a hallmark of Athenian democracy and of imperial administration, continues in Euripides' *Suppliants*, *Ion* and *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, all likely produced between 424 and 411 BC. In each of these plays, she puts an end to a cycle of vengeance as justice and, in each case as well, establishes something of benefit for Athens.

In *Suppliants*, she reaffirms the Argive alliance of *Eumenides* which, coincidentally, would be renewed in reality in 420 BC. In *Ion*, she establishes the parentage of the Ionian Greeks and Athens' role as progenitor. In *IT*, she reasserts her verdict in favor of Orestes which she rendered in *Eumenides* and then institutes as well cult worship of Artemis in Attica. Even in *Trojan Women*, which seems to stand outside of this pattern, Athena acts as an arbiter of justice. The Greeks crossed the line between being the sword of Zeus' justice and being hubristic. When no one among the Greeks enacted appropriate justice for this crime, Athena stepped in and exacted it herself. Despite the use of controlled violence there, her justice is fair and sanctioned by the other gods. Only in *Ajax*, then, among our extant tragedies, is Athena not an arbiter of justice meant to put an end to vengeance. Instead, she herself embraces the very type of justice she rejects elsewhere.

Unlike *Oresteia*, justice in *Ajax* does not move from Homeric vengeance to Athenian courtrooms. Nor does it become embodied in the final decrees of Athena as in Euripides' plays. Rather, it remains within the realm of moral dilemma, unable to be re-conceptualized and embodied by an Athenian on stage. In fact, justice in *Ajax* actively refuses to be relocated and disassociated from violence. The fact that both Athena and Ajax have close affiliation with Athens in civic myth problematizes earlier representations of Athena as well, since here the justice she exacts is not only against representational norms, but also cruel and aimed at one whom Athens claimed as one of their own. The moral dilemma that Athena's justice presents us with in *Ajax*, reflects, I will argue throughout, closer affinity to the issues facing Athens and her *archê* in the years when war had settled in at Athens, when Athens' allies, like Mytilene, could no longer be sure if they and Athens

shared the same view of their relationship and when the strains of war caused Athens to enforce ever more stringent measures to keep her subjects and allies in line. This period of oppressive rule characterized the years between 429 BC and 412 BC particularly and it is within this period that I think we ought to consider the play.[2]

The reading of *Ajax* that I offer here is not intended to be comprehensive or definitive. Rather, I want to look at an underlying current in the play that has long been overlooked by scholars: the way the play reflects the shifting view the Athenians had of their own role as an imperial power. It is an attempt to come to terms with the conflict between the democratic, "heroic" ideologies associated with the Persian Wars and the brutal imperialism of the Peloponnesian Wars. I will not try to reconcile the tensions inherent in the play, but acknowledge these tensions and see the attempt to engage with them as a primary function of the drama. The problems within the play are the key to understanding it.

I do not think that an Athenian or ally sitting in the audience would have failed to take notice when they heard Athena mockingly utter the word *summachos* to Ajax. In their daily lives, the Athenians were accustomed to images of Athena as the serene, just goddess staged by Aeschylus and portrayed in numerous statues around the city. This just Athena sanctioned the democracy, sanctioned the courts, and served likewise as the patron of the *archê*. Sophocles' Athena is not the goddess of other tragedies, or of Athenian public art, even if she is just. In her cruelty, she goes beyond any violence associated with her birth or her contest with Poseidon as envisioned on the Parthenon. Even if one views her through the *ethos* of help friends/harm enemies, this Athena, more than any other in Athenian public art, is problematic and shocking.[3] To the Athenians, she is not harming an enemy but harming a friend, Ajax. Her justice is more reminiscent of that of the Erinyes than of the justice of the courts she once sanctioned in their place.

The problem of Athena is a simple one: what does it mean when the patron deity of the city who is most often presented in Athenian iconography and literature as an arbiter of democratic justice appears on stage as a vengeful god? Scholars have spent a great deal of time trying to deemphasize her problmatic nature instead of considering that the problem her behavior poses may be the point.[4] The simplest way out is offered by the play itself. Athena's behavior results from an insult.[5] After Ajax leaves the stage to commit suicide, a messenger arrives and relates a prophecy of Calchas that on two separate occasions Ajax rejected the aid of the gods. First, before leaving home he supposedly told his father, Telamon:

πάτερ, θεοῖς μὲν κἄν ὁ μηδὲν ὢν ὁμοῦ
κράτος κατακτήσαιτ'· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ δίχα
κείνων πέποιθα τοῦτ' ἐπισπάσειν κλέος.

Father, together with the gods even a nobody could achieve power. I, however, trust that I will gain glory without them (767–69).

The second rejection came, according to Calchas, on the battlefield and was directed toward Athena. When she encouraged Ajax in battle, he supposedly replied: ἄνασσα, τοῖς ἄλλοισιν Ἀργείων πέλας ἵστω, καθ' ἡμᾶς δ' οὔποτ' ἐνρήξει μάχη (Queen, stand near some other Argive, but where I am stationed, the battle will never break through; 774–75). This is why Athena drove him mad and diverted his rage away from the Argive leaders. However, if Athena is a just god punishing Ajax for attempting to kill the Argive leaders, how can Calchas' prophecy be the reason behind her behavior? If her wrath at him is limited to one day, does that really make him her enemy? More to the point, why would Sophocles go to such great lengths to create ambiguity and dissonace only for it to be essentially mooted by Calchas' revelation?[6] Whitman is correct when he says that Calchas' prophecy is the easy way out, but not necessarily the right one.[7]

If these two insults were not part of the epic or Athenian traditions (and there is no evidence that they were), how can an audience be expected to know the reasons behind Athena's wrath before Calchas tells us? How can they then rely on the prophecy to explain why their patron deity is mocking one of their eponymous heroes so cruelly and needlessly? The answer that the audience should not have been expected to know it nor would this later revelation relieve the tension or anxiety caused by the opening scene. Athena and Ajax call each other "ally" in the opening of the play, and in fifth-century Athens they were more than allies—they were both patrons of Athens and shared the task of protecting the city and her people. They were even represented in Athenian art as fighting alongside each other at Troy, though they do not do so in the Homeric texts (Figure 3 and 8). Whitman has summed up the situation best:

As if to clarify the dubious situation, Sophocles inserts a passage later on in the play which implies that Ajax' murderous plan was not his first offence...He [Sophocles] may have invented the insult stories, but in a spirit akin to Dante's prose explanations of his sonnets, to satisfy those who cared to look no further and to warn the more curious that the answer was not so simple.[8]

I am of the curious sort who does not find the "simple" answer plausible. Athena's behavior cannot be explained away by Calchas' prophecy or by any

other of the attempted rationalizations. The audience would not have known about the insults at the beginning of the play. Only in retrospect would the audience understand the supposed reason for Athena's actions, but by then their opinions would have already been shaped.

Most scholars rely on an assumption that Athena is "just" in *Ajax* in order to pass over discussion of her character, regardless of how her justice is exacted. Podlecki, however, is right that it is not a question of justice, but the type of justice.[9] Any reading that whitewashes Athena's behavior with terms like *sôphrosunê* and *hubris* does not take into account the discrepancy between Athena's behavior and the supposed moral of the episode.[10] Athena is, despite Blundell's assertions, an unpredictable and destructive figure, whose character cannot be explained as yet another example of divine ambiguity in tragedy or as part of the "tragic" world view that supposedly dominated fifth-century thought.[11] Were the god in question Aphrodite, who is known for fickleness and cruelty, perhaps this might be a more acceptable explanation, but the god in question is Athena. On the stage and in Athenian public art, Athena stood for an end to arbitrary forms of justice that resulted from divine ambiguity. She stood as patron and protector of Athens and her empire and she, along with Athens, was the symbol of true justice.

However ambiguous previous scholars have judged her behavior in *Ajax*, her appearance becomes less ambiguous if we think of the play in terms of Athena's importance and presentation in Athenian civic myth and in the context of the Athenian imperial project in particular. In other tragedies, with the exceptions of *Ajax* and *Trojan Women*, Athena appears on stage within contexts that the Athenian audience would have recognized as about them and they would have recognized that she represented their interests. But even in those plays where her behavior seems more Homeric than Aeschylean, she still functions in some way as an allegory for Athens. Therefore, I ask: if Athena has been so altered by Sophocles in this play, does she still represent Athens on stage, or does Sophocles expect the audience to disconnect her from that tradition? Or, more likely, is her altered representation a reflection of a shift in the principles Athena symbolized in civic and imperial ideology? And, if it does reflect a shift, are we meant to understand that those principles are now as corrupt as her justice? For, Athena's justice, we shall see, is as corrupted as Ajax's vision.

A basic assumption of this chapter is that there is an extra-textual relationship between Athena and Ajax, summoned up in the play by the word *summachos* that asks us to view the corruption of Athena's justice and the Athenian institutions it stands for on stage within the scope of the empire. While Knox and Blundell have argued that Athena's interaction with Ajax exemplifies the *ethos* "harm one's enemy," with Ajax as the enemy, this is

clearly not how Ajax views the relationship within the play, and clearly not how their relationship would have been familiar to the Athenians in their own mythology. As the ally Ajax believes her to be, Athena should be helping Ajax within the frame of both the help friends/harm enemies *ethos* and by the terms of a *summachia* relationship he believes they share. Instead of aiding Ajax, however, Athena drove him mad and then taunted him needlessly while he was under her spell. This is hardly the behavior of an ally and it necessarily leads to a reevaluation of her relationship to justice. If Athena is just, her form of justice is undermined by the second half of the play where Ajax's vindication and elevation undermines her particular mode of justice and proves it faulty.[12]

These issues, taken in context of the events and attitudes of the last quarter of the fifth century, suggest various avenues for exploring Athena's character and the justice she enacts. Specifically, a comparison between the dialogue of the Atreidae and Teucer (1047–1315) and that of Athena and Ajax (89–117) pairs Athena and Menelaus as advocates of *sôphrosunê*, but a type of it rooted in a hierarchy reinforced by hubristic threats of violence against a *summachos*. In addition, the type of alliance advocated by the Atreidae and Athena finds its parallel in the Mytilinean and Melian debates of Thucydides. Finally, this pairing of Athena and the Atreidae serves to undermine the position of Athena as a representative of justice, because the dialogues enact a parody of the great persuasion scene between Athena and the Erinyes in *Eumenides* (777–1047). Thus, Sophocles devalues the divine by associating it with human fallacy, instead of positioning Athena and her justice as untainted by such things. In this way, *Ajax* also destabilizes, or shows as destabilized, an Athenian identity that rests upon the concept of justice embodied within Athenian civic myth.

I will argue in what follows that Sophocles' *Ajax* enacts the death of an idealized Athenian identity rooted in their political system and its revolutionary mechanism of justice—the democratic jury. The growth of the empire and an imperialist attitude, as embodied in Athena and the Atreidae within the play, corrupted the very ideals that Athens fought the Persians to preserve. This play signals unease with the direction Athens has chosen as an imperial power. The judicial and military alliances supported and sanctioned by Aeschylean drama have found their logical conclusion in the harried and brutal relationship between Athena and Ajax. Those very associations, which stood at the heart of the Delian League and Athens' democracy, have become the mechanisms for justice's demise. True justice is no longer found with Athena and her Athenians in Athens. Her alliances are no longer desirable or a benefit to her friends.

Athena and Ajax in Athens

The civic setting for the performance of tragedies would have shaped the way in which an Athenian audience interpreted the plays. The political nature of the pre-performance ceremonies would have also shaped any opinion the audience might have had concerning Athena's appearance on stage. In Aeschylean and Euripidean tragedy, Athena is just, serene, persuasive and queenly. In both the dramatic and visual arts, she is represented as an arbitor of justice. That image of Athena, however, is called into question by Sophocles' portrayal of her in *Ajax*. The association of Ajax in the play with Athens and the Athenians, and Athena's association with the Atreidae, further problematize it. Athena's justice no longer serves to prevent violence. but instead encourages it and turns it against her allies. Power, and their right to exact any form of justice that is within their power, is the focus of Athena and the Atreidae. The debate on power, how it relates to justice, and how those in authority exercise it, suggests strong affinity with contemporary debates on Athens' empire and how the allies were treated as a part of it. I look here at how Athena is presented in the play, her relationship to Ajax, and their underlying relationship in Athenian civic myth, in order to explore the problems inherent in a civic identity rooted in ideals like justice, which can become corrupted by the exercise of power.

How, then, is Athena characterized in *Ajax*? As mentioned above, some scholars have called her cruel. Others have explained away this cruelty with reference to the axiom "help friends, harm enemies." Whitman calls her "neutral," Papadopoulou, "ambiguous." Athena is "Homeric," "un-Homeric," the embodiment of divine law, just and unjust. Butts even goes so far as to call Athena, "queenly, compassionate, restrained, intelligent—a veritable epitome of Athenian virtue".[13] There are a wide variety of interpretations, to say the least. But perhaps the answer is to be found not so much in how Athena is portrayed, but rather in how she is not: no matter how just scholars claim her to be, she is not in any way reminiscent of Athena as represented elsewhere on stage as a paradigm of democratic justice.

The Athena of Aeschylus is the representative *par excellence* of the city of Athens and the embodiment of justice. She favors litigation and persuasion over blood-feud and revenge. She is the arbitrator even of the gods themselves.[14] She is also, in Aeschylus, the *Odyssey* and Sophocles' *Ajax Locrus*, linked specifically to legal proceedings. In the myth of the Arms of Achilles, even, Athenian painters represented her as an arbitrator between the Odysseus and Ajax (Fig. 7). However, if she is a proponent of "harm enemies" as Knox and Blundell suppose she rejects the role of conciliator as-

signed her in Aeschylus and Homer.[15] If she is an ally of Ajax, as he assumes she is, then her behavior toward him is unconscionable and the play's plot does not adequately explain her behavior.

Athena's imposition of madness upon Ajax is not part of the traditional myth. The story of Ajax and his madness has a long tradition stretching back to Homer and the Epic cycle. Sophocles, however, has made alterations to this tradition. According to tradition, Athena may or may not have had anything to do with the awarding of the arms, but she had no part in Ajax's suicide—that was Zeus' doing.[16] Also, Agamemnon does withhold cremation for Ajax after his death, but the reason is never made clear (Apoll. *Epitome*, 5.6–16). There is no mention of him going mad or attempting to kill the Atreidae.[17] On the whole, Athena is absent from the myth except in her role as a patron deity to Odysseus. She has no known enmity toward Ajax.

Athena's relationship to Ajax's suicide in the epic tradition is really quite no relationship at all. There is no evidence of a boast before leaving Salamis, no evidence of a battlefield slight (*Aj.*744–45). The audience is given no clear reason for the appearance of Athena except her traditional role as Odysseus' patron. But even this cannot explain her behavior toward Ajax since she claims, and Ajax believes, that she and he are allies also.[18] That no animosity between Athena and Ajax existed is also emphasized within *Ajax* itself by both the chorus and Atreidae. The chorus, in pondering who might have driven Ajax mad, never considers Athena a possibility. They guess either Ares or Artemis (172–81). Menelaus himself is also unaware of Athena's role (even after Calchas has announced it). He only states that "some god" diverted Ajax (κεἰ μὴ θεῶν τις τήνδε πεῖραν ἔσβεσεν—if someone of the gods hadn't quelled this attempt, 1057; and, νῦν δ' ἐνήλλαξεν θεὸς τὴν τοῦδ' ὕβριν μῆλα—now a god diverted his hubristic deed toward the sheep, 1060–61). What is she doing in the play if there is no tradition, no apparent need in the plot?

As the play opens, Athena calls out to Odysseus:

> Ἀεὶ μέν, ὦ παῖ Λαρτίου, δέδορκά σε
> πεῖράν τιν' ἐχθρῶν ἁρπάσαι θηρώμενον:
> καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ σκηναῖς σε ναυτικαῖς ὁρῶ
> Αἴαντος.
>
> Always, child of Laertes, I have watched you hunting trying to seize upon something of your enemies. And now I see you before the naval tents of Ajax (1–4).

Immediately we know that Ajax and Odysseus are presented as enemies, for Odysseus is always hunting enemies (ἐχθροῖ) and here he is hunting (θηρώμενος) outside Ajax's tent. The audience would have remembered, of

course, *Odyssey* 11.541–65 and Ajax's anger, unforgiving even in death. They would have remembered the awarding of the arms in the form preserved by Homer and the epic tradition.

We are also reminded in Odysseus' first lines of his relationship with Athena: ὦ φθέγμ' Ἀθάνας, φιλτάτης ἐμοὶ θεῶν (O voice of Athena, dearest of gods to me, 14).[19] And it is reiterated and further strengthened by the last lines of his opening speech: καιρὸν δ' ἐφήκεις· πάντα γὰρ τά τ' οὖν πάρος τά τ' εἰσέπειτα σῆι κυβερνῶμαι χερί (You have come at the right time: for in all things in the future and in times before I am steered by your hand, 34–35). To this Athena responds: ἔγνων, Ὀδυσσεῦ, καὶ πάλαι φύλαξ ἔβην τῆι σῆι πρόθυμος εἰς ὁδὸν κυναγίαι (I knew, Odysseus, and so I came awhile back onto the road as a guard eager for your hunt, 36–37). Thus, the traditional relationship between Athena and Odysseus is accentuated by Sophocles in his opening scene.

Furthermore, the animosity between Ajax and Odysseus resulting from the awarding of Achilles' arms is evident as the exchange between Odysseus and Athena at 77–79 makes clear:

> Ἀθ: τί μὴ γένηται; πρόσθεν οὐκ ἀνὴρ ὅδ' ἦν—
> Ὀδ: ἐχθρός γε τῶιδε τἀνδρὶ καὶ τανῦν ἔτι.
> Ἀθ: οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν;
>
> Ath: What might happen? Was he not a man before?
> Od: Well, I was his enemy and am still now.
> Ath: Is it not the sweetest laugh to laugh at one's enemies?

The play opens with Athena and Odysseus in their traditional roles as hero and patron. The enemy against whom they have united, however, is Ajax who is not a Greek traditionally depicted as hateful to Athena, even if he and Odysseus quarreled.[20] Her role as Odysseus' patron, however, will not explain her character.

Athena appears, as well, to be adhering to the maxim of "help friends/harm enemies." Both Knox and Blundell make this assessment based on her words at 79: οὔκουν γέλως ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθροὺς γελᾶν; (Is it not the sweetest laugh to laugh at one's enemies?). However, immediately following this, Athena calls out to Ajax, asking him to come out of his tent: ὦ οὗτος, Αἴας, δεύτερόν σε προσκαλῶ. τί βαιὸν οὕτως ἐντρέπῃ τῆς συμμάχου; (Ajax, I'm calling you out again. Is this how little you respect your ally? 90). Why would Athena call herself Ajax's ally, and why would Ajax respond to her as he does, if he did not believe that they were friends?

When Ajax first appears on stage, he greets Athena most graciously:

ὦ χαῖρ' Ἀθάνα, χαῖρε Διογενὲς τέκνον,
ὡς εὖ παρέστης· καὶ σε παγχρύσιοις ἐγὼ
στέψω λαφύροις τῆσδε τῆς ἄγρας χάριν.

Welcome Athena, daughter of Zeus, welcome. How well you have stood by me. I will crown you with trophies all of gold from the spoils of this hunting trip in thanks (91–93).

Note the παρέστης. Fraenkel explains this by suggesting that Athena stood by Ajax and "helped" him as he slaughtered the cattle.[21] She was there, but not really "helping," unless one views "help" as driving him even more insane: ἐγὼ δὲ φοιντῶντ' ἄνδρα μανιάσιν νόσοις ὥτρυνον, εἰσέβαλλον εἰς ἕρκη κακά (I urged the man on in his ravages with frenzied sickness and cast him into evil hunting nets; 59–60). Athena may have stood beside him during the slaughter but does that make them *summachoi?* The word instead seems to refer to an assumption of a long-standing friendship.Some scholars have suggested that the use of *summachos* is ironic. Indeed, it may be ironic—though not for the reason they think. It is ironic because Ajax thinks they really are allies. His view of their relationship, however, is not rooted in the Homeric world, but in fifth-century Athens.

In the epic tradition, Athena and Ajax had no special relationship as either enemies or allies. In the Athenian mythic tradition, on the other hand, Athena and Ajax were closely related as their appearances together (in scenes she did not previously inhabit) on a number of vase paintings from the early sixth to mid-fifth centuries suggests (Figures 2, 3, and 8). In the duel with Hector, which is similar in its design to vases showing the duels between Achilles and Hector and Diomedes and Hector, Athena could simply be representing the spirit of divine support for the Greeks. Alternatively, though, we could be seeing an increased association of Ajax with Athens and Athena.[22] Athena was associated in the epic tradition with both Diomedes and Achilles. The addition of Athena to the duel with Hector could very well be a part of the increase in Athenian vases representing the Trojan War (see chapter 1). Pairing Athens' divine patron with one of its eponymous heroes strengthens Athenian claims to military glory in the war.

A reason for an increased association of Athena and Ajax in paintings of Homeric scenes in this period could be Ajax's new status as one of the Athenian *eponymoi.* The reforms of Cleisthenes (c. 508/7 BC) introduced Ajax to his new role, and his worship was set up in the Eurysakleion, which was originally dedicated to his son.[23] Peisistratus most likely introduced his hero-cult earlier,[24] probably in the mid to late sixth century. The arrival of Ajax at Athens under Peisistratus coincides with the conflict with Megara over Salamis (a conflict in which Peisistratus played a role) in the middle of the cen-

tury,[25] and also with the earliest representations of Athena and Ajax fighting side by side.

We also see Ajax firmly entrenched in Athenian art as an Athenian hero. One particular vase, an Attic red-figure cup dated between 450 BC and 400 BC, represents Ajax being escorted somewhere by Athena along with Menestheus, Theseus, Lycos, Kodros, Aegeus (all named), and others.[26] This suggests that by the middle of the fifth century, before the production of *Ajax,* not only have Ajax and Athena become bound up together in Athenian representations of the Trojan War, but Ajax has become linked with myths of Athenian identity. Along with the great synoecizer Theseus, Ajax had come to represent Athens in art and had become identified as a companion and protected favorite of Athena.[27]

In this context, then, the term *summachos* is entirely appropriate when used between Ajax and Athena, because they were both companions in arms. But the use of *summachos* also moves us from epic squarely into the realm of fifth-century Athens. The term is not applied to the relationship between Athena and Odysseus, nor is it used by Homer or the other epic writers. Thus, a non-Homeric word is used to define or comment on a non-Homeric relationship and so we should not presume ourselves, despite the Homeric roots of the story, to be in a Homeric situation.[28]

Figure 8. Athena intervenes between Ajax and Hector. Ca. 515–505 BC. London E438, British Museum, London, UK. © Trustees of the British Museum.

Perhaps this is too much emphasis on a single word. Answering two questions will tell us why it is not. First, what makes *summachos* so important in the dialogue? Second, in what ways does the use of *summachos*

move us beyond the Homeric tradition? On the first point, the term *summachos* frames the entire exchange between Ajax and Athena. It is the last word spoken by Athena before Ajax appears in the play for the first time and it is the second to last word he utters before exiting the scene. In addition, the term reappears as a central point of contention between Teucer and the Atreidae. Thus, what it means to be a *summachos* structures the two major *agones* of the play, and is a central problem in *Ajax*.

To the second question, I suggest that it would be difficult for an audience member not to associate *summachos* in the play with the allies seated nearby whose tribute had just been so prominently displayed in the orchestra. *Summachos* is a technical term that applied, during the fifth century, almost exclusively to the members of the Delian League/Athenian Empire. Once the treasury moved from Delos to Athens, Athena became the patron and symbol for that League; she was the patron and symbol of that Empire. Ajax and Athena are yoked together by this word. They are *summachoi*. Despite the fact that both are associated with Athens, one is clearly in a position of superiority. The use of *summachos* to define Athena's and Ajax's relationship thus allows the play to comment simultaneously on Athens' relationship to her allies and on the internal contradictions inherent in the ideologies that support both the empire and their democracy.

It would not have been difficult for a member of the audience to conceive of Ajax as an Athenian hero. In fact, there were concerted efforts on the part of Athenians during the sixth and fifth centuries to assimilate Ajax to Athens.[29] Salamis itself was, in the fifth century, considered a part of Athens and held status as an "unofficial" *dêmos*.[30] There were definitely Athenian citizens residing on Salamis by 508/7 BC when Cleisthenes reformed the demes of Attica (IG $I^3$1) and there was, in Attica itself, a *genos Salaminioi* that held a hereditary priesthood for Eurysakes, Ajax's son. The naming of the *genos Salaminioi* itself may have had nothing to do with its members having ever resided on Salamis, being instead an artificial construction which "came into being to promote and justify the claim of Athens to possession...of Salamis."[31] Such a naming would have fit with the tale in Plutarch about the insertion of Athens beside Salamis in the catalogue of ships in *Iliad* (Plutarch *Solon*, 10; Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1375b30; Strabo 9.1.10). Moreover, this would have been in keeping with the process noted above of insinuating Athens more firmly into the heroic past by assimilating Ajax to itself. The Athenians made every effort to demonstrate that Salamis and its heroes were, from ancient times, part of Athens.

Sophocles emphasizes Ajax's status as both Salaminian and Athenian throughout the play.[32] Although Ajax is first addressed as the holder of sea-girt Salamis (134), it is made abundantly clear that Tecmessa and the Sala-

minian sailors who make up the chorus identify Salamis with Athens.[33] At 201, Tecmessa addresses the chorus as γενεᾶς χθονίων ἀπ' Ἐρεχθειδᾶν (from the chthonic lineage of Erechtheus, 201). Also, Ajax himself, in his final speech says:

> ὦ φέγγος, ὦ γῆς ἱερὸν οἰκείας πέδον
> Σαλαμῖνος, ὦ πατρῶιον ἑστίας βάθρον,
> κλειναὶ τ' Ἀθῆναι, καὶ τὸ σύντροφον γένος...
>
> O light, oh sacred field of my homeland Salamis, oh threshold of my father's hearth, and famous Athens, and the commonly nourished race (859–61).

In addition, as the chorus bemoans its fate and wonders if it will ever see home, it refers to that home as "sacred Athens" (τὰς ἱερὰς...Ἀθάνας, 1220–22). Ajax is an Athenian as are the chorus members. The audience, which included large numbers of both Athenian aristocrats and sailors, would have had no difficulty identifying with either the chorus or Ajax as Athenians. The play almost demands such sympathies and the repeated references to the relationship between Ajax and Athens should be of some concern to scholars.

While their relationship as dual patrons of Athens has been mentioned by Meier and others, no direct correlation has been made between Ajax's Athenian ancestry and Athena's appearance. Nevertheless, this ancestry causes very real problems for the Athena/Ajax dynamic, unless we posit that the Athenian audience would have been able to completely disengage themselves, during their time in the theater, from the images and rhetoric that surrounded their daily lives—images and rhetoric that represented Athena and Ajax in their roles as Athenian patrons. The fact that Sophocles made a point of emphasizing (or creating) a familial connection between Ajax and the autochthons gives it significance, and must color our understanding of how Athena's appearance shapes the rest of the play.[34] Athena appears on stage, taunts the already maddened Ajax and then, gradually, through the words of the chorus, Tecmessa and Ajax, the audience is reminded that Ajax and Athena are bound together through their relationship to Athens. By the time Ajax commits suicide, the audience sees that it was his own city's patron who pushed Ajax towards suicide. The question is why does she do it? Is Calchas telling the truth?

In a sense, Athena and Ajax represent two aspects of Athens and the conflict between these two different aspects drives the play and Athena's appearance in it. While Aeschylus' *Eumenides* may, by assimilating the audience to the silent jurors who arbitrate between Apollo and the Furies, present us with a unified vision of the Athenians, *Ajax* offers no such unity. Instead, rifts appear between projected and received identity; a distinction emerges between the perception of those wielding power and those subject to

it. In effect, the conflict between Athena and Ajax is a conflict between the ideals through which Athens justified its power following the battle of Salamis and the effects this power, in the form of the empire, had on those ideals.

Furthermore, Ajax is defined through his adherence to a heroic code. Numerous scholars have noted that the crisis of *Ajax* is that he adheres to a code that no longer applies in the world he finds himself in.[35] Ajax is called δυστράπελος (inflexible/unadaptable) at 913, and, indeed, he seems unwilling to sacrifice even the smallest shred of his dignity for a chance at living. Honor comes before all else.[36] The code to which he so doggedly adheres, however, is not simply Homeric. It connects him, also, to the honor code of the Athenian generation immediately preceding Sophocles' audience. As Themistocles' strategy at Salamis makes clear, those Athenians were willing to sacrifice their city to the Persians on the chance of defeating them at sea—something no other Greek city was willing to do.[37] The Athenian victories at Marathon and Salamis were the foundation for the Empire that grew out of the Delian League during the fifth century.[38] These same Athenians were willing to cast aside an offer of dominion in Greece and peace with Persia from Mardonius because the condition was submission to the King (Her. 8.144; 9.7).

It is important to associate Ajax with these victories in a study of *Ajax* since Sophocles goes to great lengths to emphasize Ajax's Athenian and Salaminian heritage. In part, this is because we must recognize Ajax for what he is: a remnant. He is the representative of an Athens whose moral code and attitude toward power had become outdated and old-fashioned by the time of the Peloponnesian War—50 years of exercising authority in the Aegean had changed Athens but it had not changed how it presented and justified that authority. Ajax was the uncompromising hero in an era of debate and compromise, when power needed no justification other than the realities of expediency and *realpolitik*. He was a proud man adhering to a strict—some might say too strict—code of shame and honor. He was an Athenian no longer suited to the Athens of the 420s. He was the Athens the Athenians pointed to in order to justify their power, but he was part of an Athens they could no longer claim to be. This is why Sophocles put Athena on stage in *Ajax*—to underscore this discrepancy between ideology and reality.

I suggested above that Sophocles stages two different Athens' in *Ajax*. The *ethos* of Ajax's Athens is that of the Persian Wars as it was presented on monuments, in Herodotus, and in Athenian speeches of Thucydides' *History*. But it is a heroic version of self that had become warped and corrupted under the influence of the *archê*, just as Ajax became deranged and mad under the influence of Athena. Imperial Athens, whose attitudes toward justice and the allies are embodied by Athena, is presented as destroying its own heroes; the

values embraced by imperial Athens undermined its own claim to that empire. *Ajax* poses this dilemma, forcing the audience to understand and question the necessities involved in becoming an imperial power. They must understand what it means to rule over other Greeks the way the Persians once did. Is Cleon correct when he says that a democracy cannot rule an Empire (Thuc. 3.37.1)? What has it come to mean to be an "ally" of Athens? What sort of justice can an ally expect to receive at its hands?

Athena *Summachos*

Scholars have commented that the use of *summachos* by Athena is ironic. There *is* irony in the term, though not in the way Knox and others have suggested. Knox writes, "[t]he word in Athenian official parlance suggests inferiority." When the Delian League was founded, the term was used to designate a specific legal relationship to Athens. In the beginning, this relationship was one of equals.[39] Athens was, perhaps, first among equals, but the members were not subject to each other. They supposedly voted on military actions as well as the allotment of funds; they did not simply do whatever the Athenians commanded they do. If the meaning behind *summachos* came to imply less than an equal in fact because of restrictions placed on those who bore the title, it was not because the word was intended to denote inferiority in the beginning, since even in Thucydides (from whom Knox perhaps takes his assumption), a *summachos* (ally) is distinctly different from a *hupêkoros* (subject-ally).[40] It is the status of Mytilene as a *summachos* and not a *hupêkoros* which so incites Cleon's ire and marks them for, he claims, a stricter form of justice (Thuc. 3.39.2). The shift in meaning of the term is more likely a reflection of the way Athens treated the allies as they became less like hegemons and more like imperialists specifically in the 430s and later.

Ajax's final words to Athena are the source of the irony Knox and Meier find with the use of *summachos*: χωρῶ πρὸς ἔργον· τοῦτο σοὶ δ' ἐφίεμαι, τοιάνδ' ἀεί μοι σύμμαχον παρεστάναι (I'm off to work. But I desire this of you, always stand beside me as such an ally, 116–17). Of these words, Knox writes:

> He [Ajax] gives her orders, ἐφίεμαι (112), a strong word which he repeats a few lines later (116), he roughly and insultingly refuses her request for mercy for Odysseus, and, when she tells him to do what he sees fit, he condescendingly orders her to be just that kind of ally to him always, that is, a subservient one.[41]

ἐφίεμαι is certainly a strong word and it could appear that Ajax is ordering Athena around. But it means as much to desire something of someone as

command them which does not imply an insult or disrespect. Even so, one could say that if Ajax is who I claim him to be, then he has the right to treat with Athena as an equal, god or no. He is the bulwark of Athens and the Greeks just as Athens was the bulwark of Greece. For Ajax, the term does not imply inferiority (though even equality with a god can be considered hubristic). He looks to Athena as an equal because he conceives of an ally as equal and autonomous. He is not being condescending, and the only reason he would ever consider himself her equal, or superior, in the first place is because she corrupted his vision and pushed him to the point of arrogance.

Many scholars say Ajax's ego causes his downfall. As part of this *hubris*, Knox and others point to the "condescending tone" Ajax uses with Athena. He gives orders and expects them to be followed. No one, however, marks Athena's tone and her role in provoking such behavior. Ajax is arrogant and confident, but he would be neither of these things were it not for Athena. She aids him in his slaughter of the cattle. She asks all the right questions to elicit his boasting responses. As for her "plea" for mercy—would Knox have us believe that it was a sincere plea? Athena was not begging Ajax for the life of the cow he had tied to his tent post. She was mocking him, setting him up for the fall we have come to expect (thanks to Aristotle) for our tragic heroes. This fall, however, could only happen by Athena first lifting him up, because such *hubris* was not part of Ajax's character. His "mistake" must be manufactured. Athena herself tells us that she pushed him to act hubristically, and the rest of the play is a study in his redemption. In other words, Ajax is not a Xerxes, who thinks himself equal to or greater than the gods, except when under the power of Athena.

That Athena has set Ajax up for a fall is emphasized by her own words to Odysseus immediately following Ajax's exit:

> ὁρᾷς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση;
> τούτου τίς ἄν σοι τἀνδρὸς ἦ προνούστερος
> ἢ δρᾶν ἀμείνων ηὑρέθη τὰ καίρια;
>
> Do you see, Odysseus how great is the strength of the gods? Who other than this man was more prudent in your opinion? Or who was found better able to act when necessary (118–20)?

She has taken the most prudent and capable man in the Argive camp and driven him insane.[42] Both prudence and ability mark him in the epic and Athenian traditions.[43] With these words, Athena makes clear that the sane Ajax would never boast of his power, nor would he shun the aid of the gods.[44] Only this Ajax, bloated with the insane power Athena has thrust upon him, behaved in such a manner.

If this is so, then what the text performs for us is not a mere dialogue between man and god. It is a dialogue between two opposing views of power. One rested on heroic deeds that granted one authority and justified power—Ajax's deeds as a warrior should have garnered him the honor of Achilles' armor, a symbol of his dominance in battle and his position as the bulwark of the Greek army. The other rested on the force innate in power: ὁρᾷις, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση; (Do you see, Odysseus, how great is the strength of the gods? 118). If Ajax represents the heroic Athenian past, when Athenians prudently but bravely did what needed to be done in order to protect themselves and their fellow Greeks from the Persian menace, then the power represented by Athena leads to heroic Athens' demise. The *archê*, as embodied in Athena, destroys the ethical base for Athenian hegemony because it undermines and corrupts it. The heroes of Salamis have no place in the new regime.

There is even an interesting correlation between Ajax's weaponry within the text and his madness, which suggests close affinity between Ajax and Persian Wars ideology. When his madness is described by Tecmessa at 237–39, Ajax is holding a μάστιξ, a whip, which, in the fifth century, comes to be associated with Persian tyranny through the image it evoked of a master punishing a slave.[45] When Ajax's sanity returns, he is described as a spear-bearer or shield-bearer. Thus, the madness imposed on him by Athena is Persian-like. The heroic Athens becomes the tyrant under the influence of the *archê* which requires Persian-like authority to manage. Cleon seems to have been correct—a democracy canot run an empire.

Support for this analysis of Athena's appearance can be found by looking at the dialogue between Athena and Ajax in light of other important debates on the nature of power. The first of these takes place between Teucer and Menelaus at lines 1050–1160 of *Ajax*. A comparison shows that Athena's stance in relation to Ajax is mirrored by that of Menelaus. Also illuminating is the Melian dialogue from Thucydides' history. I suggest that the stance on power made evident in Athena's words is the same power politics expressed so blatantly by the Athenians to the Melians.[46]

The attitude toward imperial power represented in these texts also reflects back upon the concerns with justice which were evident in the dialogue between Athena and the Erinyes in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. Through a comparison, we see that the other dialogues present perversions of the ideals represented in Aeschylus' plays, and demonstrate a decline in status of the Athenian ethical position for its hegemony. I also argue that the play, by aligning Athena with Menelaus—who is repeatedly referred to as "the Spartan" (thus representing the "Spartan menace")—points out even more clearly that the Athenians, for all their high flown rhetoric, have become like those

whom they propose to stand against. No longer do they gain authority by persuasion and appeal to justice, but through brute strength and threats. The ultimatums of the Spartans, which Pericles so eloquently urged the Athenians to resist as an assault on their autonomy and freedom (Thuc.1.140.2–5), demand the same type of subservience as the Athenians now expect from their so-called "allies."

Sôphrosunê and Knowing One's Place

Athena and Ajax enact a farcical dialogue between allies. Athena's pretense at being Ajax's friend is meant to prove a point to Odysseus. What is this point? Most scholars have pointed to the phrase τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι κακούς (But the gods love moderate men and hate the wicked,133) as the moral of our story. If this is moral, then the audience will find the pairing of proponents of *sôphrosunê* in *Ajax* strange. The other advocate of such behavior in the play is Menelaus, who can hardly be considered a paragon of moderation or a friend of Athens.

In his dialogue with Teucer, Menelaus gives a lengthy speech on why he and Agamemnon have decided to deny burial to Ajax. In this speech Menelaus expresses the general sentiment that misfortune strikes even those of great strength: ἀλλ' ἄνδρα χρή, κἂν σῶμα γεννήσηι μέγα, δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἂν κἂν ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ (But it is necessary that a man, even one born strong in body, seem to fall short because of some minor misfortune, 1077–8). Compare this with Athena's statement to Odysseus at 129–32:

> τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέρκοπον
> μηδέν ποτ' εἴπῃς αὐτὸς εἰς θεοὺς ἔπος,
> μηδ' ὄγκον ἄρῃ μηδέν', εἴ τινος πλέον
> ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
> ὡς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
> ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια: τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας
> θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς.

> Well then, seeing such things, do not ever yourself speak boastful words against the gods, nor puff up with pride if you hand is superior in battle to another's or your great wealth is deeper. Thus a day both sinks and raises again everything human; the gods love the moderate and hate the bad.

In both instances, the speaker is insisting that physical strength can lead one to *hubris*, which can lead to a fall. Menelaus uses the term *megas* and, as has been commented by many a scholar, Ajax is *megas*;[47] the jibe in both instances is directed at the man of greatest physical strength. Of course, it also brings to mind Aristotle's notion of *hamartia* and the *hubris* of the hero.[48] Physical strength or military might, in this case, supposedly leads to hubris.

Ajax dared, as Achilles dared, to challenge the authority of the Atreidae. Both he and Achilles asserted their right to honor as bulwarks of the army and, in both instances, Athena deflected the violence of their challenge.[49] Neither Achilles nor Ajax, however, were considered *sôphrôn* by the Atreidae (or, in Ajax's case by Athena). *Sôphrosunê* is not, it seems, permitted to one who is *megas*.[50]

Athena utters her famous moral within this context. Menelaus too introduces his comment on the misfortune that befalls the strong with a reference to *sôphrosunê*:

> οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς
> φέροιντ' ἄν, ἔνθα μὴ καθεστήκοι δέος,
> οὔτ' ἂν στρατός γε **σωφρόνως** ἄρχοιτ' ἔτι,
> μηδὲν φόβου πρόβλημα μηδ' αἰδοῦς ἔχων.
>
> Not ever would the laws of a city be upheld nobly if fear should not be established there. Nor indeed would an army be kept in line any longer having no defense of fear or shame (1073–76).

But we should be wary of morals placed in the mouth of Menelaus who is himself a *hubristês* in this play.[51] In each instance, the threat of violence behind the statement grabs our attention. Moderation in some is not an innate quality and must be taught as a lesson. Athena enforces her form of *sôphrosunê* through shame and madness. Ajax has been set up as an example of what happens when one does not behave with the appropriate amount of *sôphrosunê*. She tells Odysseus, "See how great is the strength of the gods," and the supposed moral to the story is that men should fear the punishment of the gods. They should never imagine themselves powerful enough to be "allies", and therefore equals, of any divinity.[52] As we saw, however, Athena must instill madness in Ajax before he becomes hubristic. It is a conundrum, to say the least.

Menelaus, too, discusses *sôphrosunê* in terms of shame and fear. Moderation, he says, is a result of fear (φόβος). In addition, fear (δέος) and shame (αἰσχύνη) accompany a secure man. If he wants to be secure, others must fear him: δέος γὰρ ᾧ πρόσεστιν αἰσχύνη θ' ὁμοῦ, σωτηρίαν ἔχοντα τόνδ' ἐπίστασο (For, you should know that the man having safety is the one for whom fear and a sense of shame are present, 1079–80). Menelaus also describes his relationship with Ajax as one between allies: ὀθούνεκ' αὐτὸν ἐλπίσαντες οἴκοθεν ἄγειν Ἀχαιοῖς ξύμμαχόν τε καὶ φίλον (hoping to lead him from home as an ally and friend to the Achaeans, 1052–53). As in the case of Athena and Ajax, however, he ultimately conceives of this relationship as one between master and subordinate.

Menelaus makes this understanding of the role of a *summachos* clear in his decision to deny burial to Ajax. He remarks:

> εἰ γὰρ βλέποντος μὴ 'δυνήθημεν κρατεῖν,
> πάντως θανόντος γ' ἄρξομεν, κἂν μὴ θέλῃς,
> χερσὶν παρευθύνοντες· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅπου
> λόγων ἀκοῦσαι ζῶν ποτ' ἠθέλησ' ἐμῶν.
> καίτοι κακοῦ πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ὄντα δημότην
> μηδὲν δικαιοῦν τῶν ἐφεστώτων κλύειν.

> For if we could not overpower him while alive, at least we will altogether rule over him when dead, whether or not you want it, constraining him with our hands. He wasn't ever willing while alive to listen to my opinions. Yet this is just like a commoner—being base—to think it right to ignore his superiors (1067–72).

Menelaus assumes that, in relation to himself and Agamemnon, Teucer and Ajax are commoners (δημότην) to be lorded over ('δυνήθημεν). Menelaus equates himself with the laws in a city (οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς φέροιντ' ἄν, 1073) to be maintained by the respect and fear of the citizens.[53] He seems to have forgotten that Ajax was lord over his own land, and commanded his own men.

Teucer's response to this assumption on the part of Menelaus raises important questions about what it means to be a *summachos* in *Ajax*. Teucer says:

> ἄγ', εἶπ' ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὖθις, ἦ σὺ φὴις ἄγειν
> τόνδ' ἄνδρ' Ἀχαιοῖς δεῦρο σύμμαχον λαβών;
> οὐκ αὐτὸς ἐξέπλευσεν ὡς αὑτοῦ κρατῶν;
> ποῦ σὺ στρατηγεῖς τοῦδε; ποῦ δὲ σοὶ λεῶν
> ἔξεστ' ἀνάσσειν ὧν ὅδ' ἦγαγ' οἴκοθεν;
> Σπάρτης ἀνάσσων ἦλθες, οὐχ ἡμῶν κρατῶν·
> οὐδ' ἔσθ' ὅπου σοὶ τόνδε κοσμῆσαι πλέον
> ἀρχῆς ἔκειτο θεσμὸς ἢ καὶ τῶιδε σέ...
> οὐ γάρ τι τῆς σῆς εἵνεκ' ἐστρατεύσατο
> γυναικός, ὥσπερ οἱ πόνου πολλοῦ πλέωι,
> ἀλλ' εἵνεχ' ὅρκων οἷσιν ἦν ἐνώμοτος,
> σοῦ δ' οὐδέν: οὐ γὰρ ἠξίου τοὺς μηδένας.

> Come on, tell me again from the beginning: do you think that you, seizing this man, led him here as an ally for the Greeks. Did he not sail here of his own free will? How are you general over him? How is it possible for you to lord it over his troops whom he led from home? You came as king of Sparta, not as our overlord. Nor is there any law permitting you to discipline him any more than he you...For he did not lead his army here on account of your wife as some laborer might do, but on account of the oaths which he swore—not at all on your account. Only that he did not deem his oaths "nothing" (1097–1104; 1111–13).

The primary issue between Teucer and Menelaus, then, is an old one for us: what does it mean to be a *summachos*? Menelaus' defines a *summachos* as a subordinate, someone who does his bidding and obeys his commands. For Teucer an ally is his own master, not a subject of other allies. He is bound by oaths alone (εἵνεχ' ὅρκων) to support another, and does so more out of honor and for his own chance at glory than because he is bound to Menelaus. The oath Teucer refers to may be the oath Tyndareus made each suitor swear before he chose Helen's husband.which binds Ajax even less clearly to the Atreidae. To Ajax and Teucer, the alliance is not a master/slave relationship. As leader of his own people Ajax provided ships and a fighting force, but this force was his own to command, not some self-appointed general's.[54]

Menelaus and Teucer present two different concepts of what an ally should be. On the one hand, Menelaus conceives of an ally as a subordinate who should fight when told to fight and must take abuse when given it by his supposed superiors. On the other hand, Teucer's view is that an alliance is based on a working relationship between equals who command their own troops and fight together when it is considered necessary. They fight side-by-side for the greater good; even if one is "commander-in-chief," he is still not a "master." They are not master and slave, one fighting for the good only of the other. We find these two concepts reflected in the actuality of the movement from Delian League to Athenian Empire, and a shift in meaning of the word used to denote the relationship between members from a Persian War to imperial context.

When the Delian League was formed, it was apparently a league of independent city-states working towards a common goal: resistance to Persia. Each ally swore oaths to the other allies as well as to the Athenians, and sank iron into the sea to denote the permanence of the arrangement. Granted, the Athenians had the most ships and the others looked to them, as the victors at Salamis, to lead the way, but other powerful islands like Samos, Chios and Lesbos contributed a great many ships and leaders as well. The allies wanted Athens as a leader, but it became an overseer.

The linking of Ajax with Salamis and the Athenian recent past also links him directly with this earlier conception of *summachos*. Ajax perceives his relationship to Menelaus as one among equals. Menelaus and Athena both conceive of allies as those under their direct command. Athena and Menelaus should both be linked to the form of alliances represented by, for example, the Erythrai decree. A look at the speeches of Athena and Menelaus in comparison with the most well known representation of *realpolitik*, Thucydides' Melian Dialogue, shows more clearly how they understand their relationships to Ajax.

Ajax the Melian

Athena and Menelaus are proponents of *sôphrosunê* in the play. Or, rather, they wish to force *sôphrosunê* upon their fellows while they themselves remain above it. *Sôphrosunê* should not be understood as just a literary fancy. It was a real part of real politics and this "real world" politics is found displayed no more prominently than in Thucydides. Peter Rose writes that the political context for the word *sôphrosunê* amounts in *Ajax* to "recognizing the actual hierarchy of power and adjusting one's behavior accordingly...The Athenian Empire recommended it to its subject allies".[55] Thucydides likely wrote his history decades after *Ajax* was produced. The connection in thought, however, between the two suggests a strong affinity. The exchanges between Ajax and Athena and Menelaus with Teucer embody many of the characteristics of imperialism under examination in the Melian Dialogue (and, in a less developed sense, the Mytilinean Debate).

It must be stated that I am not using the Melian Dialogue to establish an allegory as this is problematic. Comparison of the texts, however, can be a useful device in understanding the evolution of political concepts and in attempting to reconstruct the political climate of the war years. Both Sophocles and Thucydides produced their works within the same climate; both were raised with the same cultural matrix and thus carried with them many of the same cultural assumptions. Thus, reading the two texts against one another can help us better understand what those assumptions were and how the Athenians attempted to come to terms with shifts in those norms or even attacks on them. Such an interaction between texts is what I envision. There is no one-to-one correlation. Ajax is not an allegory for the Melians nor is Menelaus an allegory for Athens.

At the beginning of the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians suggest that, because the conversation will not take place in front of others, they should speak frankly. The Melians agree to talk, but feel that their only options are war with the Athenians or slavery to them. The purpose of the Athenians' visit with the Melians is this:

> ὡς δὲ ἐπ' ὠφελίαι τε πάρεσμεν τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίαι νῦν τοὺς λόγους ἐροῦμεν τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως, ταῦτα δηλώσομεν, βουλόμενοι ἀπόνως μὲν ὑμῶν ἄρξαι, χρησίμως δ' ὑμᾶς ἀμφοτέροις σωθῆναι.
>
> We will make clear how we are both here for the benefit of our empire and how we will say these words for the safety of your city, wishing to rule over you without trouble and wishing to preserve you to the advantage of us both (5.91.2).[56]

The notion of "advantage" as a primary concern of empire is first clearly articulated in the Mytilinean debate. Diodotus, arguing against Cleon's call for

capital punishment, suggests that the Athenians should base their decision not on what is necessarily just, but on what is expedient (Thuc. 3.44).[57] If we believe Thucydides, this focus on advantage seems to have become a matter of policy for the Athenians, if we can see a cohesive "policy" within our sources. Cleon thinks the Athenians cannot run an empire, because they fail to act decisively when necessary. Diodotus, on the other hand, offers a way for a democracy to justify its actions—even the violent ones—as part of the democratic process. Or, at least, he offers a method for presenting their actions within a framework of justice that considers the good of the community over the individual. Cleon calls for vengeance. Diodotus calls for communal deliberation even if only because it is expedient.[58]

The Melians, however, interrogate this notion of advantage and the apparent justness of it, and ask how this situation can be resolved to the advantage of both themselves and the Athenians. The Athenians answer:

> ΑΘ. ὅτι ὑμῖν μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τὰ δεινότατα παθεῖν ὑπακοῦσαι ἂν γένοιτο, ἡμεῖς δὲ μὴ διαφθείραντες ὑμᾶς κερδαίνοιμεν ἄν.
> ΜΗΛ. ὥστε [δὲ] ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας ἡμᾶς φίλους μὲν εἶναι ἀντὶ πολεμίων, ξυμμάχους δὲ μηδετέρων, οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθε;
> ΑΘ. οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς βλάπτει ἡ ἔχθρα ὑμῶν ὅσον ἡ φιλία μὲν ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ μῖσος δυνάμεως παράδειγμα τοῖς ἀρχομένοις δηλούμενον.
>
> ATH. Because it would happen that you submit before suffering the most terrible things, and we would gain by not destroying you.
> MEL. You would not accept that we, keeping quiet, be friends instead of enemies and the allies of neither side?
> ATH. No; for your enmity harms us not as much as your friendship which will be a clear indicator to our subjects of our weakness, on the one hand, and your hatred of our power on the other hand (5.93–5).

The reasoning of the Athenians makes clear to the Melians that Athens perceived of the allies as people to be ruled, which the Melians confirm by equating being *summachoi* with being enslaved to the Athenians. This is further emphasized at 5.100. The Melians argue:

> ΜΗΛ. ἦ που ἄρα, εἰ τοσαύτην γε ὑμεῖς τε μὴ παυθῆναι ἀρχῆς καὶ οἱ δουλεύοντες ἤδη ἀπαλλαγῆναι τὴν παρακινδύνευσιν ποιοῦνται, ἡμῖν γε τοῖς ἔτι ἐλευθέροις πολλὴ κακότης καὶ δειλία μὴ πᾶν πρὸ τοῦ δουλεῦσαι ἐπεξελθεῖν.
>
> MEL. Well then, if you risk so much not to lose you empire and your subjects do so much to be set free from it, indeed it is very base and cowardly for us who are free not to attempt everything instead of being enslaved.

The Melians believe it nothing short of necessity to fight becoming allies/slaves to the Athenians. Anything else would be cowardice. But the

Athenian response is not to sympathize with this heroic attitude on the part of the Melians, as one might expect from the heroes of Salamis and Marathon. Rather, the Athenians tell the Melians to think of their situation not in terms of honor and shame, but of self-preservation and necessity:

> ΑΘ. οὔκ, ἤν γε *σωφρόνως* βουλεύησθε· οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνην ὀφλεῖν, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἡ βουλή, πρὸς τοὺς κρείσσονας πολλῶι μὴ ἀνθίστασθαι.
>
> Not, indeed, if you are advised *moderately*. For this is not a contest concerning bravery with your equal, not to incur shame, but rather it is a decision concerning safety, not to stand up against those by far stronger (5.101.1).

The Athenians advise that showing moderation, *sôphrosunê*, is in the Melians' best interest. This is not the time, the Athenians suggest, to play the (Homeric or Persian War) hero.

The idea that one should not stand against a superior is reflected in Athena's comment: ὁρᾷς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν ὅση; (Do you see, Odysseus, how great is the strength of the gods? 118). Athena's lesson is that one should not challenge the gods, not because of some sense of duty or reverence but simply because they are stronger—stronger even than *megas* Ajax. Athena is to Ajax as the Athenians are to the Melians. Her and Menelaus' conception of a proper ally's *sôphrosunê* is one of σωτηρία. To be brave is to be foolish. To survive is to submit.

This stance on the part of the Athenians, to urge *sôphrosunê* over ἀνδραγαθία is reiterated at 5.111.4. Here, the Athenians make it quite clear that they are in a position to destroy the Melians, and that resistance will only lead to that destruction:

> ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἢν εὖ βουλεύησθε, φυλάξεσθε, καὶ οὐκ ἀπρεπὲς νομιεῖτε πόλεώς τε τῆς μεγίστης ἡσσᾶσθαι μέτρια προκαλουμένης, ξυμμάχους γενέσθαι ἔχοντας τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν ὑποτελεῖς, καὶ δοθείσης αἱρέσεως πολέμου πέρι καὶ ἀσφαλείας[59] μὴ τὰ χείρω φιλονικῆσαι· ὡς οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν ἴσοις μὴ εἴκουσι, τοῖς δὲ κρείσσοσι καλῶς προσφέρονται, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἥσσους μέτριοί εἰσι, πλεῖστ' ἂν ὀρθοῖντο.
>
> This, if you are well advised, you will guard against, and you will not think it dishonorable to submit to the greatest city when it makes a moderate offer to you to become its ally while holding your own land; nor, given the choice between war and safety, will you be so blind as to choose the worse of the two. For such ones as do not yield to their equals and who have good dealing with their superiors and are moderate toward their inferiors seem to flourish most.

The Athenians argue that moderation is accepting one's position as inferior in order to ensure survival. Survival, not bravery, is the watchword of the day. When the Melians take a stance of heroic stubbornness and choose to

die fighting rather than be labeled cowards, the Athenians consider this ἄσοφος—a strange position for people who once saw bravery as their only path to survival, and who themselves dismissed an offer of safety from the Persians and who considered σωτηρία as a concept unacceptable.[60]

The position that the Melians take is adherence to a code of justice and honor that the Athenians attempt to show is unwise and dangerous. But this preference of death to dishonor is quite similar to the way that Sophocles portrays the character of Ajax—and the stance the Athenians themselves were once known for.[61] The attitude of the Athenians here, on the other hand, can be found reflected in the speech of Athena at 127–33:

> τοιαῦτα τοίνυν εἰσορῶν ὑπέρκοπον
> μηδέν ποτ' εἴπῃς αὐτὸς εἰς θεοὺς ἔπος,
> μηδ' ὄγκον ἄρῃ μηδέν', εἴ τινος πλέον
> ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μακροῦ πλούτου βάθει.
> ὡς ἡμέρα κλίνει τε κἀνάγει πάλιν
> ἅπαντα τἀνθρώπεια· τοὺς δὲ σώφρονας
> θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς.

> Well then, seeing such things, do not ever yourself speak boastful words against the gods, nor puff up with pride if your hand is superior in battle to another's or your great wealth is deeper. Thus a day both sinks and raises again everything human; the gods love the moderate and hate the bad.

Meier suggests that Athena's speech, which calls for *sôphrosunê*, reflects Athens' need to practice moderation with its allies.[62] But he sees the lesson as being directed at Ajax, the representative, in his thinking, of Athens' imperial interests. In *Ajax*, Meier states:

> ...one could see a representation of Athens, which itself laid such importance on independence, treated its allies with such contempt and which, in its foreign policy, hardly lived up to the play's message of cooperation.[63]

However, as the discussion of the Melian Dialogue above points out, it was the allies who, in this period, laid such store by independence. It was the allies who fought to be freed from subservience to Athens. It was the allies who adhered to the code of death before dishonor to which Ajax himself adheres. In addition, while Athena's message of moderation strikes no discord in and of itself, it is not the message, but the messenger, that causes the problem.[64] Perhaps Athena, after her treatment of Ajax, should have followed her own advice, behaving in a more moderate manner. Her status as a god does not excuse her cruelty, because in Athens, and in tragedy, she typically represented the opposite.

Ajax's association with the Athenian heroic past sets him on the side of the Melians and the allies because he embodies the spirit of the Persian Wars and the origins of the Delian League. Athena embodies the spirit of the *archê*, an entity which relies on its inferiors to pay tribute and prop up its power structure through complaisance and willing subservience. If the Persian War era Athenians had been complacent and willing to submit to tribute, Athens, and all of Greece, would have become tributaries of Persia (or so they told themselves and others). Such heroic sentiments are no longer practical in the world of the *archê*. What was an absolutely unacceptable position to the Athenians in the 480s had become their policy towards others a generation later.

The comparison between *Ajax* and the Melian Dialogue situates the play as a participant in the continuing debate among the Athenians concerning their own power and its development. Many of the attitudes expressed by the Athenians in the dialogue were also foreshadowed in the Mytilinean Debate. The expediency endorsed by Diodotus, though seemingly innocuous, appears, along with the violent justice of Cleon, in the words of Athena and Menelaus. What the Mytilinean Debate presents as fair and communal, the Melian dialogue exposes as self-interest and imperial justification. The same language and attitudes towards power are apparent in *Ajax*, as well.

Athena, in her final words to Odysseus, claims that it was an insufficient amount of modesty that drove Ajax to his demise. If Ajax had yielded to the gods in an appropriate manner, he could have continued to live. Thus, the message inherent in Athena's final words is that men should show the proper reverence and fear embodied in the concept of *sôphrosunê*. *Sôphrosunê* is, as Menelaus makes clear, and as the Athenian treatment of her allies demonstrates, really the idea of knowing one's place. If one knows his place, he will live a life favored by the gods, or so Athena suggests. That modest behavior leads to the good life also central to Athena's foundation speech for the Areopagus at *Eumenides*:

> τὸ μήτ' αδναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον
> αδστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλεύω σέβειν,
> καὶ μὴ τὸ δεινὸν πᾶν πόλεως εξω βαλεῖν.
> τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ενδικος βροτῶν;
> τοιόνδε τοι ταρβουντες ἐνδίκως σέβας
> ἐρυμά τε χώρας καὶ πόλεως σωτήριον
> ἔχοιτ' ἄν, οἷον οὐτις ἀνθρώπων ἔχει,
> οὐτ' ἐν Σκύθησιν οὐτε Πέλοπος ἐν τόποις.

Neither anarchy nor tyranny—this I counsel my citizens to support and respect, and not to drive fear wholly out of the city. For who among mortals, if he fears nothing, is righteous? Stand in just awe of such majesty, and you will have a defense for your

> land and salvation of your city such as no man has, either among the Scythians or in Pelops' realm (695–703).

She counsels her Athenians to follow a middle path, the path of moderation, by avoiding both anarchy and tyranny. She tells them to show reverence (σέβειν) and to have fear. For who, she asks, can be righteous who does not fear (τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτων)? With this requisite amount of fear/reverence (σέβας) intact, the city will have both a defense (ἔρυμα) and safety (σωτηριά) against evils.

These words, meant to imbue the Athenians with a sense of pride, have a double-edged meaning. If we recall Thucydides' Athenians and their words to the Melians, we see that asking one to look to safety by behaving moderately is a way also of asking for submission:

> ΑΘ. οὔκ, ἤν γε σωφρόνως βουλεύησθε· οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἀνδραγαθίας ὁ ἀγὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὑμῖν, μὴ αἰσχύνην ὀφλεῖν, περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας μᾶλλον ἡ βουλή, πρὸς τοὺς κρείσσονας πολλῶι μὴ ἀνθίστασθαι.
>
> Not, indeed, if you take our moderate recommendation. For this is not a contest concerning bravery with your equal not to incur shame, but rather it is a decision concerning safety, not to stand up against those by far stronger (5.101).

Here, instead of reverence (σέβας), the Melians are asked to act in a manner appropriate to their position (σωφρόνως). Thus, moderation for the Melians is reverence for the Athenians, and both lead to safety (σωτηριά).

In the case of Athena and the establishment of the Areopagus court, the Athenians and her allies are asked to submit to law and justice. Through this submission they will receive gifts as no other men have: defense (ἔρυμα) and safety (σωτηριά). The Melians, too, will receive safety as the benefit for their submission. They, however, must submit to their superiors (τοὺς κρείσσονας) in order to gain it. The Athenians of Aeschylus are slaves to law, while the Melians are slaves to the Athenians. Aeschylus' play gives hints of this hierarchy and the subordinate status of a *summachos*, but nowhere is it so blatantly about power as in *Ajax* and Thucydides.

What of Ajax? As suggested above, Ajax is aligned simultaneously with the Melians and with the Athenians themselves (those of the heroic, recent past). The play *Ajax* seems to occupy a middle position, thematically as well as temporally, between Athena as she is presented in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* and Athens as presented by Thucydides in the Mytilinean Debate and the Melian Dialogue (both of which likely written at least after the Sicilian expedition if not war had ended). Ajax himself holds the position of ally, and is then aligned with Orestes as well as with the Erinyes.

Athena, Ajax and Empire

What it means to be Athens's ally changed between the founding of the Delian League and the time of the Peloponnesian War. While at first an alliance meant to be a nominally equal partner in the enterprise against Persia, it came to mean something more akin to submission, becoming a subject. Ajax, as an ally of the Atreidae, is expected to submit to their will, as would an inferior. Ajax, as a mortal, is also expected to submit to the will of the gods, and Athena represents that will. Or, does she? The audience is never really given a clear understanding of what that will is or whence it is directed. At *Eumenides* 796, Athena clearly states that the submission of the Erinyes to her decision is the will of Zeus. As *Ajax* opens, however, we know only what Athena tell us. She has made Ajax mad with no apparent antagonism toward him.[65] Though she claims to be teaching a lesson that the gods love the moderate, her actions suggest that the god can change a moderate man to a hubristic one at will. What kind of moral does that offer?

It has been said that Athena is working to benefit the Atreidae and Odysseus, and so she must thwart Ajax's attempted murder. However, it can (and has) also been argued that Athena gives no clear statement that she is working for their benefit unless we accept Calchas' prophecy relayed at *Aj.*746 as a resolution.[66] Athena and Ajax, in the everyday life of the Athenians, were allies—more than allies. Even within Sophocles' play they are connected as Athenians. Because of this, we must read Ajax's downfall as more than the mistreatment of an ally. It is the destruction of something particularly Athenian as well.

Ajax's downfall is, in many ways, the downfall of a generation's ideal. Through his relationship to both the allies and to the Salaminian heroes of Athens' past, Ajax represents an era in Athenian history when bravery and freedom came before safety and moderation. In the new world of the empire, such bravery is self-destructive, and survival means playing it safe by submitting to the stronger. Although Ajax thinks he is an ally of the goddess Athena, he and Athena have different ideas of what an ally is. He is working under the assumption that she and he fight together as equal partners. Just as the allies of the Persian Wars and the early years of the Delian League signed on for a partnership with a more powerful friend, and ended up subjects in an empire, so too Ajax went to Troy, a sworn ally, not bondsman of the Atreidae, only to find himself subject (in death) to their whims. Ajax is the brave warrior who thinks he contends with an equal, only to find himself conceived of by others as the lesser man, forced to submit to his superiors (Thuc. 5.101). The man who once provided the Greeks with safety is now being asked to beg for it. The bulwark of the Achaeans is now their slave.

By putting these two patrons of Athens on stage in conflict, Sophocles opened up a safe space in which his audience could consider different attitudes toward power at different periods in Athens' history. Athena's sentiments as expressed in the prologue of *Ajax* are more like those of the Athenians in the Melian Dialogue than they are like the lofty sentiments of Aeschylus' Athena. Sophocles' Athena still espouses the same general sentiments (moderation, justice), but does so in a language that is more akin to the hard-core *realpolitik* of the *archê* than the ideals of the Delian League. Ajax as connected with Athens' heroic past, both in the text and in Athenian civic mythology, serves as a counterpoint of justice and moderation. Athena's mockery and shaming of Ajax suggest that in the world of the *archê*, such heroic ideals have no place. Athena/Athens is no longer the savior of Greece, freeing it from the threat of a (Persian) tyrant. She has become its oppressor and a tyrant in her own right. Ultimately, the ideals upon which Athens based its power had become corrupted by the exercise of that power.

NOTES

1 Most scholars have dated the play based on metrical and stylistic arguments. In the case of Sophocles (unlike Euripides), it is too difficult to date on meter given the lack of extant plays to work with. In terms of stylistics, style is always a subjective criterion that depends very much on the taste of the scholar and what the scholar considers an appropriate development in the style of an author. But what one person calls an archaic or undeveloped style could, in fact, be a revolutionary style or a first attempt in a new direction for that author. The tone or mood of the play, however, can be a more accurate reflection of the context within which a play was written and produced. Style and meter can be experimental or intentionally archaicizing. Mood (or, ideology) is something that can infect a play divorced from authorial intent. What is intentional, though, on the part of Sophocles, was the decision to present Athena at the beginning of this play in a manner that diverges so greatly from other Athenian representation of her and thus set the tone for all that follows.

2 Paula Denbnar, "Fifth-Century Athenian History and Tragedy" in Gregory, 5, says of *Ajax*: "Sophocles' Menelaus and Agamemnon, with their meanness and flawed rhetoric, have more in common with what we know of politicians of the second half of the fifth century than with characters in epic or, for that matter, in any of Aeschylus' extant dramas." What she really seems to be saying is "after the death of Pericles" but the traditional dating of *Ajax* almost compels her to label it as the second half of the fifth century.

3 Athena in *Ajax* is often labeled "Homeric" and then evaluated within this context. For the "Homeric" nature of Sophocles' Athena see Papadopoulou, 306 and Mary Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 60–8. For a conception of what they mean by "Homeric," see Jenny Strauss Clay, *The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the Odyssey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Blundell and Bernard Knox, "The Ajax of Sophocles" in *Sophocles: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Thomas Woodard (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1966), 28–61,

apply the Homeric ethos "help friends, harm enemies" to explain her behavior. For Blundell, "[h]elp Friends/Harm Enemies expects and justifies...such gloating pleasure in an enemy's misfortune, and this aspect is particularly prominent in *Ajax*" (62). Stuart Lawrence, "Ancient Ethics, the Heroic Code and the Morality of Sophocles' *Ajax*," *G&R* 52 (2005): 20, considers the "harm enemies" mentailty to be anti-social and flawed in its focus on honor and self-image. See as well, Graham Zanker, "Sophocles' *Ajax* and the Heroic Values of the *Iliad*," *CQ* 42 (1992): 20–5; and Christina Sorum, "Sophocles' Ajax in Context," *CW* 79 (1986): 361–77.

4 Elton Barker, "The fall-out from dissent: hero and audience in Sophocles' *Ajax*." *G&R* 51 (2004): 5–8, for instance, re-reads of the opening scene of *Ajax* through *Iliad* I. Her role is to deflect the dissent of Ajax much as she deflected that of Achilles when she grabbed his hair and prevented him from unsheathing his sword against Agamemnon. Her treatment of Ajax is "staging" a tragic crisis in order pave the way for reintegrating him into society as Zeus' turning the tide against the Achaeans does for Achilles: "She sets up the action on stage and invites Odysseus, and us, to draw a particular (simplistic) lesson....In her absence from the rest of the play, the human characters on stage must work out and work through the crisis she staged. If the characters end up with the establishment of ritual that is because of, not in spite of, her role" (18). This is in keeping with to scholars like Charles Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization: an Interpretation of Sophocles* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), who turn to Odysseus and his "secular humanism" or who view the gods as distant in general and the play a method of dealing with divine amorality and ambiguity. As Papadopoulou writes, Athena behaves, "in accord with the often 'elusive' divine presence in Greek Tragedy" (310). An elusive interpretation, to say the least.

5 See especially, James Tyler, "Sophocles' Ajax and Sophoclean plot construction," *AJPh* 95 (1974): 26.

6 Malcolm Heath and Eleanor O'Kell, "Sophocles' *Ajax*: Expect the Unexpected," *CQ* 57 (2007): 363–80.

7 Whitman, 66

8 Whitman, 67.

9 For A.J. Podlecki, "Ajax's Gods and the Gods of Sophocles" *L' Antiquite Classique* 49 (1980), 55, as well as for me, the so-called crimes of Ajax are not at issue here. T. Papadopoulou is also troubled by Athena's behavior, but her problem is more with the fact that Athena has imposed madness on Ajax. This runs contrary, Papadopoulou suggests, to her Homeric role of preventing violent rage and madness (*Il.* 1.194ff; 15.121ff).

10 See J.T. Sheppard, *The Wisdom of Sophocles* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1947), 20–9; M. Blundell, 61 n.6; R.C. Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays and Fragments: Part VII, The Ajax* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1896); G. Grossman, "Das Lachen des *Ajax*" *MH* 25 (1968) 65–85; C.M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944), 11–2, 27–8; G. M. Kirkwood, *A Study of Sophoclean Drama* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), 274; H.D.F. Kitto, *Form and Meaning in Drama* (London: Methuen, 1956), 179–98; Albin Lesky, *Greek Tragedy* (London: Ernest Benn, 1967), 99; W.B. Stanford, *Sophocles: Ajax* (London: McMillan, 1963), xxvi; and T.B.L. Webster, *Sophocles*, 65. Knox also sees Athena's epiphany as impressing a moral upon the audience, but the moral is time—namely, the difference between mortality (Ajax) and immortality (Athena): "[i]t is significant that the *Ajax*, contrary to Sophoclean

practice as known from the extant plays, brings an Olympian god on stage..." ("Ajax," 2) Garvie opposes the moralizing view, stating that the previous arguments for such a reading are insufficient and do not take the entire picture into account (12–4).

11 Reading the play under the overriding principle of *hubris* versus *sophrosunê* allows scholars to see her actions as strategic and, along with suggesting an unbridgeable gap between human and god, allows them to downplay the cruelty of what she does to Ajax. Blundell sees her gloating as expected and justified and suggests that to call her cruel is nonsensical (65). Others acknowledge the cruelty but see it as part of her justice. It is the justice of a god and therefore a justifiable justice no matter what form it takes: "we must remember that for Sophocles and his contemporaries, gods and men were not judged by the same standards" (Knox "Ajax," 36). If anyone was at fault, it was Ajax, because he gave Athena cause to exact such a cruel justice by deigning to behave as a god himself (Knox "Ajax," 38).

12 For the "rehabilitation" of Ajax's character, see especially Knox, "Ajax," 56; David Cohen, "The Imagery of Sophocles: A Study of Ajax's Suicide" *G&R* 25 (1978): 24–36; Debnar, 12. For an opposing view, see Vincent Rosivach, "Sophocles' *Ajax*" *CJ* 71 (1976): 47–61.

13 H.R. Butts, *The Glorification of Athens in Greek Drama* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944), 85.

14 In the Prometheus trilogy, she seems to have been the conciliator between Zeus and Prometheus, a role in keeping with her other appearances in Aeschylean tragedy.

15 In the *Iliad* (1.194ff; 15.121ff), she prevents madness and unnecessary violence, not encourages it. In the *Odyssey* (22.210–40, 255, and 297–98), she helps Odysseus avenge himself on the suitors, but in a less direct method than in *Ajax*. Furthermore, as the *Odyssey* shows, even justifiable revenge necessitated some sort of legal reconciliation in order to bring stability and peace to Ithaca (24.472–548). Despite the galling behavior of the suitors, Odysseus must seek a legal solution and give recompense to the families whose sons he killed.

16 *Odyssey* 11.541–51 says that the award was granted by the "children of the Trojans and Pallas Athena." According to the *Little Iliad*, the award was granted after overhearing two Trojan captives argue over who was the bravest warrior. The women who chooses Odysseus was apparently inspired by Athena (Schol. Ar. *Eq.* 1056a).

17 The closest we come to madness is a reference in *The Sack of Ilium* to "Ajax's flashing eyes and clouded mind when he was enraged" (Schol. (T) *Il.* 11.515). Holt points out that scholars assume the story of Ajax's delusion and rampage come from the *Little Iliad*, but no one knows for certain (27).

18 As Tyler, 28–29, I.M. Linforth, *Three Scenes in Sophocles' Ajax* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 3, and Kirkwood (275) conclude, Athena apparently shows no special interest in Odysseus and is punishing Ajax for his own sake.

19 See Pietro Pucci, "Gods' Intervention and Epiphany in Sophocles," *AJPh* 115 (1994): 19–20, for a summation of arguments on Athena's visibility to Odysseus. The bigger question, though, is whether she is visible to Ajax. Pucci does not speculate but seems to assume she is not.

20 In fact, Tyler goes so far as to suggest that the enmity between Ajax and Odysseus and the Atreidae has neither real bearing on the plot of *Ajax* nor is it a motivating factor in Athena's punishment. They "are necessary to the story only because Ajax' desire to kill them provided Athena with the opportunity to frustrate him" (32).

[21] Athena's questions suggest that the audience would not have been familiar with a myth containing the slaughter of the cattle by a mad Ajax. She asks Ajax first whether he had sufficiently blooded his sword (ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό μοι φράσον, ἐβαψας ἔγχος εὖ πρὸς Ἀργείων στρατῶι, 94–5). Then she asks what he has done with both the Atreidae and Odysseus (ἦ καὶ πρὸς Ἀτρείδαισιν ἴιχμασας χέρα; 97 and τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτδου; ποῦ σοι τύχης ἔστηκεν; ἦ πέφευγέ σε, 101–2). If the version of the myth presented by Sophocles was new, this exchange could be to tell the audience exactly what happened as well as to show them something of Athena's character.

[22] Mary Moore, "Exekias and Telemonian Ajax." *AJA* 84 (1980): 417–34, argues that before Exekias, there were very few representations of Ajax on vase paintings at all but that Exekias changed that and was influenced, in no small part, beause he was a Salaminian, and therefore favored the pseudo-Athenian hero. After Exekias made a series of scenes famous, they begin appearing as a more regular part of painted pattery such as the scene of Ajax fighting over Achilles' introduced first by Exekias and then found in a sketch of a lost Chalcidian Amphora ca. 540 BC (*LIMC* Achilleus 850) among others.

[23] Eurysakes supposedly handed over rule of Salamis to Athens. The addition of Ajax to the pantheon of *eponymoi* seems to be an attempt to reach back beyond Eurysakes and set up a Trojan War source for control of Salamis. This is a similar phenomenon as the mention in *Eumenides* to Athena receiving land in the Troad for the deed of the sons of Theseus in the war.

[24] On the relationship between *Ajax* and hero-cult in Athens, see Jon Hesk, *Sophocles: Ajax* (London: Duckworth, 2003), *passim.*

[25] Brian Lavelle, *Fame, Money, and Power: The Rise of Peisistratos and "Democratic" Tyranny at Athens* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004), 30–51.

[26] 217210, Bologna, Museo Civico Archeologico, Pu273. The image can be found at the Beazley archive (or *CVA*: Bologna, Museo Civico 1, III.I.C.8,III.I.C.10,PLS. (216, 217, 218, 219) 19.1-2. 20.1-2, 21.1-2, 22.1-2. I was unable to obtain a copy for this book.

[27] There is also supposedly even a myth in which Ajax is Theseus' bastard son but I have not been able to find a source.

[28] Homeric setting does not equal Homeric characterization, values and concerns. On tragedy as the assimilation of ancient myths to contemporary society, see D. Boedeker.

[29] M.C. Taylor, *Salamis and the Salaminioi: The History of an Unofficial Athenian Dêmos* (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1997), 21–24.

[30] Taylor, 104–5.

[31] W.S. Ferguson, "The Salaminioi of Heptaphylai and Sounion," *Hesperia* 7 (1938): 42.

[32] Rose, *Sons*, 69–71.

[33] According to the catalogue of ships (*Il.* 2.557–58), the Salaminians under Ajax were positioned next to the Athenians at Troy. This emphasizes the closeness of the two groups and suggests that the audience would have recalled this in the staging as Teucer enters and exits from the direction of the friendly Athenian encampment (Heath and O'Kell, 365 and 375).

[34] Ajax was tied to Athens not only as an eponymous ancestor but is also linked to the autochthon Erechtheus. The audience is also reminded, at line 645 that Ajax has become in Athenian genealogy a descendant of Aeacus (Αἰακιδῆς)—a possible attempt to assert mythic claims to Aegina which had been forced to submit to Athens prior to the Peloponnesian War and whose independence Sparta insisted upon in their ultimatum (Thuc. 1.139.1).

[35] Knox suggests that Ajax is "unsuited to democracy" ("Ajax," 56). See also Cohen, "Ajax," 24–36; P. Holt, "Ajax' Ailment" *Ramus* 9 (1980): 22–33; Rosivach "Ajax," 47–49; and Lawrence, 25-26.

[36] Lawrence, 24-30, especially.

[37] Ajax was also associated with hoplite ideals. Pindar's praise of him at Odysseus' expense smacks of aristocratic coloring and Marathon was a hoplite/aristocratic victory.

[38] Athenian imperialism predates the Persian Wars as the conflicts with Megara suggest. The Persian Wars is the immediate catalyst for the ecpanded empire.

[39] This is as least the case with islands like Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, and perhaps other large *poleis*. (T.J Quinn, *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 478–404BC.* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981).

[40] When Thucydides speaks of the allies, he considers them two groups, the *summachoi* (allies) and the *hupêkoroi* (subject-allies). The former may denote those who physically fight alongside of the Athenians in their own ships, while the latter may refer to those who sent tribute instead.

[41] Knox, "Ajax," 38.

[42] Of course, it could be (and has been) argued that his attempt to kill the Atreidae and Odysseus was a crime in and of itself, and that Athena saved him by diverting his mind, thus acting as his *summachos*. But Ajax' shame from his point of view was not attacking the Atreidae. Ajax's shame was his failure to achieve revenge, and the form this failure took, madness. Lawrence, by focusing on morality as defined by later philosophers, comes to the conclusion that Ajax's virtue is flawed because it focuses on courage above all other virtues and because it is blind to the dangers such a code poses to the society which a hero is supposed to protect.

[43] Ajax's inclusion in the embassy to Achilles suggests that he must have been considered reasonable. Also, recall that it was Ajax's speech to Achilles that was the most persuasive and most capable of penetrating Achilles' wrath. See also, Blundell, 93–94; and Helen North, *Sôphrosynê* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

[44] The picture Athena paints of him prior to his madness runs contrary to Calchas' words. It is as if Calchas is speaking more to soothe the Atreidae and justify their (and Athena's) actions than explain Ajax's.

[45] See especially Hdt. 7.35 where Xerxes orders the Hellespont whipped for destroying his bridge. In *Persians* as well there is an emphasis on the spear-bearer as innately "Greek" and "free" and the archer as slavish. See especially Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 85–86.

[46] There is also affinity between the positions of Athena and Menelaus and the positions debated in the Mytlinean Debate. The objections raised by Cleon to a democracy's ability to run an empire speak directly to the conflict between Ajax and others in the play The expediency of Diodotus finds its reflection in the attempts of Odysseus to mediate between the two parties and serves as a justification by Odysseus of the actions of Athena and the Atreidae.

[47] Garvie, A.F. *Sophocles: Ajax* (Warminster: David Brown Press, 1998), 11-17; David Rosenbloom, "Ajax is *Megas*. Is that all we can say?" *Prudentia* 33 (2001): 109-30 (Review of Garvie).

[48] See Lawrence for a discussion of the application of Aristotolean ethics to Ajax.

[49] Barker, *Agon*, 284–90.

[50] North, 51 asserts that Ajax was hubristic "long before he is made mad." There is no evidence for this except within the rhetoric of the play itself.

[51] See David Cairns, "Hybris, Dishonour and Big Thinking," *JHS* 116 (1996): 11-13.

[52] Michael Davis, "Politics and Madness," in *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, ed. J. Peter Euben (Berekley: University of California Press, 1986), 146, has pointed out that part of Ajax's madness is his inability to distinguish between human and not human. Just as the herd which Ajax slaughters appears human to Ajax, the goddess, when she appears, also seems human. His world is entirely mortal thus entirely purposeful and intentional. We must not forget, however, that Athena made it this way.

[53] The position of the leader *vis a vis* the people is a common theme in Sophocles' plays occurring as well in *Antigone* and *Oedipus Tyrannos*.

[54] Achilles' withdrawal of his troops in the *Iliad* makes it quite clear that they fought only under Achilles (or Patroclus), not Agamemnon or Menelaus.

[55] Rose, *Sons*, 67.

[56] Translations for the Melian Dialogue have been adapted from Crawley.

[57] At 3.46, Diodotus suggests that the Athenians should be moderate in their punishment—perhaps something Athena and Menelaus should have considered as well.

[58] In this way, Ajax's notion of justice aligns more with Cleon's while Athena falls somewhere in between Cleon and Diodotus—the pursuit of advantage without moderation.

[59] This word is associated in the *Ajax* with Ajax as well as with Athens in *Persians*. He is the defense/bulwark of the Greek army.

[60] June Allison, *Word and Concept in Thucydides* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 54–61.

[61] Ajax's speech directly preceding his suicide (644–92) demonstrates his desire to die rather than to live in disgrace for the cowardly act men will say he has committed. Suicide is the alternative to disgrace. Compare the suggestion of the Athenians that the Melians not be too concerned with the idea of being disgraced (Thuc. 5.111–13).

[62] Meier, 184–85.

[63] Meier, 184.

[64] North suggests that the actions of Athena prior to her speech at 127–33 are designed to demonstrate Odysseus' moderation, as opposed to Ajax's arrogance. Because he refuses her invitation to gloat over Ajax, he is a model of moderation (59).

[65] This act could also be perceived as dis-aligning Athena of *Ajax* with Athena of *Eumenides* and aligning her with the Erinyes. For it is their task to avenge blood and to drive mad the murderer. Athena's preemptive strike on Ajax removes their necessity, but still results in the same thing, madness.

[66] Tyler, 24–42.

•CHAPTER SIX•

Conclusion

Athena, Tragedy and the Empire

Living as a political community is not a natural act. Living in a democracy is even less so.[1] There was no idea in Greece, not even in democratic Athens, that all people were inherently free, not even all men or all Greeks. But the Athenian democracy was established on the principle that all Athenians citizens were free and even equal in the eyes of the law. Thus, the courts became one of the most prized institutions of the democracy and their justice the great equalizer between aristocrat and *dêmos*. In order to do so, however, all citizens must have believed that this was possible and such belief could only be engendered by convincing individuals that the good of the polis was paramount. They had to believe that all glory and influence and authority flowed from the polis and that what benefited their fellow citizens also benefited them. This attitude was engendered most easily through public art—through the constant and subtle representations in myth, sculpture, painting, oratory, coinage, and poetry that convinced the Athenians that they were a unified people. These arts appealed to what Herodotus' Athenians cite as the fundamental components of an *ethnos*—shared language, religion and *nomoi* (Hdt. 8.144). It is the arts that convinced the Athenians that they *should* listen in assembly to their fellow citizen, regardless of socio-economic status, because he had equal right and ability to be in that assembly.

In this way, public art served to give the Athenian polis its unity more than the political institutions of the city, because the arts persuade the unconscious mind of the citizen that their political institutions, like the courts,

were a part of the city's essential being. They were necessary and appropriate. Perhaps this is why Plato wished to banish some of the arts from his utopian republic. The arts are an intimate part of the identity formation process of a people, and tragedy in Athens was no exception. In fact, tragedy was likely one of the most important contributors to Athenian political identity. Sometimes a tragedy could problematize identity, as Goldhill suggests. At other times, tragedy served to strengthen a particular identity. Oftentimes, it could do both, though in a way that was almost undetectable. The figure of Athena, as she appears in tragedy, could function in this way. Her centrality and status as a unifying figure in Athenian daily life was reinforced by her great temple on the hill, her many statues throughout the *agora,* and the myths that were told and retold at festivals held in her honor or represented on the pots citizens used each day. The power of her presence and representation could sway an audience in a way that no single speech in the assembly could. If a woman dressed as Athena could, without speaking, persuade the Athenian people to return Peisistratus to the city (Hdt. 1.60),[2] how powerful must the invocation of her image have been on the tragic stage?

In his landmark work, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus*, Paul Zanker writes, "Art and architecture are mirrors of society. They reflect the state of its values, especially in time of crisis or transition".[3] Tragedy is no different, and when the symbolic world of art and architecture intersects with tragedy, its importance as a looking glass into the polis that created it becomes more evident. As a public performance art in Athens, more than in Augustan Rome, tragedy and the theater served to promote certain communal identity markers and subsume others. In imperial Rome, the theater functioned as a dialogue of sorts between the *princeps* and the common people, where they responded to his appearance with applause as he showed how he shared their delights. It also served to reinforce social stratification in a way that supported Augustus' authority and the authority of the monarchy he had established. In Athens, however, the formation of this collective identity was not structured from the top down but as communal and contested. The theater was a space where social stratification was, in the physical space, temporarily put aside, and where the dialogue was between fellow citizens or between citizen and non-citizen and performed in the plays themselves, as opposed to the show of the monarch's entrance and exit. Instead, the entrances and exits that mattered were those of the great figures of myth: heroes like Ajax and Theseus, and gods like Athena.

The continuity or discontinuities between the way these mythic heroes were represented in sculptures and paintings on the Parthenon, or Theseion, or Stoa Poikile, and how they appeared in tragedy can be explained simplistically as the differences in media. The figures of painting and sculpture were

static and so their symbolic power was fixed. In tragedy, the statues and sculptures came to life and had personalities or, at least, reflected certain specific characteristics attributed to them in their stories. As a result, clearly, the images of the heroes and gods would deviate from the more static material arts. But to eschew this simplistic understanding of myth is precisely the point of this study in some ways. Tragedy should be counted among the public, visual arts of Classical Athens, and the characteristics of the important gods and heroes should be understood within the climate that produced those works as well. Seeing Athena on stage in *Ajax* or *Ion* would be like seeing the Athena Promachos or Parthenos walk down from the Acropolis to join her fellow citizens in the experience of the theater. This feeling would be reinforced all the more when she spoke and her words reaffirmed, as they do in *Eumenides*, *Ion, Suppliants* and *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, firmly held beliefs by the Athenians on the centrality of their city and goddess not only in the myths of the House of Atreus but as the arbitrators of mythic and real justice.

Does this affirmation process change when the representation of Athena is not aligned with the "official" representations as in *Ajax*? No, and this is the remarkable thing about tragedy. Because it is alive and fluid, tragedy, unlike other public works of art, can function to interrogate those representational norms. The representation of the patron goddess is no exception. When Athena appears in the *theologeion*, as in the plays of Euripides, she still appears as a statue—a living statue come to pronounce certain truths to the characters in the play and the audience alike. When she appears in the orchestra, as she likely does in *Ajax*, we see Athena brought down to the level of heroes and men, and her character suffers the same pitfalls of arrogance and cruelty as theirs. But this fluidity in representation does not negate the symbolic norms. If Athena is different in one representation, we shouldn't dismiss the idea of her symbolic status as representative of the city and its institutions. Instead, we should ask how the understanding of those institutions themselves has been altered. If Athena is elsewhere represented as a goddess who delivers and guarantees true justice, can we simply dismiss a single representation in which the justice she offers is crooked as outside of that mode? Or is Athena's justice crooked in representation because the justice she represents and symbolizes has become crooked or corrupted?

As the fifth century wore on and the Athenians moved from being both leaders of a military hegemony and proud holders of an innovative and radical government, to being a polis in an almost constant state of war and also threatened at times with serious civil strife, it seems inevitable that their cultural artifacts would reflect this transformation. When Aeschylus' *Eumenides* was produced, Athens was in the midst of a minor conflict with Sparta (the

so-called First Peloponnesian War), about to engage Persia in Egypt, newly allied with Sparta's long-time enemy, Argos, and riding high on a series of victories at Aegina, Halieis and Megara. The confidence they developed from almost two decades of continuous victories showed not only in the increasing authority they wielded over their allies but also in their public arts, including buildings in the Agora and tragedies like Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. It happened that this victorious streak coincided with a radicalization of their democracy of which the courts were a fundamental component and for which Athena was increasingly the symbol.

In the case of Athena and her justice, *Eumenides* and *Ajax Locrus* reflect a pride in the Athenians' legal system that bordered on chauvinism. This chauvinism contributed to the Athenians turning this particular institution into a key aspect of their democratic identity. In Athens, as Athena tells us in *Eumenides*, there was found a justice (and *eunomia*) unlike any other. Athena, their goddess, was the fount of justice—not only for the Athenians at home, but also for any other Greeks who were in need of straight judgments. In order to help those others and grant them access to this uniquely true justice, Athens exported its courts, and so its justice to the allies whether they felt they needed it or not.

The process by which Athens used the courts to control its allies tainted the justice they purported to provide. In *Eumenides*, the courts stood for the good of the community and the individual alike, replacing revenge with reasoned judgment. This surety is called into question, and then reaffirmed, in *Iphigenia among the Taurians* when, despite the judgment by Athena and the Athenian jury in his favor, Orestes must still complete another penance before all of the Furies spare him their savage justice. Once, Athena's word was final. Decades later, it was uncertain, incomplete and, on the whole, less persuasive. This uncertainty was a result of real policies that Athens pursued, and which the allies considered more and more harsh. Although Orestes and Ajax Locrus received a fair day in court, in 438 BC the island of Samos did not, and Mytilene barely survived its encounter with Athenian justice in the aftermath of its revolt in 428/7 BC.

Sophocles' *Ajax*, produced in this later period (we argue), most clearly reflects the taint of imperial power upon the justice of Athena and Athens. In *Eumenides*, Athena's court and verdict function as a renunciation of the heroic axiom of "help friends, harm enemies" and the archaic and aristocratic process of blood feud. And yet, it is with these very instruments of justice that Athena punishes Ajax—though his crime is itself unclear, as is her position as his enemy. In an Athenian context, Athena and Ajax were not just allies but members of the same family. The justice of Athena and Athens, once so straight and true, once the envy of all the Greeks (so Aeschylus

would have it), to which even gods would submit, had now turned against its own in a most cruel way. Athenian justice, if it became too bloated with its own power, if it forgot its purpose and ideals, would turn on and consume its own in the same way as Athena, forgetting her allegiance to Athens, aligned herself with Menelaus and Agamemnon against her fellow Athenian, Ajax.

Over time, we can see a definite shift in the plays from a security in the image of Athens as the seat of true, court-based justice in *Eumenides* and *Ajax Locrus*, to a disturbing probe of the of the corrupting influence of imperial rule on Athenian institutions during the early years of the Peloponnesian War in *Ajax*, to a sometimes cautious, and other times brazen, attempt to reassert the purity of Athenian justice in years of uncertainty in a series of plays by Euripides between 424 and 410 BC. The latter plays reflect, in their attempts to reaffirm Athenian justice as a pan-Ionian and welcome value, an anxiety about Athenian claims to preeminence in the realm of justice, while Sophocles' head-on look at the corrupting influence of power on even the most just of gods still inhabits a world where Athens was secure in her power—perhaps too secure. In all instances, though, the focus remains on justice and on Athens' role, via its goddess, in arbitrating it. What changes is not Athens' role as arbitrator of justice, but how that justice is dispensed. The corrupting factor—the thing that shifts the image of Athena from the serene, even-handed goddess of Aeschylus to the vindictive one of *Ajax* and then, at last, to the stern and rather forceful arbiter of Euripides' plays—is the relationship represented between justice and power.

In the years following the end of the Persian Wars and the creation of the Delian League, the Greek world was opened up to the possibilities that power had to offer like never before. While Archilochus' Charon could gaze upon the wealth of Gyges and look away (Arch. 22), the Greeks of the fifth century seemed unable to turn their eyes from Xerxes and Persia. Having been drawn into international affairs with the Persian Wars, and having seen what a powerful navy could do in the Aegean, the Athenians set about building a mini-Persia of their own and, despite attempts by members of the Delian League to leave the alliance, the Athenians seemed able to contain these attempts and reassert control through treaties after only unremarkable military intervention.[4] One of the primary mechanisms of strengthening control was the expansion of Athenian jurisdiction.[5] After 440 BC and especially in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, however, this changed, and the tenor of Athenian hegemony, as well as the tenor of Greek interstate warfare itself, seems also to have changed irrevocably. The revolt of the island of Samos, favored among the Athenian allies, and the harsh fight to suppress it led to even harsher penalties than an expansion of Athenian legal jurisdiction. Instead, the women and children of Samos were sold into foreign sla-

very and the men of military age put to death. It appears that justice as reasoned judgment had once again reverted to vengeance.

Athens' justice as represented in paintings like the *Ilioupersis* and plays like *Eumenides* and A*jax Locrus* was above and beyond that of other poleis. Athens stood above the fray and could use the courts, instead of its navy, to contain violence in her allied cities. It was divinely sanctioned, even-handed justice. In *Ajax*, however, that justice becomes fully human, just as Athena herself comes down from the heights of the stage to stand on the level of Odysseus and the Atreidae. Athena's justice is then more akin to what Cleon offers the Mytilineans in 425BC. Just as Ajax supposedly spurns Athena's offer of favor, so too Mytilene (like Samos before) spurns Athens' offer of favored status and prefers autonomy to the status of favored ally of Athens. Just as Athena sought to drive Ajax to his shame and death, so, too, Cleon and the Athenians sought to destroy Mytilene. That favor was offered and rejected factors into whether such a punishment is just or not more than some abstract principle of justice as detached and reasoned. The justice of Athena in *Ajax* reflects an arrogance that comes from the uncontested (or perhaps, in the case of Athens, contested but proven) wielding of power. As such, we see an Athens no longer needing to claim an idealized superiority through divinely sanctioned law courts. Instead, the fact of power is enough to enforce any type of justice—even if it contradicts the ideals upon which rested the authority of the city among its allies.

Ajax seems to have served as a warning shot across the Athenian bow, one that was borne out as necessary only a few years later when Athens suffered a major defeat following on the heels of a hard fought revolt from a major ally. Following the defeat at Delium, and the refusal of Thebes to allow the Athenians to bury their dead, we see a shift in the representation of Athena from *Ajax* to *Suppliants*. In the appearances of Athena that follow, we see a return to a more detached Athena, one less bloated by power, but one that still exudes authority. The appearances of Athena again, as in *Eumenides*, come in plays that tout Athens' ability to unite Greeks under its leadership and fix seemingly unfixable problems. But this touting of Athenian wherewithal is underscored, also, by an appeal to a pan-Ionian ideal that lacks the clear chauvinism of Aeschylus' play. Indeed, while many scholars consider *Ion* and *Suppliants* "patriotic" plays, the patriotism of those plays is much different from that of *Eumenides* or, say, *Persians*, for embedded within the praise of Athens is recognition of Athens' flaws.

Perhaps in response to the overwhelming communalism of Aeschylus, and perhaps as a result of Sophocles' dramatization of the struggle between individual and community, Euripides staged his plays in ways that are simultaneously aware of this struggle and also conciliatory. While Aeschylus

could confidently assert Athenian superiority and Sophocles could (not so) subtlety question the use of power that results from such superiority, Euripides sought to persuade others that, despite certain abuses of power, Athens was worthy of its power and could wield it to the betterment of all Greeks. It was an idea that never really went away until the conquest by Alexander. Athens was a city that others turned to as a leader, in no small part because of the effective job it did in promoting an image of having strong and divinely-sanctioned leadership qualities. Because Athens was so closely identified with its goddess and the ideals she promoted, it remained the place to which smaller poleis turned when they needed protection.

And this brings us back to Athena. She was the heart of the city, its spirit, its representative and symbol. In many ways, Athena was the city itself. So, when the city began to change, Athena, too, changed. The dynamic of the fifth century in Athens was a powerful combination of a community identity rooted in abstract principles and an unusual constitution, coupled with military power given free rein under pretext of the threat of foreign attack and embodied in their namesake goddess who stood for skill in war, politics and the arts. It was a perfect case of city and patron melding their identities completely. Or, rather, it was a case of city perfectly melding itself to the image of its patron. So close was the identification that when the ideals upon which the city was governed and which the goddess supposedly supported became corrupted through the exercise of power, the goddess herself, her image, became corrupted as well.[6]

NOTES

1 The premise of G. Anderson's *The Athenian Experiement* is that the decomcratic identity that moved Athens from a small, unimportant *polis* in 510 BC to a militarily significant, democratic state by 490 BC could not have been a result of a spontaneous popular uprising as Josiah Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), suggests. Instead, the democracy emerged as part of a coordinated effort on the part of a group of elites who both sought a way to resolve socio-economic tensions by opening up political participation to a larger segment of the population and by disguising such changes as a return to traditional Athenian institutions that had been interupted by the reign of the Peisistratids. In other words, to think that the Athenians had always been free and equal and democratic is to believe absolutely the myth-making of the creators of Athens' democracy. I believe Anderson is correct.

2 The fact that Phye dressed as Athena could have, in fact, roused to Athenians to accept the tyranny of Peisistratus has troubled not a few scholars and even Herodotus himself. But I find it very difficult to believe that the Athenians were "fooled" by the episode more than they really appreciated the bravado of it. It is important for us to remember that most of our sources from ancient Athens are aristocratic and most were hostile to the Peisistratids and populist leaders of the fifth century. To call the Athenians fools smacks of aristocratic bias whereas, in truth, the commons likely would have welcomed

Peisistratus back with or without his costumed escort. Having a pseudo-Athena bring him back simply emphasized his populism. Greg Anderson (66–72) has, actually, made a very plausible argument that Peiesistratus was symbolically escorting *Athena* back to the Acropolis as opposed to the way Herodotus represents it. He also suggests that this was *not* an instance of Peisistratus regaining a lost tyranny but him returning to support the elder Megacles in his dispute with Lycurgus. I find his argument compelling.

3 Paul Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 148–53.

4 Robert Parker, "Introduction," in eds. J. M et al, 5; and K. Raaflaub, "Learning from the Enemy: Athenian and Persian 'Instruments of Empire,'" in Ma et al, 67–124. See also Margaret Miller, *Athens and Persia in the Fifth Century BC: A Study in Cultural Receptivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

5 Kennedy, *passim*.

6 It is interesting to me that in the Classical period, there is no evidence of myths in which Athena shares the characteristics of most of the other gods. She is, with the exception of her appearance in *Ajax*, not vindictive nor does she target humans capriciously. After the Classical period, like every other god, we see myths of such petty acts as turning Medusa into a gorgon or turning Arachne into a spider. It is as if the image of a just and detached Athena was so embedded in tradition that so long as Athens was strong, stories of a cruel or unjust Athena failed to gain currency.

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Athena is recognized as an allegory or representative of Athens in most Athenian public art except in tragedy. Perhaps this is because tragedy is rarely studied as a public art form or, perhaps, because her character is not static in tragedy. Although Athena's characterization changes to fit the needs of a particular drama, her clear connection with justice remains true throughout and suggests that she is always the representative of the city and its institutions. Athens, the city Athena protected, experienced a dramatic transformation in the fifth century: its political institutions, physical landscape, military power and international prestige underwent dynamic change. Athena, its goddess and its symbol, simultaneously transformed as well, although not always for the better.

Athena's Justice follows the question of civic identity and ideology in Athenian tragedy, focusing specifically on the link between tragedy and its influence upon identity creation and promotion during the period when Athens was asserting itself as an imperial power. Through examination of tragedies in which Athena appears, this book traces the process by which Athens came to identify itself with its legal system, symbolized by Athena on stage, and then suffered the corruption of that system by the exercise of imperial power. *Athena's Justice* is essential reading not just for classicists and ancient historians, but for anyone interested in the interaction between art and politics and the process by which human beings in any period seek to shape their identity as a people.

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ISBN 978-1-4331-0454-1

9 781433 104541